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Participation is a notion found frequently in contemporary (especially 
ecumenical) theology and while some attention has been given to the notion in 
terms of its scriptural grounding in terms such as koinonia, little work has been 
done recently on the theological and historical development of the concept in 
the Christian tradition. Because the term predates Christian theology in a 
philosophically significant way, discussion has often turned on the issue of how 
far the term has been applied appropriately to the Christian context, what 
degree of originality the term carries within the context of Christian doctrine and 
what dangers there are in reverting to its usages in Classical philosophy. This 
thesis seeks to move this discussion on, tracing the development of the notion 
of 'participation' from Plato to the present-day, not by way of an exhaustive 
historical survey, but by way of particular theologians whose (not always fully 
conscious) use of the term participation develops and clarifies an 
understanding of that term and which flags up some of the theological strengths 
and weaknesses of using such a notion. Consideration of participation 
demands that a whole host of inter-related theological issues are addressed 
and this leads in the course of this study to reflection on a number of key issues 
in Christian theology such as otherness, relationship, freedom, causality and 
'sharing in the life of God'. 
While a definitive, problem-free account of participation remains to be realised, 
the thesis explores an understanding of participation in terms of an entering into 
the relations of the Trinitarian persons in a manner appropriate to human 
creatureliness. Some of the main challenges which confront those theologians 
seeking to formulate a doctrine of participation in the late twentieth century in 
this way are illustrated and tentative proposals for ways forward are offered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In common usage the verb 'participate' means, according to the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, to have a share in, to take part, in a thing and/or with a person; or to 
have something of. The Latin term means to take part (partem capere) or to 
have part (partem habere); so if something obtains a part of that which is or 
which rightly belongs to another, it might be said to participate in that other. In 
common parlance participation can involve relations pertaining to groups of 
people, groups with common aims, objectives, experiences, feelings and so on. 
For example to "take part" can involve membership of a team, entering a 
discussion or feeling another's joy. Participation can involve all kinds of objects 
spanning the physical to the moral, the scientific to the theological, the rational 
to the emotional. Indeed it might be said that participation is the broadest and 
most effective term to express the relation of the whole person to reality in its 
manifold dimensions: physical, moral, cognitive, artistic, sociological, economic, 
and so on. The meaning of participation varies with the nature of that which is 
participated; so for example to participate in a quantitative 'something' may 
involve a sharing out of a whole into its parts, while participation in another's joy 
is more about a correspondent responsiveness to the "whole" which remains 
intact and undivided. Plato used the term participation (methexis) to explain the 
relationship of particular cases to general Forms, so that for instance 'Susannah 
is good' could be understood as 'Susannah participates in the Form of the 
Good'. This way of using participation to explain the relation of the One and the 
Many in terms of dependence and vertical structure has tended to dominate 
philosophical and theological discussions of the term 'participation' and as a 
result the different nuances and developments in understandings of 
participation in the Christian tradition have often been overlooked. Within the 
New Testament itself we see a development of the term which focuses on the 
dependence of the creature on the Creator and the integral nature of relations 
with other participants in participating in aspects of the divine. 
Our objective in this discussion is to trace the development of the notionsof 
'participation' from Plato to the present-day, not by way of an exhaustive 
historical survey', but by way of particular theologians whose (not always fully 
1 For example space considerations mean that we will only skirt the notion of 'participation' in 
Eastern Orthodox thought, despite its frequent and persistent presence in the historical 
development of that theological tradition. 
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conscious) use of the conceptualities of participation develops and clarifies 
understandings of that notion and which flags up some of the theological 
implications and difficulties of using such a notion. Seen from the perspective of 
this term a whole host of inter-related theological issues require analysis and 
this will allow us to consider some wider issues in doctrinal theology and give 
some broad brush-strokes towards a coherent, consistent picture of human 
beings' relationship with the Godhead. While a definitive, problem-free account 
of participation remains to be realised, we would hope to illustrate the main 
challenges which confront those theologians seeking to formulate a doctrine of 
participation in the late twentieth century and suggestions for ways forward. 
The notion 'participation' has been fixed upon rather than 'communion', 
'obedience', 'faithfulness' or other possibilities for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the history of the notion predates Christian theology in a philosophically 
significant way and this raises the issue of how far the notion has appropriately 
been applied to the Christian context, what degree of originality the notion 
carries within the context of Christian doctrine and what dangers there are in 
reverting to its usages in Classical philosophy. Secondly, while the notion might 
appear to have only a slight scriptural basis, related terms such as koinonia 
reveal wider associations and an understanding of the scriptural usage of 
participation and associated terms will reveal pointers to defensible 
contemporary understandings of the term. Thirdly, the notion captures the sense 
and priority of relationship with God without separating that relationship from 
inter-human relationships, and it is a useful window through which to explore 
how the nature of human beings' relationships to God and one another are 
jointly conceived. In particular the notion has been associated with disputes 
concerning the ontological nature of relationship with God and we shall argue 
from our analysis that it is vital that a clear ontology of relationship is elucidated 
if a coherent understanding of human beings' relationship to God is to be 
presented. Fourthly and relatedly, participation has been used particularly 
where relationships with the Triune God are being expounded, and we shall 
reflect upon how we can conceive of participation 'in the Trinity', 'in the divine 
life' and in 'the intra-trinitarian relationships'. In this context it should be noted 
from the outset that our theological sympathies lie with a Trinitarian 
understanding of God. Having said this, our thesis does not begin with God 
rather than human beings, nor vice versa, but seeks a dialectic interplay 
6 
between both the ascending and descending routes to divine-human 
relationships. Fifthly, the notion has featured in recent theology as well as 
repeatedly in the theological development of Christianity and a modern in-depth 
study of the notion is still lacking. 2 Sixthly, focusing on participation will enable 
us to raise a number of concerns associated with key contemporary theological 
concepts of interest such as otherness, relationship, freedom and causality. 
Seventhly, as a particularly common way of translating the ecumenically 
popular term koinonia, analysis of the notion may contribute to ecumenical 
discussions, helping the debate to move beyond assertions of the biblical 
grounding of concepts such as koinonia and listings of the means of koinonia 
(such as the sacraments) towards an explanation of how koinonia is effected, 
what ontology might underpin such conceptuality, how we might understand 
key theological terms in this context, and so on. 3 Our analysis will also 
contribute to such discussions in helping to fill out parts of the theological 
history of participation in the Christian tradition from the time of the early Fathers 
to the twentieth century, a history largely (and perhaps fearfully? ) neglected in 
contemporary ecumenical dialogues focusing on koinonia. 
2 W. Jeanrond, speaking of the precious nature, of Trinitarian language, argues that the mysterious 
nature of God is "a mystery which s. inviting and open to everybody eager to participate in 
relational praxis (of love)". See his The Question of God Today' in The Christian Understanding of 
God Today, (Dublin: Columba Press, 1994). Robert Jenson, writing recently of Luther's thought, 
suggests in conclusion that "Human freedom, in the only sense Luther wants to talk about, is 
nothing less than Participation in God's own triune rapture of freedom". See his 'An Ontology of 
Freedom in the De Servo Arbitrio of Luther', Modern Theology, Vol. 10, no. 3 (July 1994), p. 252. 
These and other theologians often draw in the notion of participation in ways suggestive of its 
importance, yet explanations of the notion are either absent or so tantalisingly brief as to leave 
readers none the wiser. 
3 See S. Wood's "Ecclesial Koinonia in Ecumenical Dialogues" for a useful survey of what different 
churches mean by koinonia, One in Christ (vol. 30, no. 2,1994), 124-45 
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2. PARTICIPATION IN GREEK THOUGHT AND THE SCRIPTURES 
We shall first look to Plato to explore the understanding and use of the term 
`participation' because he provides a philosophical outlook which rests heavily 
on the concept and because the Platonic perspective has been uniquely 
suggestive and influential in various ways on Christian thought. 
2.1 The Theory of Forms 
Central to Plato's philosophy is his conception of Forms (or Ideas, see 
Euthyphro 5d and 6d), whose postulated existence provided Plato with the 
means of answering such questions as 'what is Justice? ' and 'what is the 
Beautiful? ' In discussing Beauty for example, Plato speaking through Socrates 
can say "it seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute 
beauty is beautiful because it partakes of that absolute beauty, and for no other 
reason. "l Further, "the reason why other things are called after the forms is that 
they participate in the forms. "2 Thus Plato explains how it is that diverse realities 
.n 
in the world are unified by having a 'share the Forms. For Plato the world of 
Forms, unchanging, unified and alone truly "real" contrasts with the world of 
sense, ever in flux and perpetual change. Connected with this contrast is a 
distinction between knowledge (which pertains to reality) and sense-perception 
or mere opinion. For Plato knowledge cannot rest on the shifting sands of 
sense-perception, but must have its foundation in the immutable, reliable, 
eternal world of Forms. Awakening to knowledge of reality (i. e. the world of 
Forms) is most memorably expressed by Plato in his illustration of prisoners 
languishing in the dark in The Republic( Republic VII, 514a ff). Initially the 
prisoners can see anything of themselves or of one another only through 
shadows cast on the wall by fire behind them, and ignorantly they suppose this 
to be reality. Upon release, a prisoner turns to be dazzled by the light, and as he 
is drawn out of the cave intd'the sunlight and becomes accustomed to the light 
he begins to realise that what previously he took to be real was in fact shadow 
and illusion, and he gazes upon the true reality. The movement from darkness 
to light represents the soul's ascension to the intelligible realm and 
contemplation of that realm. In this allegory the sun represents the Form of the 
1 Phaedo 100c. 
2 Ibid., 102b. 
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Good, the source of reality and value for the rest of the universe. 
We are awakened to a sense of true reality and we orient ourselves to this 
reality as we purify ourselves (e. g. Phaedo 65e-66a). Such purification has 
both a moral and an intellectual aspect. Moral purification entails disciplining 
the body so that it is not a hindrance to the soul in its task of contemplating true 
reality. Intellectual purification has two elements, the abstract and the 
passionate. By the study of such abstract subjects as Mathematics (e. g. 
Republic VI, 51 Oc ff) and dialectics (as the search for the essence of things, e. g. 
Republic VII, 534b) the soul is being trained for contemplation, because the 
soul is confining its attention to non-sensory objects, which Plato took to be true 
reality (cf. Phaedo 66c). But as Louth points out, this abstract and somewhat 
austere way of purification is fused with passion. 3 So in The Symposium 
Diotima speaks of longing and devotion towards the one single Form of Beauty 
which lies behind the passion and love of particular beautiful objects 
(Symposium 210a ff). In The Symposium the soul is purified and ascends by 
way of love, the soul's devotion leading eventually to that final contemplation of 
universal beauty or beauty in itself, the eternal, ineffable Form of Beauty. The 
kind of knowledge associated with participation here is knowledge by 
acquaintance which includes propositional elements; true knowledge implies 
and involves actualisation so that for example to participate truly in the Form of 
courage entails knowing about courage and being governed in one's actions by 
courage. In relation to this it is noteworthy that Plato often has Socrates saying 
that virtue is knowledge (e. g. Protagoras 352c)4 
Looking more closely at the Forms themselves, it is clear that, at least in the 
early and middle dialogues, Plato sees Forms as having at times a causals 
relation to those particulars which participate in them (see for example Phaedo 
100c4-6). Indeed participation in a given Form F is the only cause of a given 
3 A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: OUP, 1981), p. 9 
4 Plato appears not to have distinguished propositional knowledge and knowledge by 
acquaintance; indeed in setting out a theory of knowledge that would hold for all kinds of 
knowledge Plato gives the example of knowing a road in Meno 97a ff., an example of knowledge 
by acquaintance. 
5 G. Vlastos notes that the Greek word is aitiai and that there are certain problems in translating the 
term as'cause' if by this we mean simply efficient cause. At times'reason' may be a more 
appropriate translation. See Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology ed. G. Vlastos (New York: 
Anchor, 1971) pp. 132-66. 
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thing's being or becoming F; so Socrates can state that there is "no other cause 
for the coming into being of two than participation in duality, and that whatever 
is to become two must participate in this, and whatever is to become one must 
participate in unity". 6 It is worth noting an ambiguity in Plato's thought at this 
point. It is unclear whether Forms function as efficient or final causes for Plato. 
As Prior points out "the description of the causal role of the Forms given in this 
passage (i. e. Phaedo 101c) fits rather well with the conception of the Forms as 
efficient causes, but some of the things Plato has to say earlier in the dialogue 
(74d-75b... ) about phenomena 'striving to be like' the Forms suggests that they 
are final causes. "7 It may be that Plato had different types of causality in mind at 
different moments but saw no difficulty in reconciling them. Indeed the 
distinctions between different types of cause is first seriously reflected upon only 
later in Greek thought by Aristotle; perhaps such distinctions had not occurred to 
Plato. 
Not only are Forms described by Plato in the early and middle dialogues in a 
manner which suggests they are immanent in things; he describes them also as 
paradeigmata, 'paradigms' (see e. g. Parmenides 132c-d). Forms are 
somehow 'standards' telling us what it is for particular things to partake of the 
respective Forms. Prior argues, persuasively in our view, for seeing paradigm or 
standard as not meaning that the Form is itself an exemplar, but something 
exemplified, a general pattern8 (like for example a colour). Thus in regarding 
Forms as paradigms Plato does not mean that Forms are exemplars of 
themselves but that they are patterns shared in some way by things that 
exemplify them. 
Finally here we might note the separation which Plato points out at times 
between Forms and phenomena. Plato's famous allegory of the sun and cave 
illustrates the separation of the intelligible and sensible world (cf. Republic 
507a ff); in the Phaedrus the world of Forms is located in 'that place beyond 
the heavens' (Phaedrus 247c); and in the Phaedo only it seems when the 
intellect is separated from the body, as when at death the soul separates from 
the body, is the soul able to "leave this world" (Phaedo 61 e). While we should 
6Phaedo 101c 
7 WA Prior, Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 14. 
8 Ibid., p. 18ff. 
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not interpret such metaphors in a crudely literalistic way, it does seem that Plato 
is suggesting a transcendent nature to the Forms, motivated no doubt at times 
by the wish not to see them soiled by too close a contact with the transient, 
mutable phenomenal world - contact which would undermine their function as 
objects of enduring and sure knowledge. (There is a tension in Plato's thought 
here, because at other times he wishes to stress the immanent nature of the 
Forms and the way in which the notion of participation affords a real relationship 
between Forms and particulars). 
2.2 Participation in the Forms 
Because Forms exert a causal influence on phenomena in some sense, Plato 
required a description of the relation between Form and phenomena, and he 
found this in the concept of 'participation' (methexis). Unfortunately Plato 
nowhere provides a direct explanation of this concept, but two different aspects 
of his understanding can be indirectly discerned. 9 Participation is sometimes 
regarded as 'sharing' or 'communion', relating to metalambanein (to partake of 
or literally to have a share in) and metechein (to have a share in). Such a view 
suggests the Form is where its participants are and that it is immanent in them. 
The problem with this understanding is that it might suggest that the Forms are 
somehow split up between the participants. A second conception of 
participation in defence of the Forms is that of resemblance or imaging. 
Socrates states "the best I can make of the matter is this - that these Forms are 
as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things. The other things are made in 
their image and are likenesses, and this participation they come to have in the 
Forms is nothing but their being made in their image" (Parmenides 132d). 
In making this suggestion Socrates does not seem to answer Parmenides' most 
damaging argument against-the theory of Forms, namely that the theory of 
Forms results in an infinite vicious regress1o - Parmenides' famous `Third Man 
9 We are indebted here to the analysis of Prior, Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics, 
pp. 37-45. 
10 Briefly, if x is F and F-ness is itself F then x and F-ness have a common characteristic. Take x, F- 
ness and this characteristic together and it seems that we require a fourth 'Form' to account for the 
resemblance between the first three, and so on. This argument produces an indefinite number of 
Forms and undermines claims (of Plato's middle-period at least) that the Form of each general 
characteristic is unique. 
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Argument (TMA). Without entering into the details of the TMA we should note 
that it can be consistently formulated11 if it is assumed that Plato was committed 
to the non-identity assumption (if x is F, x cannot be identical with F-ness) and 
the self-predication assumption (F-ness is itself F). Plato's commitment to such 
assumptions is by no means clear however. Concerning the self-predication 
assumption for example, while remarks concerning certain Forms suggest they 
are genuinely self-predicative (e. g. the Form of Beauty; cf. Symposium 21Oe- 
211b, Phaedo 100c), elsewhere Plato appears to reject this assumption (as in 
the 'Third Bed Argument' in Republic X). Allen points out that there is no need 
to assume that Form and particular belong to the same category of realities and 
the fact that the Form causes the particular makes it unlikely that Form and 
particular do exist on the same level or in the same way. Giving the example of 
a red scarf reflected in a mirror Allen notes the reflection is "not similar in kind to 
the original"12 and that in calling the reflection red "you cannot mean the same 
thing you mean when you call its original red"13. To do so would be to say that 
both Form and particular share a common quality (redness) and as Allen 
succinctly puts it "the reflection does not resemble the original; rather it is a 
resemblance of the original"14 
A second version of the TMA is used to attack not only the theory of Forms 
generally, but particularly the understanding of Forms as paradigms and 
Socrates' suggestion of participation as resemblance. But the second TMA also 
requires that the resemblance relation between Form and phenomenon implies 
the sharing of a common property. However, as Prior points out, this assumption 
is not necessarily valid: 15 
Plato seems to ground the possession of a property by an object (e. g. the property of being 
beautiful) in the relation between that object and a Form (in this case the Form of Beauty), rather 
11 See for example W. Sellars'Vlastos and "The Third Man"' in Philosophical Review 64 (1955), 
405-37 
12 R. E. Allen, 'Participation and Pj dication in Plato's Middle Dialogues' in his Studies in Plato's 
Metaphysics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 50. 
13 Allen, ibid., p. 50. However the issue of language comes to the fore here because "it leaves 
open the vexing question of precisely how the redness of scarf and image are one: is there not a 
rather formidable problem in suggesting that 'red' means something quite different when applied 
to each in turn? " In R. Williams' Arius: Heresy and Tradition (London: DLT, 1987), p. 217. 
14 Allen, ibid., p. 50. Form and particular do not stand under the same concepts (like redness) in 
the way in which say red scarves and red ties stand under redness, there is rather a relation of the 
dependent to the independent present, the particular being a relational entity, defined by its 
relation to the Form. 
15 Prior, Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 39-40. 
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than grounding participation in the common possession of a property. In other words, common 
properties are for Plato derivative entities, not primary ones; the relation of participation... is basic. 
If this is so, any attempt to ground participation in the sharing of a property would inevitably distort 
Plato's own intentions, as well as producing a vicious circularity (first we explain common 
properties in terms of resemblance, then we explain resemblance in terms of common 
properties). 16 
The two aspects of Plato's understanding of participation mentioned earlier 
parallel Plato's view of the Forms as immanent and transcendent; the 
understanding of participation as 'sharing in' lending itself more to the 
understanding of Forms as immanent, the understanding of resemblance being 
more appropriate when the transcendence of the Forms is to the fore. The 
tension between understanding the Forms as immanent and transcendent is 
brought to light by Parmenides in his 'Two Worlds' argument, an argument 
questioning the very possibility of participation. While Plato may have been 
aware of some if not all of the errors in Parmenides' argument at this point, it 
does seem that the thrusts of the argument - that there is a conflict between the 
immanence and the transcendence of the Forms and that the threat of an utter 
divorce of the world of phenomena and the world of Forms looms large - are 
possibilities which Plato takes seriously. Behind this, there is the threat that the 
two kinds of participation Plato envisages must reduce to one or the other and, 
more radically, that no notion of participation is adequate to spanning the gulf 
between phenomena and Forms which must remain forever separate. 
Plato does not adequately answer the questions raised by the Two Worlds' 
argument in Parmenides. However, in the Timaeus, while Plato maintains the 
distinction between the concrete, spatial phenomenal world and the abstract, 
non-spatial world of Forms, he suggests a new understanding of the causal 
nature of the Forms which helps address the 'Two Worlds' argument (assuming 
the Timaeus is a later work than Parmenides. ) Plato introduces the idea of the 
craftsman, creator or demiurge who, working from the Forms as patterns or 
paradigms, creates copies of*them in the phenomenal world from a preexistent 
chaos (Timaeus 28a-29c). So the Demiurge provides the necessary link 
between the world of Forms and that of phenomena, and is the agent that 
moulds this world in the image of the Forms. The Demiurge is the efficient cause 
of the resemblance of phenomena to their Forms, so that while the Forms 
16 Prior, Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 50, n. 38. See also his 'Parmenides 
132c-133a and the Development of Plato's Thought', Phronesis 24 (1979), 230-40 
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continue to provide patterns for the phenomenal world, their immanence is 
removed. In this way Plato appears to make some rejoinder to the 'Two Worlds' 
argument. 
Interestingly, while Plato continues to speak of the Form-phenomenon 
relationship as one of imaging or resemblance in the Timaeus, he does not 
speak of this relationship of imaging as one of participation. Further, after 
Parmenides 
, 
Plato does not discuss the concept of participation closely, nor 
does he offer a definition of it. Whether this is due to the force of the arguments 
in the Parmenides is a moot point but assuming Plato's continued allegiance 
to the theory of Forms in his later dialogues and if, as we would suggest, some 
of the points made in the Timaeus indirectly respond to arguments from 
Parmenides, it seems that Plato's silence on the matter is best taken not as a 
sign of his diffidence concerning participation but rather as suggesting he views 
the concept as in some way beyond explanation, as primitive and fundamental 
in his metaphysical scheme. 
One more point concerning Plato's discussion of participation should be made 
before moving on, namely that Plato does not always restrict the relation of 
participation to that between Form and phenomenon but in the later dialogue 
the Sophist considers the Forms participating in one another. By using 
participation in describing some of the relations between the Forms, Plato 
seems not to be restricting that relation to cases where the two entities in the 
relationship belong to ontologically different realms. Yet Plato's main illustration 
of participation, that of imaging or resemblance has been used in earlier 
dialogues in the context of the image belonging to a different and inferior order 
of reality from the original. 17 If such an illustration can no longer help Plato 
explain what he understands by participation, which it seems it cannot where 
participation of the Forms in other Forms is under- consideration, then the 
concept of participation is more in need of explanation than ever; if Plato was 
aware of such difficulties, then nevertheless they were left unresolved. 
2.3 Causality 
Another issue of interest in relation to participation in Plato is causality and what 
place, if any, there is for the participant's activity in coming to participate in the 
17 Only in the Parmenides is the resemblance relation actually offered as a way of understanding 
participation of course, though the relation is mentioned frequently in the Timaeus. 
14 
Form. Plato's comments on the role of intellect and passion leave us in no doubt 
that there is a role for the participant to play but this being the case, Plato needs 
a suitably nuanced conception of the Form's causality to allow for this. 
Unfortunately Plato does not provide us with such a conception in the writings 
we have of his. The issue is sharpened by the fact that for Plato, the Supreme 
Being of the Republic is somehow 'outside' of the realm of being and 
undetermined by that realm. But in that case the reason of Greek philosophy 
would have been unable to grasp it, because such reasoning since Parmenides 
assumed that only what was could be thought of or intellectually perceived. 
Plato spoke vaguely of that final state of the philosopher which was achieved 
through sudden illumination, a state which cannot be forced by intellectual 
achievement or desire. But if, as implied, the Supreme Being was able to cause 
such sudden illumination at this stage, then why not at any stage in our 
intellectual journey? If it was because the Supreme Being waited on our 
achieving a certain stage then it does seem that we can force the issue through 
our abilities and if not then what is to stop the Supreme Being's causing our 
participation in the Good at whatever point in our development? Part of the 
difficulty for Plato is reconciling our activity with the inscrutable influence of the 
Good, and impersonal conceptions of cause fail to resolve the issue 
satisfactorily. 
Closely related to the theme of the participant's actions is the initial and 
developing movement towards the Forms. Is this caused by the respective Form 
or do we play a part? Recalling Plato's allegory of the prisoners in the cave it 
seems that the Form initiates a response (the prisoner being released) and the 
prisoner is drawn out by the Form through his intellectual efforts, aesthetic 
desire and passionate longing, moral purification enhancing and enabling the 
process. But if the initial cause is not to be. coercive there must be a sense in 
which the prisoner turns his mind freely to the light, an act or decision which is 
hardly simply a cognitive effort. Rather it is an act of will. And it is here that the 
limits of Platonic philosophy become apparent because, as Dihle points out in 
his study of the theory of will in Classical Antiqüity18, such a notion of will on the 
part of human beings was conspicuously absent. (Michael Foster argued in a 
not dissimilar way that "the failure of Greek ethics to achieve a notion of will was 
18 A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (California: Uni. of Calif. Press, 1982). 
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a necessary consequence of Greek metaphysics.. . "19). The impersonal, logical- 
type nature of the Form's causality undermines the very possibility of a mode of 
personal causation which gives room both to a sovereign, initiating, willing God 
and the respondent, willing freedom of the human being. If God's causality is 
understood as the personal willing of a Creator then we at least stand more 
chance of retaining the creature's integrity and contingent autonomy than we do 
with Plato's scheme. 
2.4 Plato's Bequest 
Much as Plato's thought on participation remains under-developed and 
opaque, there are some key issues raised by his use of the term. As an attempt 
to express the relation between Form and particular, the type of causality and 
resemblance described by the relation require elaboration, as does the 
ontological framework and the way in which the aspects of transcendence and 
immanence are retained. Linguistic issues concerning participation are also 
raised by Plato's account; if a particular participates in a Form F then how are 
we to understand their community of character? Problems result from univocal 
and equivocal interpretations and Plato's own concerns to protect the imitation 
model from oversimplification (in terms of the image merely imperfectly 
reflecting the glory of the Archetype or being 'like' the archetype but only to a 
lesser degree)20 suggest the need to examine linguistic descriptions of 
community of character expressed in the notion of participation. Some of 
Plato's own remarks can lead to a univocal understanding of Form and 
particular bearing the same name in the same sense. Recalling our intellectual 
development whereby we ascend the hierarchy of reality, gradually we 
perceive the Forms and that in virtue of which they exist finally, the Form of the 
Good. But implicit in this is the fact that the Good is a case (albeit a special 
19 See his The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), p. 131 
Foster goes on to argue that the Christian doctrine of creation provides a basis for the notion of a 
divine, personal will (Rev. 4: 11), cf. pp. 1 91f. One might wonder whether Plato was not fumbling 
for such a conception with his introduction of the Demiurge in his middle period. 
20 "If this interpretation is accepted, it is quite fatal. But it turns on construing the deficiency of 
particulars as one of quality, rather than of type; they are deficiently something else of the same 
sort, ... yet surely the force of the metaphor of 
imitation ... is to indicate that the deficiency in 
question is that of one type of thing with respect to something of another type". Allen, Studies in 
Plato's Metaphysics, p. 52. So when Plato speaks of the particular being 'deficient' in degree of 
reality relative to the Form "'deficiency' is here a category distinction, not a distinction within 
categories", ibid., p. 52 
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case) of intelligible reality. This can lead to seeing the Good, or God, 
participated in by the Forms in a manner comparable to the participation of the 
particulars in the Forms, and the intelligible world being seen as an imitation or 
image of the first principle. Williams notes that this is what happened with the 
likes of Middle Platonists such as Numenius and Plutarch and such thinking 
catalysed a revision of 'participation' in terms of 'procession' by Neoplatonists 
such as Plotinus and Porphyry: 
the lower reality is constituted or formed in this or that respect by the active life of the higher, but 
does not reproduce the 'essence' of the higher, there is no question of univocity between Form 
and particular, or of the Form perfectly exemplifying what the particular imperfectly exemplifies. 21 
Given the hierarchical structure we find in Middle Platonism, it is unsurprising 
that participation was used "to express not only the relationship between the 
intelligible and sensible worlds, but also more generally the relation of any 
lower to any higher degree of reality". 22 Such a trend can be seen in the 
thought of Plotinus, who stands not only as a philosopher influenced by Middle 
Platonism but as the thinker most closely associated with Neoplatonism. 
2.5 Neoplatonic Participation 
Plotinus' emphatically vertical model of reality may seem to sharpen Plato's 
tendency to view progress as flight from this world (e. g. Theatetus 1768) 
especially given Plotinus' understanding of evil as the absence of structure, life 
and consciousness such as is embraced more the further from the One23 reality 
is. Even so just as Plato can have at times a positive view on creation (e. g. 
Timaeus 90 A-D) so too in his anti-Gnostic polemics Plotinus asserts 
21 Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 220. Williams goes on "the relation is a.. kind of 
equivocity recognized by Porphyry: a can be called f because some aspect of its existence can be 
understood by reference to a central or normative fact of something being f; but a's f-ness is not 
itself a case off that can stand alongside the normative f. Thus the agency of Form goes out from 
its own reality not to produce imitations of itself but to cause certain related and purposive 
activities in a lower reality. There is not and cannot be any question of participation between Form 
and particular in the sense of their simply exhibiting a common structure in different degrees. 
Plato's own misgivings about an oversimple'imitation' doctrine in respect of Forms and particulars 
are here pressed to a radical conclusion", p. 220 
22 Balas, D. L., MErovaia e£ov. Man's Participation in God's Perfections according to Saint 
GregoryofNyssa (Rome: I. B. C. Libreria Herder, 1966), p. 4 
23 Plotinus heads up his metaphysical hierarchy with the absolutely negative One of the first 
hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides. He identifies this One with the absolute good of The Republic 
(509b, cf Enneads V, 1,8). 
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energetically that "the descent of the spirit into matter is not only the cause of 
evil, but primarily the origin of the ordered, animated, and beautiful universe". 24 
It seems that individual beings are free to turn away from the One and so 
become morally and physically corrupt and in Plotinus we see voluntaristic 
elements entering the framework which have inevitable ramifications for 
participation in his thought. It is the fact of the inexplicable longing to be creative 
which provides the rationale for the procession through various levels of reality 
beginning with the One. Further, the refusal to turn back to one's origin can be 
described only in terms of volition finally, "though the act of turning is 
undoubtedly realised as a poor intellectual performance of the being in 
question". 25 Although 'will' is not considered in Plotinus (or in his biographer 
Porphyry) in terms of an anthropological category separate from that of the 
intellect, there is an awareness here of the freedom with which would-be 
participants in the intelligible realm can embrace that realm or otherwise. Thus 
while reflection on the activity of participants in that which is participated begins 
in Plotinus to take on much more of a voluntaristic dimension than in Plato, the 
movement is not sufficiently self-conscious for it to equate with 'modern' notions 
of free-will. 
Plotinus points out that the anima mundi participates in both the intelligible and 
the sensible world (cf. Enneads IV, 8,7; V, 1,7 etc. ), its inadequate contemplation 
of nous 26 having Nature as its product. But Plotinus tends to focus 
participation more on the purely intelligible world, between the souls and nous 
or between nous and the One. In this context participation concerns the 
relation of a lower level of reality to a higher one, and, it should be noted, lacks 
any understanding of participation as involving both 'horizontal' (e. g. inter- 
human) and 'vertical' aspects. 
The fact that union with the One involves the cessation of noetic activity raises 
questions concerning the possibility of language about the One. Participation of 
the nous in the One and our progressive intellectual grasp of thenous might 
suggest we do have some legitimate claim to talk concerning the One, but in 
24 A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, p. 114. 
25 Ibid., p. 115. 
26 For Plotinus nous is the act, image and imitation of the One, being above all things except the 
One, contemplating the One and cogitating the multiplicity of intelligent beings or Ideas which we 
find in the world. 
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Plotinus' thought the nous emerges from the One as totally other than the One 
(e. g. being self-conscious the nous is essentially dyadic) and the closer the 
nous approximates to the One, the less can be said. Such epistemological 
humility concerning the first principle was unlikely to satisfy many Greek 
philosophers, never mind most Christian thinkers. Proclus is a case in point. 
In Proclus and in later Neoplatonism in general we continue to find 
'participation' used as an explanation of relations holding between different 
levels of reality, and the dependence of lower on higher levels. Proclus 
understands the relation between higher beings and lower ones in terms of 
bestowal (metadosis, in Proclus' Elements of Theology (El. theol. ), 18), while 
relations between lower beings and higher ones are described as 'participation' 
(methexis, metousia, metechein, cf. El. theol. 1,2,3 etc. ). Following Plotinus' 
idea of production due to giving superabundantly and without diminishment, 
Proclus sees no loss in the producer which produces 'secondary existences' 
(as Dodds translates the term27 ); neither will he countenance the idea of a 
parcelling out of the producer among its participants (El. theol. 27). The 
produced being bears a likeness to that which produced it, although it is inferior 
to it, and the higher or lower point occupied by produced beings in the 
hierarchical scale reflects the degree of original perfection and unity of the 
respective beings (cf. El. theol. 36). 
Proclus attempts to reconcile the immanence and transcendence of Forms by 
multiplying the entities involved, a procedure typical of his methodology; "For on 
the one hand the unparticipated, having the relative status of a monad (as being 
its own and not another's, and as transcending the participants), generates 
terms capable of being participated" (El. theol. 23). Thus that which is 
participated in is the 'immanent universal', while-the 'transcendent universal' is 
strictly 'unparticipated' (amethekton). Indeed every order has its beginning in 
the unparticipated monad, deriving from which there are manifolds which may 
be participated in by participants (see El. theol. 14-24). Thus each order of 
reality can be understood by reference to the distinction between the 
'participant', the 'participated' and the 'unparticipated'. Dodds points out that 
Plotinus "shrinks from calling the transcendent term amethekton (cf. esp. 
27 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, trans. and ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933), 
p. 31 
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Enneads VI. 5.3) though it is ameriston and apathes - his mystical sense of the 
universe as the expression of a single divine force made the sharper distinction 
impossible for him". 28 It might be argued that Plotinus also wished to avoid 
inconsistency, but despite having said in El. theol. 1 that "pan plethos metechei 
pe tou enos" Proclus is not being inconsistent in his analysis, provided we 
understand that "a term which is proprie amethekton is yet indirectly methekton 
through the metechomena which it generates (cf. El. theol. 56)". 29 For our 
purposes it is unnecessary to go further into the elaborate and difficult scheme 
which is implied by Proclus' comments on the hierarchy of participation30, 
having noted the role the term plays in expressing the (dependent) relation 
between lower and higher levels of reality, and having noted the triadic 
structure undergirding each grade of reality (the unparticipated, the participated 
and the participant). Proclus wishes to bridge the gap between the first principle 
and its emanations in a manner which can retain something of the qualitative 
difference and supremacy of the first principle but which yet affords some 
epistemological access to that principle. He bridges the gap to his own 
satisfaction with his notion of participated and unparticipated aspects of the first 
principle. The latter generates the former but participation in the former does not 
imply any access to the latter. However because they are related, the immanent 
universal indicates something of the nature of the (unparticipated) transcendent 
universal. Lurking behind this thinking may well be the axioms that God's 
substance is unparticipated and that no substance can be part of another 
substance. In this case a lower substance can be 'generated' by a higher 
substance's agency but in what sense the lower substance participates in the 
higher is questionable. Clearly there can be no essential participation if the 
axioms hold but if the participant only participates in that which is accidental to 
the higher substance, then in what sense does the participant participate truly in 
the higher substance? And in what sense is there epistemological access to the 
first principle and how is language concerning the first principle justified? These 
problems are not peculiar to the esoteric discussions of Greek philosophers, 
and as we shall see some early debates among Christians centred around such 
issues. 
28 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 211 
29 Ibid., p. 211 
30 Ibid., pp. 211-212,237 and 282 for a more detailed consideration. 
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2.6 The Old Testament 
A. Raymond George claims that there is little of relevance to the theme of 
'participation' in the Old Testament3l and he notes only three relatively 
insignificant uses of the term koinonia in the LXX. 32 However, while it may be 
true that out of Jewish piety and a sense of God's transcendence a certain self- 
restraint and caution was exercised in use of the term, the O. T. does provide 
fertile ground for later thinkers (and in particular Paul) to develop a notion of 
participation, particularly through the Hebraic notion of a basic human solidarity 
among the sons of Adam. This notion entailed an understanding of the 
individual as a representative as well as a constitutive member of his group, an 
understanding marked by a certain "fluidity of reference, facilitating rapid and 
unmarked transition from the one to the many, and from the many to the one". 33 
As individuals Israelites shared in the identity of Israel in a sense and lines of 
thought such as this may well have been built on by Paul in his construction of 
an understanding of participation. However we shall see that Paul radically 
adapts this fundamental communitarian awareness in including Yahweh within 
this community, as the author and focus of the community of the faithful, who are 
gathered in communion with one another and God. Thus (as we shall see) 
participation will become in part a sharing with other believers in that which is of 
God in Paul's thought. 
2.7 The New Testament 
The most familiar passage concerning participation is found at 2 Peter 1: 4, 
where it is stated that through power and knowledge of Christ and his promises 
"you may escape from the corruption that is in the wörld'because of passion, 
and become partakers of the divine nature (theias koinonoi phuseos)" (RSV). 
The word partaker translates the Greek word whose root is xoLvwv- here, 
alerting us to the relevance of such words as koinonia, koinonos and koinoneo 
31 A. Raymond George, Communion With God in the New Testament (London: Epworth, 1953), 
p. 134. 
32 Namely Lev. 5: 21, Wisd. 8: 18,3 Mac. 4: 6. Other KOLVWV- words are rare in the Septuagint, 
regularly representing the Hebraic root chabar. This Hebraic term can give rise to expressions 
such as'join', 'unite' or'bind together' and often refers to human partnerships (such as the 
partnership between worshippers of Psalm 119: 63). 
33 H. W. Robinson, "The Hebrew Concept of Corporate Personality" in ZAW 66 (1936), p. 50 
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in our study of the word 'participation'. It might be argued that the word 
'communion' is more appropriate to such Greek terms, and perhaps such a 
translation is more appropriate where a certain mutuality or shared activity is 
indicated. However we must allow the context to dictate how we translate such 
terms, and 2 Peter 1: 4 is a typical case where 'partaker' is the more apposite 
translation. Indeed as Campbell's study of koinonia points out, that word's 
primary and common meaning is to share in something (genitive) with someone 
(dative), i. e. participation along with others in something (or someone). 34 Moule 
also points out that: 
Koinonia is sometimes referred to carelessly by modern writers as though it were a concrete noun 
meaning '(the Christian) fellowship'. But the debate over this from the time of C. A. Anderson Scott 
onwards ought to make it clear that it is normally an abstract noun meaning 'participation', and, as 
such, plays an important part in the expression of the religious experience of contact with God. 35 
Given these findings, the scope of our study of 'participation' in the N. T. is 
widened considerably, because we must take into account those words rooted 
by KOLVWV- in the N. T. and their various contexts, as well as terms such as 
metoche, metochos and metecho. 
2.8 Paul's notion of Participation 
One important usage of words related to the root KoLvwv- is that denoting a 
joint relationship to something which is of God, be it grace, the Gospel, the 
Spirit, Christ's sufferings, Christ's Body and Blood. However other uses of the 
word can be found in Paul's letters; for example at Rom. 15: 26-27 koinonia is to 
be understood as "collection" and at Gal. 2: 9 perhaps means simply 
"community". 
Participation in the Platonic and Neoplatonic understanding of the word has, as 
we have seen, tended to focus on the individual's participation. With Paul 
34 J. Y. Campbell, Three New Testament Studies (Leiden: Brill, 1965). See also H. Seesemann, 
Der Begriff KOINQNIA im Neuen Testament (Giessen 1933). Apart from the main use of 'having 
a share in something with someone', it can mean 'sharing' or'fellowship (arising out of the 
common sharing of something)', or very occasionally, it can mean 'willingness to give a share, 
generosity'. For a detailed survey of koinonia in scripture and a recent bibliography see 
J. Reumann's "Koinonia in Scripture: Survey of Biblical Texts" in On The Way To Fuller Koinonia. 
The Official Report of the Fifth World Conference in Faith and Order, eds. T. F. Best and 
G. Gassmann (Geneva: WCC, 1994), pp. 37-69. 
35 C. F. D. Moule, The Origin of Christology (Cambridge: CUP 1977), p. 69. 
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however, the corporate dimension is stressed. The use of xoLvwv- words in the 
sense of sharing with others in something in Paul's letters is supplemented by 
other important Pauline language (such as Paul's use of the proposition "surf' 
and the phrase "en Christd') suggestive of a relationship together with others in 
God and these can be referred to in support of the idea that for Paul 
participation and other descriptions of relationship to God are to be thought of 
not simply in individualistic terms. 
For example, the expression en Christo occurs 165 times in Paul's letters, and 
while both en and en Christo are used by Paul in a variety of ways36, one of the 
main meanings of the latter phrase involves a corporate understanding. In Gal. 
3: 28, a common baptism implies that "you are all one in Christ Jesus", while 
elsewhere whole churches are described as being in Christ (cf. Gal. 1: 22,1 
Thess. 1: 1,1 Thess. 2: 14). Elsewhere, as at Rom. 5: 12-21 and 1 Cor. 15: 20-3, 
45-9, we find Paul contrasting those who are 'in Adam' with those who are 'in 
Christ'. Adam and Christ appear to be representative figures here, suggestive of 
two different ways of being human, two possible manifestations of humanity. 
Being 'in Christ' entails in this respect some sort of incorporative or participatory 
notion, because otherwise being in Christ would not imply (for example) that 
Christ's resurrection meant resurrection for all who are in him (Rom. 5: 18ff. ). 
Certainly the phrase is also applied to the individual's relation with Christ, as at 
2 Cor. 5: 17 for example, where "if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation" (cf. 2 
Cor. 12: 2), and it has behavioural and ethical implications for the individual (cf. 
Rom. 12: 3-8), but this reflects only one pole (the other being the corporate pole) 
of Paul's understanding of being in Christ. 
It is perhaps Paul's understanding of the church as the Body of Christ which 
best illustrates the corporate nature of much of his thought concerning 
relationship with God in Jesus Christ. The risen Christ is conceived of at times 
as a corporate entity, of whom Christians are members (e. g. 1 Cor. 6: 15,1 Cor. 
12: 12f), and at other times Christians are understood to become a united body 
by participating in Christ's body and blood (e. g. 1 Cor. 10/11); elsewhere it 
36 For example 'by the instrumentality of Christ' (e. g. 1 Cor. 1: 2) or'on the authority of Christ' (e. g. 
1 Thess 4: 1). See A. J. M. Wedderburn's article'Some Observations on Paul's use of the phrases 
"in Christ" and "with Christ"' JSNT 25 (1985) 83-97 for a detailed consideration. 
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seems that as Christians come together there is a single human organism37 'in 
Christ' (Gal. 3: 28) or a situation where Christ is 'all and in all' (Col. 3: 10-11). It 
would seem natural from this to take the whole Church as Christ's body, even 
though Paul speaks at times of the local church as being the body (cf. 1 Cor. 
12: 27). (Given that Paul was addressing local churches often suffering internal 
difficulties, it is perhaps not surprising that we should find the latter emphasis in 
his writings). Certainly the relationship of members to one another in the body of 
Christ is an intimate one; Paul can speak of how, if one member suffers, all 
suffer together (1 Cor. 12: 26), and how if one member suffers and is comforted, 
all are comforted (2 Cor. 1: 3-7, cf. 2 Cor. 2: 3). However the individual is not 
somehow lost by absorption into Christ's body, Paul speaking of the particularity 
and importance of each individual member by analogy with the various organs 
of the body (1 Cor. 12: 14f. ). 
The phrase 'Body of Christ' is problematic however - can Paul mean when he 
says that "you are the Body of Christ" (1 Cor. 12: 27) that a whole collection of 
people somehow equals the person of Christ or his body? Ziesler addresses 
himself to this question, rejecting some common and misplaced answers to it. 38 
Importantly, Ziesler rejects the idea of a Hebraic notion of 'corporate personality' 
being used by Paul in regard to the Body of Christ, recent scholarship 
suggesting that it is no longer clear whether Old Testament and later Judaism 
envisaged corporate figures (though representative figures were certainly 
present, as mentioned above). Positively, Ziesler suggests that we can at least 
say that Paul's corporate language "means that believers corporately live under 
his power and authority". 39 Thus those who are in Christ, members of his body, 
are influenced by him, being freed from other powers (e. g. Gal. 2: 4), allowing 
Christ to work through them (cf. Paul's boasting in Christ, Rom. 15: 17), and 
dependent on Christ. If we take being in Christ as equivalent to being in the 
Spirit (which Ziesler sees as justified in the light of Rom. 8 and 1 Cor. 15: 45b40 ) 
then the ethical activities and service of the Christian community which mark the 
37 However the phrase 'body of Christ' should not be understood to imply an organic relation of 
the believer to Christ whereby, for example, the believer's falling away causes a certain 
incompleteness in Christ. The interdependence of believers as the body of Christ is also a shared 
dependence on Christ, Paul nowhere suggesting that Christ is dependent on believers, 
organically or otherwise. 
38 J. A. Ziesler, 'Pauline Christianity' (Oxford: OUP, 1990), pp. 59-72. 
39 Ibid., p. 65. 
40 Ibid., pp. 46-48. 
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Spirit's presence (cf. 1 Cor. 2: 4; 12: 4-11, Gal. 5: 18 etc. ) show how relationships 
between human beings are radically affected by this membership of Christ. 
Hooker notes how the Corinthians failed to realise fully the implications of 
sharing in Christ; for them Christ had given that they might receive, Christ died 
so they lived, Christ became poor, so they became rich. But for Paul: 
being in Christ means sharing in in the dying as well as the living, in the giving as well as the 
receiving, in the poverty as well as the riches, in the humiliation as well as the glory. That is why 
conformity to the gospel affects his whole lifestyle. 41 
Thus participation in Christ has implications for all aspects of life, including the 
ethical, the social and the economic spheres. 
I G. Panikulam goes so far as to say that koinonia is always used for someone's 
sharing in Christ with others and that "this leads to the conclusion that koinonia 
in Paul has a strict communitarian sense". 42 The antecedent presupposition of 
participation is often the living Christ, in whom (perhaps through the Spirit) 
Christians participate, by following Christ's example, obeying his teaching, 
sharing similar sufferings, partaking of his body and blood, and entering into the 
dynamic of death and resurrection through baptism. Behind this we can 
perhaps glimpse the idea of Christ as "the true self of the human race, standing 
in that perfect union with God to which others can attain only as they are 
incorporate in Him; the mind, whose thought is truth absolute... which other men 
think after Him; the true life of man, which other men live by sharing it with 
Him". 43 Paul does not provide a detailed explanation of how exactly Christians 
participate in Christ beyond giving examples of such participation. There is 
room however for a Trinitarian understanding of how participation occurs for 
Christians. Phil. 2: 1 and 2 Cor. 13: 14 show how Paul understood Christians as 
becoming partakers of Christ and a fellowship among themselves in the Spirit. 
Thus, there is some support for Panikulam's-conclUsion that "In its God-ward 
and brother-ward dimensions the Spirit becomes-the activating and dynamic 
principle making the concept of koinonia itself a dynamic reality"44 Indeed 
Panikulam, taking iCor. 1: 9 as his starting-point, sees Paul's thought on 
41 M. D. Hooker, 'Interchange in Christ and Ethics' in JSNT 25 (1985), p. 14. 
42G. Panikulam, Koinonia in the New Testament: A Dynamic Expression of Christian Life (Rome: 
Analecta Biblica 85, Biblical Institute Press, 1979), p. 5. 
43 C. H. Dodd. The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: CUP 1953), p. 249. 
44 Panikulam, Koinonia in the New Testament, p. 78 
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koinonia as oriented around the idea of a calling to koinonia with the Son, a 
koinonia realised in the Spirit. Panikulam perhaps overstates his case, and 
understates the variety of use of koinonia in the Pauline corpus, but it is 
noteworthy that we can draw out this Trinitarian strand from Paul's thought. 
A further contrast between Pauline and Platonic understandings of participation 
relates to the way in which Paul can use koinoneo to mean not "to share or 
participate in" but "to give a share in, to make (another) a participant". 45 Paul 
does this on four occasions (Gal. 6: 6, Rom. 12: 13, Phil. 4: 15,16). This usage 
suggests a dimension to participation involving the activity of contributing to 
making the other a fellow-sharer. The much more individualistic way of 
participation stressed in Platonic writings lacks this nuance, a nuance which 
emphasises that koinonia is a dynamic including in its movement the activity of 
assisting others to koinonia. Interestingly Philippians 4: 15 uses koinonia in 
terms of a mutual assistance and reception of assistance and illustrates how 
Paul can stress the active element within participation as mutual assistance, an 
active element resting on the passive element understood as reception of God's 
gift of Himself in Christ through faith. 
Ontologically Paul is quite ambiguous, in two places (1 Cor. 12: 12f and 1 Cor. 
6: 15f) suggesting that being in Christ was somehow really to become part of 
him, while elsewhere speaking of the congregation of Christians as a corporate 
unity, participating in Christ in a manner falling short of organic identification. In 
the light of such ambiguity, we can at most say that in Paul the participating 
relation of Christians to Christ is one involving utter dependence46, intimately 
relating Christians to one another. Moule captures this in seeing phrases such 
as 'we are one body in Christ' as meaning that Christians owe their deep unity 
with one another to the fact that they are 'in Christ', incorporated in him and in 
unity with one another as they participate together in Christ. 47 However Moule 
45 See M. McDermott, S. J., 'The Biblical Doctrine of KOINONIA' in Biblische Zeitschrift (1975), 64- 
77. 
46 J. D. G. Dunn puts it well when he notes that the "religious experiences of the earliest 
community, including experiences like those enjoyed by Jesus himself, were seen as dependent 
on him and derivative from him... the religious experience of the Christian is not merely 
experience like that of Jesus, it is experience which at all characteristic and distinctive points is 
derived from Jesus the Lord, and which only makes sense when this derivative and dependent 
character is recognised'. Jesus and the Spirit (London: SCM 1975), p. 194f., p. 342. 
47 Moule, The Origin of Christology, p. 73. 
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suggests further that "it is by participating in what is thus given that Christians 
become a 'united' body"48. We would rather say that to participate in what is 
given is to be, in part a united body. In this way we do not stand in danger of 
separating the individual's participation in Christ from interpersonal relations. 
Finally we should note an (at least implicit) eschatological dimension to Paul's 
understanding of participation. Paul speaks of how "we suffer with him (Christ) 
in order that we may also be glorified with him" (Rom. 8: 17), of how we are to be 
made alive at a future resurrection by being in Christ (1 Cor. 15: 20-23), and 
Ziesler points out that in Paul's discussions of the Eucharist at 1 Cor. 10: 16-21 
and 11: 20-33 Paul "sees it as looking back to the death of Jesus, as conveying 
a present fellowship of participants with one another and their lord, and as 
pointing forward to the messianic banquet". This eschatological dimension 
should perhaps further caution us against an ontological identification of the 
present church with Christ. 
2.9 The Gospel Writers 
Moving on to the Gospels, there are relatively few occurrences of terms which 
relate to the word 'participation'. Among a number of isolated occurrences in the 
Synoptic Gospels, Mt. 23: 30 and Lk. 5: 10 use koinonos, meaning one having in 
common with (a particular function) and Lk. 5: 7 has metochos, meaning partner, 
in this case fellow fisherman. The one reference to koinonia in Acts, at Acts 
2: 42, has been argued by McDermott to imply "a unity of heart and spirit among 
the early Christians, a recurring theme in the early chapters of Acts (1: 14; 2: 46; 
4: 32)". 49 We might add that the koinonia referred to is one involving "the 
breaking of the bread and the prayers"' (2: 42b), so that koinonia does not 
simply mean "community", but the community sharing in a particular relation to 
the God who has called them to koinonia (cf. Acts 2: 39). The synoptic gospels 
certainly do not continue to-use xoLvwv- words with anything like the frequency 
or depth of meaning which we find in Paul. 
Before moving on to the letter to the Hebrews, we should note that much of the 
work done by the term 'participation' in Paul's letters is carried by the idea of 
48 Moule, The Origin of Christology, p. 73 
49 M. McDermott, "The Biblical Doctrine of KOINONIA" in Biblische Zeitschrift 19 (1975), p. 231 
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'indwelling' in the Johannine literature. The link of relationships between 
believers and between believers and God is underlined (e. g. 1 Jn. 4: 12,1 Jn. 
2: 5-6, Jn. 15: 4), the unity of believers is understood in terms of indwelling (e. g. 
Jn. 17: 21,17: 22b), the dependence of believers on Christ is stressed (e. g. Jn. 
15: 4), and the indwelling does not omit an eschatological perfecting of the 
believers (e. g. Jn. 17: 24,12: 32, contra Bultmann's claim that John's 
eschatology is strictly realised50. ) Admittedly there are differences - for example 
John tends to see indwelling as being reciprocal (e. g. the reciprocal indwelling 
of Jesus and the disciples, Jn. 15: 7) whereas Paul did not speak of Christ 
participating in believers. Again John is much readier to speak of believers 
being in God than Paul is, Paul's Jewish piety and sense of God's 
transcendence perhaps constraining him to speak rather of participation, and 
participation in Christ as a mediating relationship with the Father. Still, the fact 
that 'indwelling' is used in the ways illustrated perhaps goes some way to 
explain the paucity of terms relating to participation in the Johannine corpus. 
2.10 Hebrews 
Finally, the Epistle to the Hebrews frequently speaks of metochos or metochoi, 
partaker(s). So at Heb. 3: 1 Christian brethren are sharers in a heavenly calling, 
they are metochoi tou Christou (Heb. 3: 14), and "have become partakers of the 
Holy Spirit" (Heb. 6: 4). C. K. Barrett asserted that a Platonic type of vertical 
dualism between earth and heaven does not control the author's thinking, 
Barrett having established the role of history and time in the letter. 51 Even so, 
there do seem to be echoes of a Platonic understanding of participation, not in 
terms of an imitation of a heavenly reality but rather in terms of a partaking of a 
superior and permanent reality, albeit one which breaks into earthly existence 
in an unplatonic way. H. W. Attridge, commenting on Heb. 3: 1 says that "the 
terminology of participation... has, at least in this context, some of the 
connotations associated with the Platonic notion that things in the material 
world of change and decay have their reality by 'participation' in an ideal 
50 See for example R. Bultmann's Theology of the New Testament, Vol. II (London: SCM, 1955), 
pp. 37-43. 
51 C. K. Barrett, "The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews, " in The Background of the New 
Testament and its Eschatology. Festschrift for C. H. Dodd. Ed. D. Daube and W. D. Davies 
(Camb(dge: CUP, 1956), pp. 363-393. 
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realm". 52 
As to the time when participation occurs F. F. Bruce suggests that the meaning of 
the phrase "partners in Christ" at Heb. 3: 14 is "probably not that of participation 
in Him (as in the Pauline expression "in Christ"), but rather that of participation 
with Him in His heavenly kingdom - the unshakeable kingdom of Heb. 12: 28". 53 
But this need not necessarily imply that there is no real participation in the 
present life, Heb. 6: 4 speaking of a present participation in the Holy Spirit which 
means for the baptised participants a tasting "of the goodness of the word of 
God and the powers of the age to come" (Heb. 6: 5). We should note the falling 
away of some who have already partaken in the Holy Spirit (cf. Heb. 6: 1-8) and 
perhaps agree with E. Nardoni that, 
since their baptism, believers have come to partake in Christ in the eschatological reality. Yet, 
while on earth, they are exposed to a loss of their participation. Their definitive participation is 
contingent on their faithfulness to the end. 54 
The Epistle uses the concept of participation to encourage its readers who may 
be tempted to return to the Mosaic priestly system (Heb. 3: 1-6) and to 
strengthen those who suffer and are tempted; "For we share in Christ, if only we 
hold our first confidence (upostaseos) firm to the end" (Heb. 3: 14). While the use 
of 'participation' stresses the nearness of the new invisible world and in part 
seeks to comfort, it does not exclude the need for perseverance or make room 
for moral laxity. If the brethren share in the heavenly call (Heb. 3: 1), they are to 
understand that this includes becoming sharers in discipline (paideia) (Heb. 
12: 8). Not participating in such discipline implies that "you are illegitimate 
children and not sons" (Heb. 12: 8), and part of sharing in this discipline involves 
ethically proper and loving relations with the brethren (Heb. 12: 14-13: 9). 
Particularly notable in the Epistle is the way in which the relation between Christ 
and the church can be understood in terms of participation. Christians are 
exhorted to share in the heavenly call (Heb. 3: 1), a call which brethren share in 
as they are "faithful in God's house" (v. 2,6) and as they do so they "are his 
house" (v. 6). As Nardoni points out the Christians are "brothers of Christ in 
52 H. W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews (Philadelphia: Fortress, c. 1989), p. 106. 
53 F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1964) p. 68. 
54 E. Nardoni, 'Partakers in Christ (Hebrews 3: 14)' in New Test. Stud. vol. 37 (1991), p. 472. 
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God's house because they are given to partake in a heavenly call (kleseos 
epouraniou metochoi). "55 It is this group which is also referred to as the 
partakers in Christ in the later phrase in the same section (Heb. 3: 14), so that it 
is the Christian community that has received the heavenly call and "are 
partaking in the transcendent and eschatological reality that the divine call 
offers". 56 Indeed it is not implausible that the parallel of "we are God's house" 
(Heb. 3: 6) and "we have become partakers in Christ" (Heb. 3: 14) is meant by 
the author to imply that the participatory relationship of believer to Christ occurs 
in God's house. Nardoni argues that to understand the participation of the 
Christian in Christ in Hebrews more closely, we must pay attention to the role of 
Christ in God's house, a role which is primarily that of high priest. 57 Interestingly, 
this is precisely what Heb. 3: 1-6 reflects upon, and Nardoni brings out the point 
that the four prominent roles ascribed to Jesus in this passage, that of apostle, 
high priest, the son of God and the messianic king, are all encompassed, 
dominated and directed by the notion of Jesus as high priest. 58 The Christian 
community participates in these various roles of Christ; the apostolic witness 
(e. g. Heb. 13: 4,13: 17), the divine sonship (e. g. Heb. 2: 10,12: 23), the royal 
power (Heb. 12: 28) of the messianic king, and the priestly capacity to approach 
God in the heavenly sanctuary (Heb. 10: 19-22). 59 
This capacity to approach the heavenly sanctuary is understood as a regular, 
free right for the believer, in contrast to the exclusive privilege of the high priest 
of the old covenant (Heb. 9: 25, Heb. 10: 19). Christians are exhorted to draw 
near to the sanctuary, confident of the way having been pioneered by Christ 
and assured by his blood (Heb. 10: 19), Christians are to "draw near to the 
throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and find grace to help in time of 
need" (Heb. 4: 16). This is not to undermine the uniqueness of Christ's sole 
mediatorship and intercession, nor the expiation due to him alone, but the 
priestly language used to describe the liturgical performances of the community 
sanctified by Jesus' blood is suggestive of "the priestly capacity of the believer 
of the new covenant, a capacity which derives from, and partakes in, Christ's 
55 Nardoni, 'Partakers in Christ', p. 458. 
56 Ibid., p. 459. 
57 Ibid., p. 459. 
58 Ibid., 459-462. 
59 Ibid., 462-465 for a more detailed discussion. 
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unique priesthood. Such a participation is consistent with the pattern of 
Christians partaking in Jesus' titles". 60 
2.11 Conclusion: Implications 
A number of closing remarks concerning 'participation' in the New Testament 
should be made. First of all, the concept can be thought of using different terms, 
deriving from the root xoLvwv- or ji r -. Participation is dependent upon the 
action of God, involving a coming together of those called to participation. 
Participation is dependent upon Christ in particular, and it is tempting to suggest 
that "in him exists a koinonia between man and God, because he is himself God 
and man. Incarnation is the first moment of God's koinonia". 61 Strictly speaking 
we cannot read this conclusion off from the Biblical documents, but it is certainly 
a valid implication from the scriptural evidence. Again the work of the Spirit is 
often in view, facilitating participation, and enabling it to continue and perhaps 
even perfecting it. Participation is God's initiative, yet it depends upon human 
responsiveness for its development, and participation has both a 'vertical' and a 
'horizontal' dimension, involving relationships between participants as well as 
between believers and God. (We have often found icotvwv- words to be best 
translated as implying 'participation with others in something', especially the 
Pauline corpus). There is a real participation in God in the present life, yet there 
is also a future completion or perfection of this participation awaited. At only one 
point is it suggested that believers partake of the 'divine nature' (2 Peter 1: 4) 
and it is much more frequent to find that in which we participate being 
correspondent to the way of Christ's existence in its social, behavioural, ethical, 
didactic and spiritual dimensions. Such participation is not simply due to our 
autonomous imitation however because our dependence on Christ and his 
initiative through the Spirit is responsible for raising us to participation, a 
participation including involvement in Christ's suffering, death and resurrection, 
which path to resurrection has first been forged out by Christ. We have also 
seen how participation can be 'in' the various roles of Christ in his relation to 
creation (e. g. as high priest) and in his relation to the Father (e. g. as Son of 
God), but this is again dependent on Christ and our relationship with him. The 
60 Nardoni, 'Partakers in Christ', p. 468, see also 465-467. 
61 Panikulam, Koinonia in the New Testament, p. 140. 
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locus of our participation is often regarded as the Christian community (e. g. 1 
Cor. 10/11, Heb. 3: 1-6) which immediately suggests the significance of 
ecciesiology for our discussion. Further, sacramental participation is especially 
highlighted (e. g. 1 Cor. 10/11, Jn. 6: 52,56, cf. Rom. 6: 3-4) and given the 
corporate nature of participation it is at least plausible to infer that the beginning 
of our active participation in Christ is the moment of embedding in the Christian 
family, baptism. 
Talk of 'divinisation' through participation finds little Biblical warrant and 
requires considerable qualification (such as that of our continuing dependence 
on Christ) if it is to bear any continuity with the scriptural understanding of 
participation. Undergirding the notion of participation in the New Testament is 
no clear ontology but there is room for an understanding built on a Trinitarian 
basis and this is perhaps the most promising way forward, understanding our 
participation as coming about through the Trinitarian action of God and 
involving us in the dynamic of interrelations within the Trinity (e. g. the Father 
and Son 'making their home' in the believer, Jn. 14: 23). As we are caught up in 
the Son's response to the Father through the Spirit we find ourselves being led 
to that teleological fulfilment in which both horizontal and vertical relationships 
have 'come right' and which have enabled our ontological re-constitution as 
who we were meant to be. (This assumes that relationship is an ontological 
rather than simply a logical category - see Chapter 3 for this). Further, the nature 
of God's Trinitarian life being one of self-differentiation, perfect giving and 
receiving and harmony in otherness at least suggests the possibility that the 
creature's otherness, giving and receiving might find a place in God. 
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3. PARTICIPATION IN EARLY CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
To survey the large amount of material relating to the concept of participation in 
the first six centuries after Christ would require a thesis in itself. Here we shall 
concentrate on key aspects of the notion which provide further insight into the 
waysthe m ; c, 't was understood and developed, along with ways in which the 
concept helped crystallise particular theological positions and focus debate. 
3.1 Origen 
In Origen we can see the first extensive use of a theology of participation, and 
one which is grounded in the (Platonic and Neoplatonic) understanding of 
'participation' (metoche, metousia) as relating lower to higher within a hierarchy 
of being. Origen writes that the Son is begotten of the Father "as an act of will 
proceeds from the mind" (De Principiis 1.2.6, hereafter D. P. ), the Son being 
begotten as the image of the invisible God, "and what we are to the Son, such is 
the Son to the Father" (D. P. 1.2.6). (What we are to the Son depends on our 
participation in the Son for Origen, so Origen seems to be suggesting a kind of 
participation of the Son in the Father here). Origen works hard to give the Son 
his due in describing his relationship with the Father but supposed Biblical 
warrant for the Son's secondary nature (e. g. Jn. 14: 28, Jn. 17: 3, Mk. 10: 8), 
added weight to Origen's case for distinguishing the Father (as autotheos) from 
the Son; indeed "all that is deified... by participation in the godhead of the 
autotheos, ought more properly to be called notV Theos' but 'Theos"' (Comm. 
on John 2.2) argues Origen. In the light of this, Crouzel's view that metoche is 
indicative not of "participation" but of "communication" in the context of the 
Son's participation in the Father requires qualification. ' "Communication" does 
not of itself imply the Son's dependence or subordinate status as one who has 
been communicated to, such status being implicit in Origen's use of 
'participation', although it does capture the Father's initiative and gives us 
perhaps a sharper sense of the Neoplatonic influences on Origen. 
But not only is it the case that the Son (and the Holy Spirit) participate in the 
1 Crouzel states that for Origen "the Father and the Son possess a common nature, of which the 
Father is the origin and which he communicates to the Son. " H. Crouzel, Theologie de 1'image de 
Dieu (Paris: Aubier, 1956), p. 110. 
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Father, because at a different level 'rational creatures' participate in the Trinity. 
(A third kind of participation might also be mentioned - namely that of creatures 
in the Trinity in virtue of which they have their being2). Origen remarks that "all 
rational beings are partakers of the Word of God" (D. P. 1.3.6). Such a 
participation varies "in proportion to the earnestness of the soul and the 
capacity of the mind" (D. P. 4.4.9). The human soul of Jesus had clung to God 
from the beginning to a preeminent degree, unlike other souls whose affections 
had 'cooled' to varying degrees, as a result of the exercise of free-will. 3 This 
relates to Origen's understanding of an originary world of spiritual beings in 
koinonia with God, minds or rational beings which strictly speaking became 
souls (psuches) as a result of wearying of contemplation and the divine love, 
(see D. P. 2.8 on this). Jesus' firmness of purpose in clinging to God ensured 
that what formerly depended on will was, by influence of long custom changed 
to nature, his human soul becoming attached to the Son in a "union inseparable 
and insoluble" (D. P. 4.4.4), so that we can assume that in Christ there was a 
human rational soul, yet not one susceptible to human sin (D. P. 2.6.5). (Notice 
here that Jesus' status is achieved by moral means and appears to have 
ontological implications). The varying degrees of 'cooling' help explain the 
diversity of states human beings find themselves in (D. P. 2.9.6), and the fact that 
this falling away is a result of disaffection and the exercise of free-will suggests 
that the way back to participation in the Trinity is through an appropriate use of 
freedom and a focusing of love on the Trinity. That this progression is also 
understood in a rational and intellectual sense is made clear by Origen (cf. D. P. 
2.11.7) The tone here is deeply Platonic in that the soul becomes more free to 
contemplate "the pure" as bodily burdens become less cumbersome (and are 
finally alleviated at death. ) The 'inner man' never falls so far as to be beyond 
recall to the image and likeness of God, an initiative which may be God's but 
which also depends on human effort for its realisation (D. P. 4.4.10). The rational 
creature's participation in God varies according to the degree of the creature's 
dedication and the capacity for such participation (D. P. 4.4.9). (On the whole 
Origen does not tend to stress the corporate dimension of participation, 
2 Origen sees God Himself as transcending Being; God is "beyond Being"(Comm. on John 19.6) 
and "God does not even participate in being. For he is participated in, rather than participates" 
(Contra Celsum VI. 64). These statements also reveal the asymmetrical character of participation in 
Origen's thought. 
3 Origen sees a primordial and intimate fellowship of souls with God, but he does not make clear 
whether this originary situation involves human souls encircling the Father, the Logos or both. 
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concentrating on the 'vertical' rather than the 'horizontal' implications of the 
notion, perhaps reflecting the dominance of Platonic rather than Christian ideas 
in his understanding of the term. ) Origen's Eucharistic teaching is of a piece 
with his emphasis on participation depending on right conduct. He condemns 
those who consume the elements while also harbouring enmity for their 
neighbours but the Eucharistic act is "a holy thing which sanctifies those who 
use it with a sound purpose". 4 Having said this, a Gnostic, Platonizing tendency 
can be seen in the way in which, in a number of passages, Origen distinguishes 
two aspects to sacramental nourishment: 
The outward rite, he implies, which imparts the sacramental body and blood, is for the simpler 
grade of Christians, while the more advanced, with their profounder insight, find nourishment in 
the Logos Himself. 5 
Participation in God is a participation in the Trinity for Origen, and as 
by participation in the Son of God a man is adopted among God's sons, and by participation in the 
wisdom which is in God he becomes wise, so, too, by participation in the Holy Spirit he becomes 
holy and spiritual(D. P. 4.4.5) . 
Participation in the Holy Spirit is the beginning of the road to perfection, the 
Spirit sanctifying and purifying the creature. In relation to this, it should be noted 
that the soul's ascent to God is initiated for Origen by baptism, the Spirit making 
it possible for us to receive and benefit from what God has done for us in Christ. 
While the work of the Spirit is always present in those participating in the 
Godhead, it leads on to a participation in Christ, participation in whom makes 
the participant rational and wise (See D. P. 1.3.7-8). (This is not to say the 
Logos has not been active since the Fall, for its activity can be seen reflected in 
rational creatures' possession of intelligence, which is participation in the Logos 
(cf. D. P. 1.3.6). ) Further, through the Logos "the highest and holiest of rational 
creatures are themselves 'made gods' (theopoiethenai) - by their own mediated 
and analogous 'participation in the deity of the Father' (metoche tes ekeinou 
theoteton - Comm. on John 2: 2-3)". 6 This progression upwards through the 
persons of the Trinity is typical of Origen's treatment of the ascent of the soul in 
stages. We have noted already the importance of a 'rational love' in 
4 Contra Cefsum, 8,33 
5 See J. N. D. KeIIy, Early Christian Doctrines (London: A&C Black, 5th ed., 1977), p. 214. The 
earlier Alexandrian thinker, Clement, comes close to a mechanical view of participation through 
the Eucharistic act at times; "To drink Jesus's blood (Clement states), is to participate in His 
incorruptibility;... and those who drink it are sanctified in body and soul". Ibid., p. 213 
6 B. Drewery, 'Deification' in Christian Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Gordon Rupp ed. 
P. Brooks (London: SCM, 1975), p. 45. 
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progressing through the stages and 'degrees' of participation but Origen is also 
concerned in places to remind us of the dependence on that which is 
participated for participation to be a reality. 
A danger in considering the soul's ascent through stages is that stages are 'left 
behind' as successive stages are reached. Origen's remarks on our 
participation in the Trinity and qualifications concerning the 'unceasing' work of 
for example the Spirit in the work of perfecting the creature should perhaps 
warn us against understanding the various levels of participation as discrete. It 
is "through the ceaseless work of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, renewed at 
every stage of our progress, (that) we may perchance just succeed at last in 
beholding the holy and blessed life" (D. P. 1.3.8). Origen also speaks at times of 
our ultimate participation not as being one in the Father alone, but as 
participation in the unity of the Father and the Son (e. g. D. P. 3.6.1). Even so, 
some of Origen's remarks concerning faith in the Incarnation as "the period of 
the shadow" suggest that this is a stage which is left behind as the soul ascends 
(see esp. Comm. on John 1.9). These points can best be reconciled by noting 
that Origen is often less than clear about his distinction between Jesus Christ 
and the Logos in his writings, but that his Platonic inclinations dominate so that 
"Origen's mysticism centred on Christ is ultimately transcended by a mysticism 
centred on the eternal Word". 7 But this estimation of the importance of the 
Incarnation immediately raises questions about Origen's ontology, questions 
which, as we shall see, lead to deep concerns about Origen's thought. 
3.2 Origen and the Ontology of Participation 
Crouzel, dealing with Origen's image-theology, shows how the human being 
proceeds through stages from being in God's image to being in his likeness 
("which will be conferred upon us in proportion to the perfection of our merits" 
(D. P. 3.6.1)) to being one with him ("from being similar to become 'one thing'... 
that in the consummation or end God is 'all in all... (D. P. 3.6.1)). This final stage 
led Jerome to accuse Origen of "distributing the essence of Almighty God to 
angels and men"8, and is one more indication to scholars such as Meyendorff 
that Origen is working in the framework of an "essentially Platonic monism"9. 
7 A. Louth, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, p. 66. 
8 See G. W. Butterworth's Origen on First Principles (London: SPCK, 1936), p. 326 
9 J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (New York: St. Vladimir's, 1975), p. 51. 
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However it can be argued that while Origen speaks of our 'kinship' with God 
and of how 'men have a kind of blood-relationship with God' (D. P. 4.4.10) and 
while it may be that an understanding of deification lies in the background of 
Origen's thought concerning the rational creature's ascent, such criticisms pay 
too little attention to the way in which Origen distinguishes the creatures' 'deity 
by participation' from the deity of God; Drewery points out that "Their 'deification' 
is always by grace, never by nature: ... they are never... immutable, eternal as is 
God... They are gods who can go wrong and lose their divinity"lo. The price 
Origen pays for such a distinction is of course a high one; Origen speculates 
that there will be successive cycles of worlds, rational creatures passing 
through different phases of existence according as they choose good or evil 
(e. g. D. P. 1.6.3,3.6.3). This in turn suggests further falls are possible, 
undermining Christian eschatology. 11 Further, even if Origen succeeds in 
distinguishing deity by participation from the Father's deity, we need to inquire 
whether Origen distinguishes our (prospective) participation in God from the 
participation of Christ in the Father. 
What is the distinction between our participation in God and that of Christ, 
between our prospective divinisation and the divinity of Jesus Christ? If by dint 
of discipline and long-custom we too are joined to the Logos in a union 
'inseparable and insoluble' then does our status not become the same as that 
of Christ, and our relation to the Logos similar? (Origen exhorts his readers to 
imitate Christ and the deification of Christ's human nature "is the terminus of the 
divine pedagogy for all those who follow him to God". 12) Very briefly, the 
uniqueness of Christ lies in the fact that his nous13 alone clung to God 
unchangeably, enabling his free-will (because it made its definitive choices 
prior to Incarnation) to be unhampered by incarnation and enabling his nous to 
combine with the characteristics of the psychic realm to positive effect. Our free- 
will is unreliable in comparison because of our being immersed in the psychic 
10 Drewery, 'Deification', p. 45. 
11 Origen himself argued that God will be all in all as at the beginning finally, a situation realised 
through discipline, persuasion and instruction where human beings are concerned (cf D. P. 
3.5.7f). The question is whether his ontology and view of enduring human mutability expressed 
elsewhere can allow for this hopefulness. 
12 Drewery, ibid., p. 46. 
13 Psuche and nous are to be distinguished in Origen's understanding of 'soul'. Psuche refers to 
the empirical condition of the inner person, including the mechanics of passibility as well as the 
rational, intuitive, contemplative element of nous. 
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realm before definitively orientating ourselves towards God. Not only so, but the 
price paid for our original infidelity appears to be permanent instability and the 
possibility of further falls, unlike Christ. 14 So the quality of our relationship with 
the Logos has an element of contingency about it which does not hold in Jesus' 
case, distinguishing our participation in the Logos from that of Jesus. 
The dioratic15 quality of the nous entails an openness towards the Logos which 
is never lost and which allows for a share in the divine life, participation. Origen 
speaks of our 'participation' in the Logos and also of Jesus' participation in the 
Logos. Such language gives the impression of there being an important 
distinction between Jesus and the Logos, Jesus' soul being "in partnership with 
the Word of God" (D. P. 4.4.4). In the end, as we have seen, Origen chooses to 
see the Incarnation leading us up to a higher conception of God the Logos, 
suggesting a separation of Jesus and the Logos in the hierarchy of being. 
Origen's difficulties rest in part with his notion of 'participation'. However much 
the word may be intended to operate analogically when applied to different 
levels (of our participation in God, the participation of Jesus in the Logos and 
participation within the Trinity), the term always relates in Origen to the 
participation of an inferior, dependent reality in a superior, independent reality. 
So in attempting to use the term to describe Jesus' relation to the Logos, it is not 
surprising that the idea of Incarnation gives way finally to a Logocentric 
theology. However Origen still manages to defend the uniqueness of Christ by 
following this course and he does separate and connect the Logos from deified 
man, as archetype from ectype. Such thought leads us to a discussion of what it 
is to be in the image of God, a discussion we shall take up later. What is clear is 
that the understanding of participation in terms of imaging is also found in Plato, 
and Origen shows his reliance on this notion of participation as he struggles to 
distinguish between our participation in God and that of the Son in the Father: 
Sometimes the term 'image' is app tpd to an object painted or carved on some material, such as 
wood or stone. Sometimes a child is said to be the image of its parent, or when the likeness of the 
parent's features is in every respect faithfully reproduced in the child. Now I think the first of these 
illustrations may be fitfully applied to him who was made'in the image and likeness of God', that is, 
man... But in regard to the Son of God... the image may be compared to our second illustration; for 
this reason, that he is the invisible image of the invisible God... (D. P. 1.2.6). 
14 Augustine rather unkindly refers to Origen's understanding of the soul's situation as endless 
real misery punctuated by short periods of fallacious happiness (City of God XII, 20). 
15 By dioratic we mean 'open at both ends', open that is to union with the Logos and also open 
and capable of being limited by association with the passible, empirical condition of the inner self. 
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Both illustrations rely on the idea of imaging, although Origen manages to 
distinguish different kinds of imaging, one being much more intimate and 
'organic' than the other. 
It still remains for us to assess the charge of "Platonic monism" levelled at 
Origen by Meyendorff. That Origen appears to understand reality in terms of the 
Platonic distinction between Being and Becoming seems clear from remarks he 
makes concerning followers of Christ in Contra Celsum ; 
It is not merely a matter of theory when they distinguish between being and becoming and 
between what is intelligible and what is visible, and when they associate truth with being and by all 
possible means avoid the error that is bound up with becoming. They look, as they have learnt, 
not at the things which are becoming, which are seen and on that account temporal, but at the 
higher things, whether one wishes to call them 'being' or things 'invisible' because they are 
intelligible, or'things which are not seen' because their nature lies outside the realm of sense- 
perception. " (Contra Celsum VII. 46). 
The problem arises concerning how to connect these two realms and it is here 
that Origen stands in danger of Platonic monism, of identifying that which is of 
the essence of human beings with the realm of Being. Space does not allow a 
detailed consideration here, but what is clear is that Origen does not in fact 
make such an identification, arguing that the human nous is open at both ends, 
able that is to be in union both with the mundane order of Becoming and also 
open to union with the Logos and the realm of Being. Paradoxically the nous 
itself, the organ of salvation, does not seem to belong to the order of Becoming 
because it is by nature immutable (D. P. 1.4.3), yet neither does it seem to 
belong to the order of Being because it had a 'beginning' (D. P. 1.2.2). (This 
understanding begins to challenge the Being/Becoming dualism which is at the 
heart of early understandings of participation, and while at one level it might be 
regarded as confused and contradictory, at another level it might be regarded 
as visionary! ) 
Origen's ontology is not simply a "Platonic monism" then, if by this we mean 
that the essential nature of the human being is ontologically identifiable with the 
divine realm. However his ontology still faces problems associated with the 
assumed exclusivity of the spheres of Being and Becoming. How, with this 
Platonic background, can the nous belong to both realms or neither or, if it 
belongs to one realm only, how is it open to union with the other realm? Origen 
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does not provide answers to such questions. Notions such as that of 
participation help to ease the tension in suggesting a degree of affinity to God 
which softens the sharp either/or duality inherent in the Platonic ontology of 
Being and Becoming but without a clear explanation of the ontological 
implications of such participation, the questions remain pressing. 
Aware as he is of the distinction between the realms of Being and Becoming, 
Origen works with a hierarchy of Being, lower levels of reality being both 
connected and separated from higher levels by means of relationships he refers 
to as 'participation'. (And we have seen that this is true of relationships within 
the Trinity as well as between God and creaturely beings). As the human soul 
progresses it participates in ever higher levels of reality, moving from a simple, 
'natural' participation in being-in-general to a participation in the Spirit to a 
participation in the Son to a participation in deity. (We have already cautioned 
against seeing such a process as rendering earlier stages superfluous as the 
soul progresses). This participation is the result of God's initiative and the free, 
loving and personal response of creatures to that initiative. But even at the dizzy 
heights of deification the rational souls betray their beginnings, retaining their 
freedom, their finitude and their instability. Thus participation in Origen signals 
the possibility of a relationship between ontologically different realms but does 
not imply ontological conversion. This is its richness and its final limitation in 
Origen's thought; how for example on this understanding are we to understand 
participation in God as a genuine relationship able to sustain a Christian 
eschatology if we wish to keep a qualitative distinction between participants and 
that which is participated, and what ontology can allow for this? 
3.3 The Arlan Crisis: Distinguishing Divine and Human 
Participation 
The Arian crisis of the fourth century helps focus attention on an issue already 
present in Origen's thought, namely the distinction of Christ's 'participation' in 
the Godhead and human beings' participation in God. Arius denied any 
participation of the Son in the Father's ousia or phusis, being moved to do so 
perhaps by talk of a 'substantial' unity between Father and Son expressed by 
the likes of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Following Williams' assessment of the 
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evidence, it may be that Arius felt such language is "either (nonsensically) 
ditheistic, or else it is Sabellian - in which case it is completely subversive of 
the Son's dignity, since it altogether denies his independent existence". 16 It is 
not simply that Arius was concerned to stress the Father's sovereign position, 
which he probably was, » but that he also sought to assert the Son's distinctive 
position in the face of what he saw to be dangerously ambiguous phraseology 
and innovation. Behind Arius' protestations may lie quite precise 
understandings of 'substance' and 'substantial participation'. For Arius it seems 
that the Son "is not that Logos which is in the Father by nature and proper to his 
substance, nor his own proper wisdom, by which he created this world". 18 
Substance is that which defines a thing essentially and if the Son's particularity 
is to be protected he must have essential characteristics different from those of 
the Father. Otherwise the Son cannot be aypostasis or, if he is, then Father and 
Son are component elements in the Godhead, making the Godhead divisible so 
threatening divine simplicity and immateriality. 19 
But can the Son not 'participate' in the Father according to Arius? Arius would 
have no qualms accepting the Son's dependence on the Father but if, as seems 
plausible, Arius understood the term 'participation' in terms similar to that of 
Alexander and Porphyry, he could not accept that the Son 'participated' in the 
Father. Arius would seek to avoid talk of the Son's participation in the Father, 
indicative as it would be of the sort of identity of substance he is at pains to 
avoid. 20 
However Arius does use the term metoche according to the testimony of 
Alexander and Athanasius, the Son being appropriately named Wisdom and 
Word because the Son participates in the eternal Word and Wisdom of God. 21 
16 R. Williams, 'The Logic of Arianism', JTS Vol 34, No. 1, p. 58. 
71* 17 Arius is shown to speak of God in an extremely absolutist fashion by Athanasius (Or. con Ar. 
1: 5-6) and Arius' letters are consistent with this, his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia for example 
citing scripture which spoke of God as monos (Jn. 17: 3,1Tim. 6: 16b, Rom. 16: 27). 
18 R. Williams, ibid., p. 59, n. 20. 
19 R. Williams, ibid., pp. 63-66 for a more detailed argument. 
20 ".. a good deal of Arius' polemic, in the Thalia and in his letters, hangs together very 
consistently if it is read as a refutation of all the available senses of substantial identity or 
participation applied to God and the Son, the whole range of meanings covered by omoousios, ek 
tes tou patros ousias, ... and so forth". R. Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 223. 
21 R. wlliams, 'The Logic of Arianism', p. 74, n. 90. 
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While it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Arius' opponents are often 
couching his arguments in a manner suited to their critique of them, Arius also 
used such language in his Thalia, the divine Logos and Wisdom creating in the 
Son their closest possible finite image so that the Son could be said to 'share' 
in such divine powers in so far as he is directly their product: "He demonstrates 
the immediate and unimpeded eff ect of logos and sophia, and so in some 
significant measure reflects what they are like". 22 Indeed given that Arius is 
relatively clear in showing that participation cannot be substantial, he may well 
have felt liberated to use the term, indicative as it is of dependence, "capitalising 
a little on its vagueness and its acceptability in Trinitarian vocabulary of a 
conventional 'hierarchical' kind. "23 (Perhaps Arius was also influenced by 
Origenistic thought, both to claim orthodoxy ironically and sharing Origen's 
concern to establish the sovereignty of the Father, using similar terminology 
such as participation and image in describing the Son's relation to the Father). 
When Arius speaks then of the Son participating in Wisdom and the Logos, it 
seems that he is not suggesting that being rational and wise is part of his 
essential definition, but accidental to him. According to Athanasius, Arius writes 
that: 
Christ is not true God, but by participation (metoche) even he was made God. The Son does not 
know the Father exactly, nor does the Logos see the Father perfectly, and neither does he 
perceive nor the Logos understand the Father exactly; for he is not the true and only Logos of 
Father, but by a name alone he is called Logos and Sophia and by grace is called Son and Power 
(Or. con Ar. 1.9). 
Further, Athanasius notes that the Son's metoche charitos in God implies the 
Word's remaining "good by his own free will, while he chooses" (Or. con Ar. 
1.5). But this ethical and voluntaristic understanding of the Son's obedience 
appears to suggest that there is-some impropriety in ascribing divine titles 
outright to the Son, and Alexander and Athanasius are quick to point this out, 
accusing Arius of being able to call the Son Logos and Sophia only 
katachrestikos, an accusation whose implication is that the 'participation' of the 
Son in the Father's perfection is in name alone. 24 Further, Arius appears to 
22 Ibid., p. 74. 
23 Ibid., p. 75. 
24 Williams details the meaning of katachrestikos as used by Alexander and Athanasius, 'The 
Logic of Arianism', p. 76-77. 
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stand in danger of a kind of adoptionism (as Athanasius points out) if the Son is 
Logos and Sophia kata charin, rather than by substantial participation. It is only 
fair to note however that these allegations do not concur with the explicit 
statements of Arius in his own letters concerning the nature of the Son. 
Athanasius' concerns with Arius' thought at this point reflect his desire to stress 
the true, full and authentic divinity of Christ. Our salvation depends for 
Athanasius on our participation in the divine nature, in virtue of which we are 
divinised (theopoiesis). Athanasius writes that "the Word became man so that 
we might be deified" (De Inc. 54), and "by becoming man He made us sons to 
the Father, and he deified men by Himself becoming man" (Or. con Ar. 1.38). 
Had Christ not been 'fully' divine he would have been unable to communicate 
his divine nature to us, his grace being sufficient only for himself; 
it is not possible, that He, who merely possesses from participation, should impart of that partaking 
to others, since what he has is not his own but the giver's; and what he has received is barely the 
grace suff icient for himself" (De synodis 51). 
Kelly notes a certain Platonic realism about Athanasius' thought at this point, 
human nature appearing as "a concrete idea or universal in which all individual 
men participate". 25 Only through the Incarnation is our participation effected and 
through the Incarnation there is a kind of 'transfer' of human nature to a 'Christ- 
like' nature, a transfer beginning personally with the dawn of faith and being 
completed at death with the realisation of immortality and deification (e. g. Ad 
Adelphium 4). However the knowledge of God mediated to us through Christ " is 
a knowledge which is realised only through the activity of the Spirit and only as 
in the Spirit we participate in the Son and through him in God (Or. Con. Ar. 1.15- 
16)". Elsewhere Athanasius speaks of that divinisation which depends on our 
intimate union with the Spirit, who unites us to the Father through the Son, a 
union dependent on the response of our hearts (Or. con Ar. 2.59). Even so, 
more commonly Atha nasius-Stresses that by suffusing human nature with his 
divinity, the Logos in His incarnation seems to effect redemption and return 
human nature to incorruptibility, irrespective of our moral acts, sacramental life 
or personal relationship with God. Gregg and Groh's (implicit) contrast between 
what Williams calls "a static and 'essentialist' (near-physicalist) view of 
25 J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, , p. 378. 
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deification by participation"26 in Athanasius and an Arian participation through 
the practice of moral advancement27 is an oversimplification, but remarks along 
the lines of Or. con Ar. 2.59 are too few to allay our anxieties that Athanasius 
erred towards an understanding of the doctrine of salvation through 
participation and deification which seriously underplayed the role of ethics and 
ecciesiology for example. 
Returning to Athanasius' criticism of Arius concerning the impropriety of 
ascribing divine titles to the Son, that this criticism is not necessarily entirely fair 
we can observe by noting that "Athanasius has telescoped two different points: 
for Arius it was an unavoidable conclusion that to call the Son Word and 
Wisdom was to speak metaphorically; but this does not imply that it is metaphor 
to call him rational and wise". 28 Behind such a distinction lies the Platonic 
understanding of the Form which in a sense alone can be properly designated 
as beautiful or good or whatever. The Son cannot be properly called Wisdom, 
yet he is a special case of wisdom and rationality in being the direct issue of 
God's will, without whom we would not know how rationality and wisdom can be 
authentically and lastingly present in the contingent order. Perhaps then we can 
see between the realm of Becoming to which we creatures belong and the 
realm of Being to which the Father belongs the Son as an ontologically 
unstable creature "yet perfectly in communion with the realm of Being, morally 
stable by the confluence of God's prior grace and his own unfaltering 
response". 29 If Williams (for example) is correct in his interpretation of Arius, 
then we can see that Arius does conceive of a real participation of the Son in 
the Father, albeit a non-substantial sharing. Such participation appears 
moralistic but given the metaphysical background against which Arius 
formulated his position and his concern to protect God's transcendence (in 
terms of freedom and understanding) there is perhaps no other way in which he 
could have understood the Son's participation. 30 What stress Arius laid on the 
Son's participation being paradigmatic for our own participation in God is open 
26 Williams, 'The Logic of Arianism', p. 75, n. 97. 
27R. C. Gregg and D. E. Groh, EarlyArianism -A Viewof Salvation (London: SCM, 1981), pp. 66-67. 
28 Ibid., p. 78. 
29 Gregg and Groh, EarlyArianism, p. 79. 
30 C. Stead's hypothesis of an ontic "middle ground" between creatures and Creator occupied by 
the Son (who is ktisma but not as one of the creatures according to Arius) is not implausible, but 
the evidence is too thin for this to be more than hypothesis. See his "The Thalia of Arius and the 
Testimony of Athanasius", JTSvol. 29 (1978), pp. 20-52. 
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to question, but the voluntaristic and ethical nature of Arian participation allows 
for such a paradigm, and Athanasius' arguments concerned to "stop the Arians 
from any longer thinking they shall be as the Son! " (Or. con Ar. 3.24) 
communicate his own anxieties concerning ideas connected with such 
imitation. 
In the end it seems that it is God's will which enables the participation of the 
Son in the Father, a will including the willing of the Son's wisdom and rationality 
which enable an enduring participation in the Father. We are able to see true 
wisdom and rationality incarnate in the Son, true reflections of the divine in the 
contingent, because of God's willing it to be so. But how true can such 
reflections be, given Arius' separation of the Son and the Father? If we separate 
the Son from the Father by suggesting that the Son is an act of the Father's will 
then, Athanasius argues, not only is Scripture contradicted (Scripture making it 
clear for Athanasius that the Word is the reasoning act of the Father), but there 
might be anything at the source of Being willing the Son to be as he is. 31 If the 
Father's will expresses the divine nature then "the first step to a Nicene account 
is taken; if it does not, an arbitrary deity is suggested". 32 Further, whether or not 
the Son is "morally stable", the Arians provide no final ontological distinction 
between the Son (who is directly willed by God) and creation (which is also 
willed by God). 
Wider issues are raised by Athanasius' critique of Arius. Arius' understanding of 
participation in God as finally due to God's will suggests to Athanasius that 
access to who and what God is in Himself are sealed from us. This raises 
serious questions concerning the legitimacy of religious language, because if 
God's will and activity towards us (especially as the Father of Jesus Christ) are 
separated from the divine nature, then we appear to have no justification for the 
use of theological language. This separation also threatens to make the Son's 
work redundant: 
.. 
if God can truly give a share in his freedom and his glory to a creature by pure causeless will, 
resting on nothing in his own being, why can he not give directly to us what he gives to the Son? 
If, on the other hand, we do not receive a real share in the divine life through the Son, because 
he, as a creature, is as far from God as we are, what is the point of his incarnate work?. 33 
31 Athanasius reports that Arius taught that "since all beings are foreign and different from God in 
essence, so also the Word is alien and different from the essence and individuality of the Father in 
all respects... " (Or. con Ar. 1.6). 
32 Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 229. 
33 Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 240. 
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Perhaps a closer connection of being and act in God can answer concerns such 
as these34, a connection which would help clarify the nature of our participation 
in God and its distinctiveness from the Son's relation to the Father. Arius' 
thought also reminds us that different notions of participation will have different 
implications for religious language, the role of Christ (and the Spirit) and 
metaphysics. 
In contrast to the Arians, Athanasius distinguished the Son's being from that of 
the world by seeing it as belonging to the Father's substance, whereas the 
world's being was due to the will of God. So in his early writings Athanasius 
writes: 
.. 
being the good Offspring of Him that is good, and true Son, He is the Father's Power and 
Wisdom and Word, not being so by participation, nor as if these qualities were imparted to Him 
from without, as they are to those who partake of Him and are made wise by Him; but He is the very 
Wisdom, very Word, and very own Power of the Father, very Light, very Truth, very 
Righteousness, very Virtue... (Contra Gentes 46-47: 25,93 BC). 
Later Athanasius does speak of participation of the Son in the Father though, as 
Balas notes, this is a participation implying "a total communication of the 
essence of the Father". 35 This later use of 'participation' is significant in the 
context of understanding Athanasius' ontology. Zizioulas claims that Athanasius 
transforms the idea of substance because "to say that the Son belongs to God's 
substance implies that substance possesses almost by definition a relational 
charactef'. 36 Some statements of Athanasius lend themselves to such an 
interpretation, Athanasius noting for example that without the Father-Son 
relationship "the perfectness and fullness of the Father's substance is depleted" 
(Or. con. Ar. 1.20). However other statements (such as a later use of 
participation noted by Balas above) do not lie easy with such an interpretation, 
Athanasius speaking for example of the Son's generation in terms of 
participation (e. g. Or. con Ar, 1.15-16). The fact that Athanasius speaks of the 
divine substance not per se but qualified with the term Father may indicate a 
consciously relational understanding of ousia but it might equally well have 
34 A contemporary follower of Arius might respond to this by rejecting the possibility or desirability 
of knowledge of God's being, arguing that the only knowledge of God available and necessary for 
us can be inferred from God's actions and revelation of Himself in his created Logos. 
35 Balas, Mt-rouaia ®eou, p. 12. 
36 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (New York: St. Vladimir's Press, 1985), p. 84. 
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been motivated by the desire to reject Arius' view that the Son is in no way 
'proper' to the Father. 37 Athanasius' thinking may invite a relational 
understanding of ousia, but how conscious and consistent his thoughts were 
geared in this direction is perhaps a little more open to debate than Zizioulas 
would have us believe. 
One of the limitations making it difficult for Athanasius to develop a 
consideration of ousia in a relational sense was the terminology of the day. 
Lacking the language with which to describe 'otherness' within substance 
(ousia ands ypostasis meaning the same thing for Athanasius and his 
contemporaries38), it was perhaps inevitable that Athanasius should struggle to 
speak of the Son's relation to the Father in terms distinct from that of creatures', 
'participation' being a case in point. Even so, Athanasius' use of words such as 
metousia and careful qualifications of the Son as "wholly participating" unlike 
creation (e. g. Or. con Ar. 1.16) suggest ways in which Athanasius was aware of 
the importance of the distinction. It was to be the Cappadocians however who 
developed an ontology enabling being to be understood primarily as being in 
relation, and who thus promised a clearer distinction of terms applying to the 
relations of the Trinity ad intra and ad extra. Before investigating this more 
closely, an overview of the use and meaning of 'participation' in the 
Cappadocians is in order. 
3.4 Gregory of Nyssa: The Process of Relational Participation 
Of the Cappadocians, it is Gregory of Nyssa who develops the theme of 
participation most notably, his brother Basil only touching on the idea and his 
friend Gregory of Nazianzus giving the term little attention. Gregory's concern to 
refute the heresies of the Macedonians or Pneumatomachoi (who saw the Holy 
Spirit as an intermediary being, being both a creature and the source of 
sanctification for other creatures, but not having the divinity of the Father. and the 
Son), perhaps invited the use of the term, as may have Eunomius' 
understanding of the Spirit as an intermediary being between God and the 
37 Williams summarises Arius' position well; "to be Father is, as it happens, an identifying and thus 
inalienable characteristic of God, but it is not part of the 'essential' definition of God, since God as 
such, being self-subsistent, cannot be defined as to what he is by reference to anything else", 
Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 61. 
38 Zizioulas, ibid., p. 87. 
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creatures. For Gregory there lie no such intermediaries between the Created 
and Uncreated natures, because such intermediaries would need to participate 
in both created and uncreated, a fusion Gregory finds "unimaginable" (Adv. 
Maced. 17: 111,1). The gulf Gregory stresses between created and uncreated 
strikes a note quite discordant with the chain of being we found at times in 
Origen and seems to suggest a departure from certain Platonic speculations 
concerning intermediary degrees of being connected by the idea of 
participation39. 
Looking more closely at his understanding of the hierarchy of Being however, 
we find that Platonic influences are present. The Christian division of created 
and uncreated beings is found together with the Platonic distinction between 
sensible and intelligible beings. The human being is a synthesis of intelligible 
and sensible qualities, the soul (psuche) being an intelligible substance (De. 
hom. op. 14: 176B), and the corporeal substance being sensible. The 
intelligible substance has an affinity with God though Gregory emphasises their 
distinction in stressing the created nature of the human being (see e. g. De hom. 
op. 16: 44,184C). Gregory relates the intelligible and the sensible, the 
incorporeal and the corporeal, the heavenly and the terrestrial using the 
concept of participation; 
through the formation of man both of these elements may receive a participation (metousia) of the 
things pertaining to the other; insofar as the intellectual nature of the soul, which seems to be akin 
and belonging to the celestial powers, is dwelling in terrestrial bodies, and in the restoration of all 
things this earthly flesh will be transferred to the heavenly place (Or. Dom. 4: 44,1165C-D). 
Participation is used here to describe how different elements may relate to one 
another, Balas seeing the underlying meaning of participation in applications 
such as this as "that of a secondary (derived) possession of=a property 
belonging primarily to another". 40 The mediation of the human being between 
the heavenly and corporeal-realms is the way in which intelligible and sensible 
might intermingle, so that all things might "participate in the Good and nothing 
39 All three Cappadocians also emphasised the equality of the Trinitarian persons, a stress 
distancing their thought further from such stratified, hierarchical orderings of reality as we found in 
Plotinus for example. Other important differences from Platonism and Neoplatonism are a doctrine 
of creation (Plato arguing in the Timaeus for the eternity of matter) and (an at least verbal) rejection 
of the idea of souls falling from a pure bodiless condition to embodiment (such as we find in 
Plato's Phaedrus). 
40 galas, Mr-rovata erov, p. 53. 
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be deprived of a share in the higher nature" (Or. cat 6,2: Sr. p. 30,7-9: 45,25C). 
Thus the role of the human being in establishing the communion of creation 
with God can be seen. Gregory illustrates the sort of participation he has in 
view and a sense of hierarchical ordering by picturing the mind as a mirror of 
archetypal Beauty and nature as a mirror of this mirror (De hom. op. 12,44, 
161C-D). In this way Gregory builds up a hierarchy of participation which we 
have seen expressed before in different ways by Plato, Plotinus, Origen and 
others. 
It is however mainly in the context of God's relation to His creatures that we find 
Gregory using the theme of participation. A number of elements of his thought 
on the theme are brought out in his work Contra Eunomium (see esp. CE I, ch. 
22). Gregory writes that; 
since the source and origin and supply of every good is found in the Uncreated nature, and the 
whole creation inclines toward It, attaining to and partaking of (metechousa) the lofty nature 
through the communion (koinonia) of the First Good; therefore, by necessity, proportionately to 
the participation (metousias) of the lofty goods - insofar namely as some are partaking 
(metalambanonton) more and others less according to the freedom of their will - the more and the 
less is discerned in the creation, proportionately to the desire of each (CE 1274: I, p. 106,16-23: 
45,333C-D). 
Gregory is careful to underline the difference in the mode of possession of such 
goodness41 between God and creatures. For Gregory participation implies the 
secondary, dependent, derived possession of a quality or perfection such as 
goodness, God's possession of such qualities being essential in contrast. 
Emphasising this Gregory, like Origen and others before him, also contrasts 
God's possession of qualities with those participating in such qualities by 
speaking of God as (for example) autoagathotes, autozoe, and autoaletheia. 
In the passage (CE 1274: I, p. 106,16-23: 45,333C-D) quoted above Gregory 
speaks of "more or less", of-`a greater or lesser degree of participation. Three 
points are important here. First, participation in a perfection implies a limit on 
that perfection, whereas the unparticipated perfection is infinite (in the sense not 
of unlimited duration or boundless power, but in the sense of intensive 
perfection). Second, the different degrees of perfection of human beings 
41 Goodness in Gregory is understood here primarily in the sense of religious and moral 






depend on their different degrees of participation which depend on their 
different degrees of choosing "the lofty goods". Thus the appropriate use of 
freedom is essential if creatures are to participate in the divine perfections. 42 
Thirdly, because the "more or less" does not apply to that which is participated, 
it cannot be the case that God's perfections are diminished by their being 
participated in. 
When Gregory writes of participation in the divine perfections he tends to mean 
the participation of our created, intelligible nature. This nature stands on the 
borderline of the good and its contrary, capable of moving either way 
depending on its free choice. Given the similarities with Origen at this point, we 
might wonder how Gregory avoids the prospect of future falls. Gregory does 
manage to avoid Origen's weakness, by understanding the creature's 
participation of "more or less" not in a static way but in a dynamic way. Gregory 
writes that our created intelligible nature is 
constantly being created, ever changing for the better in its growth in perfection, so that... no limit 
can be found, nor can its progressive growth be limited by any term, but its present state of 
perfection, no matter how great and perfect it may seem, is always merely the beginning of a 
greater and superior stage (In cant. 6: VI, p. 173,11-13: 44,885C). 
Further " participation in the good not only permits a limitless progress , but 
actually consists in perpetual growth, a continuous `change for the better"'. 43 
We are continually being drawn on to a greater and deeper participation, 
participation in virtue dilating the capacity for more virtue, our desire ever 
increasing as we progress. 44 Such eternal progress does not imply continual 
frustration or dissatisfaction but is indicative rather of the infinite nature of God, 
so that "no limit would interrupt growth in the ascent to God, since no limit to the 
Good can be found nor is the increasing of desire for the Good brought to an 
42 Gregory remarks that "we are in some manner our own parents, giving birth to ourselves by our 
own free choice in accordance with whatever we wish to be.. " (De vita Mos. 11,3), admonishing us 
to that state where "all the movements of our soul are shepherded, like sheep, by the will of 
guiding reason" (De vita Mos. 11,18). 
43 galas, Me-rovcna Oeov, p. 137. 
44 G. C. Stead believes Gregory to see this progression also in terms of an advance in being, "by 
gaining an ever-increasing participation, IIETouata, in God who is the absolute being and the 
absolute goodness". See "Ontology and Terminology in Gregory of Nyssa" in his Substance and 
Illusion in the Christian Fathers (London: Variorium Reprints, 1985), p. 116. This need not entail a 
transcendence of creaturely parameters so long as we understand that "for a thing to exist is for it 
to conform to the pattern of existence laid down for it by its creators, ibid., p. 116. This is a dynamic 
vocation, not a static reality. 
50 
end because it is satisfied" (De vita Mos. II, 239). The infinite nature of the divine 
is the basis for humanity's perpetual self-transcendence and increasing 
participation. The momentum of our participation in God carries us forward and 
increases the resolve with which we pursue a deeper participation in God, the 
dynamic perfecting us in the process for "the perfection of human nature 
consists perhaps in its very growth in goodness" (De vita Mos. 1,10), cf. Phil. 
3: 13. 
It should be pointed out that God's boundlessness not only implies an eternal 
progression towards perfection in those who participate in God, but it also 
relates to God's ultimate unknowability and transcendence. Participation in God 
is a constant ascent because it is impossible finally to exhaust God or 
comprehend Him45, and God always remains greater than any knowledge we 
have of Him. At one point Gregory writes that "we know that God is but not what 
God is" (De vita Mos. I, 47), suggesting that the essence of God is impenetrable 
to human understanding, although His existence is manifested by His action in 
the world. In De vita Moysis more generally, Gregory describes the spiritual 
ascent of Moses as characterised by God's revelation first in light, then in cloud 
and finally darkness, a typology echoed and amplified in later apophatic 
mysticism. None of this is to suggest Gregory understands the ascent of the soul 
simply in epistemological terms. Although his earlier writings betray an 
understanding of virtue as largely the way to knowledge, Gregory's more 
mature writings indicate a dialectic between virtue and knowledge such that 
knowledge also moves us to greater moral perfection (and indeed to deeper 
desire and contemplation). 
The potential human beings have for eternal progress rests in their capacity for 
participation in God which is the purpose for which God created them (De hom. 
op. 16: esp. 44,184A-D). We are able to participate in the divine goods 
because of our similarity to God, just as the eyes must have some innate 
brightness in order to partake of light claims Gregory (De an. et res. 5,4: Sr. 
45 Meredith sees Gregory motivated in part here by the Eunomian contention that the divine 
nature could be adequately defined. Against this Gregory appears to argue that God's goodness 
knows no bounds and is thus infinite, and is thus incomprehensibly excellent. This involves a 
radical departure from the Platonic view that to be unlimited was to be strictly unknowable and 
therefore somehow defective, but it also involved the somewhat questionable "leap from not 
being in principle receptive of improvement from outside to being infinite". See his The 
Cappadocians(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1995), p. 66. 
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p. 22,16-23,3: 45,21C). What enables our participation is our rational nature 
together with our freedom so that, despite the sullying of the image of God in the 
fall, we are still able to partake of the divine goodness. 
But this participation becomes an ontological possibility only in and through 
Christ and again we can see Platonic influences on Gregory here. Gregory 
believed that "evil was mixed with our nature from the beginning... through 
those who by their disobedience introduced the disease" (De beat, or. 6), so 
that although human will remains free and we are thus responsible for our acts, 
we inevitably sin and have sin grow in us in our fallen state (see e. g. De orat. 
dom. or. 5). Christ's incarnation, death and resurrection restores human nature 
permanently to its pristine disease-free state, the second Adam showing the 
way to a proper exercising of freedom and opening up the ontological 
possibility of our own participation in God. Platonic realism undergirds 
Gregory's thinking here, human nature in its entirety having been affected by 
Christ's work: 
(the Lord) conjoined Himself with our nature in order that by its conjunction with the Godhead it 
might become divine, being exempted from death and rescued from the adverse tyranny. For His 
triumphal return from death inaugurated the triumphal return of the human race to life immortal (Or. 
cat. 25). 
Not that our participation in God is automatically achieved as the fruits of 
Christ's labours, but the ontological ground for a progressive participation in 
God is established, a ground which denies the option for non-being in an 
ultimate sense. Our participation is now enabled but depends for its progressive 
realisation on the union of ourselves with Christ through the sacraments and by 
the Christ-like exercise of freedom and love, a union no longer disabled by the 
eff ects of the fall because of Christ's work. Our freedom rightly exercised is the 
key to progressive participation, for Gregory, so vital in fact that at times it seems 
that Gregory sees freedom as (almost) constituting the whole of God's image in 
us. (In relation to this it might be noted that Gregory often casts Christ in the role 
of Revealer rather than Mediator). Rightly used, such freedom is exercised in 
the loving pursuit of God, the (remodelled) Platonic motif of eros peppering 
works such as On the Christian Life and On Virginity. 
Because of Christ's work the capacity of the image of God in us is restored. 
Gregory often describes this image as a mirror, conversion restoring our 
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capacity to reflect the divine nature. If a person turns to the good by means of 
free, rational choice "it is as if he places his own soul, like a mirror, face to face 
with the hope of good things, with the result that the images and impressions of 
virtue, as it is shown to him by God, are imprinted on the purity of his soul" (De 
vita Mos. II, 47). Gregory also uses the language of archetype and image in 
describing the relation of God to participants in goodness (e. g. CE 11 89: I, 
p. 252,29: 45,940D). But Gregory also uses this language in describing the 
Son's relation to the Father (e. g. CE I, 531: I, p. 180,9-10: 45,416A). This is not 
to say however that Gregory understands the Son to participate in the Father in 
the fashion in which creatures participate in God, because for Gregory the Son 
is the perfect image of the Father, distinguished from those who only partake of 
goodness by being phusei kalon (cf. CE III, VI 56-57). Participation in God is 
open-ended, always providing for the possibility of greater participation in God 
whereas with the Son, who is already and eternally the perfect image of the 
Father, no such dynamic of ascent is involved. 
3.5 The Cappadocian Contribution 
Considering the contribution of the Cappadocian idea of participation more 
broadly we should first call attention to their development of Greek ontology. 
Athanasius' ontology made it difficult for him to say how exactly the otherness of 
the Son was contained within the substance of the Godhead, a point it was 
necessary to make if the Son's divine equality with the Father was to be 
protected and the Son's distinctive relationship with the Father was to be 
maintained. The ontology of the Cappadocians overcame Athanasius' difficulty 
by beginning to understand the term&Jpostasis no longer in terms of ousia alone 
but also in terms of prosopon, a relational term originally foreign to the sphere 
of ontology. Thel postasis, the bearer of the nature in its totality, is thus no 
longer understood in isolation as self-existent, but, Zizioulas claims, "since 
'hypostasis' is identical with Personhood and not with substance, it is not in its 
'self-existence' but in communion that this being is itself and thus is at all". 46 
46J. D. Zizioulas, 'Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of 
Personhood' in SJT Voi. 28 (1975), p. 409. It might be argued that Zizioulas is engaged in special 
pleading concerning the identification of hypostasis and personhood because at times the 
Cappadocians see hypostasis as a compound of ousia and person. However the underlying point 
still stands, that personhood and relationality take on a key ontological status with the 
Cappadocians, a status stressing the originary nature of personhood and relationality in 
constituting the structure of God's ousia. What is vital to appreciate from the Cappadocian 
understanding is the ontologically and logically inseparable link of person and substance. 
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Zizioulas puts his finger on the key issue here, although at times he perhaps 
misleads the reader into assuming a clarity and cortency to the 
Cappadocian authors which is not always present. Even for God to be is for 
God to be in relation (schesis), communion between distinct persons 
constituting the Godhead. (See for example Gregory of Nazianzus' Theological 
Oration (section 16)). The Cappadocians were fond of the ontological epigram 
mia ousia, treislypostaseis, which stressed both the threeness of God in terms 
of particular hypostases and the oneness of God in terms of the substance 
constituted in virtue of the communion of the hypostases (a communion itself 
constitutive of the hypostases). 47 If God's being is a being-in-relation then the 
relationships themselves are of vital import And this brings in to focus the 
central significance of ecstasis for ontology. God's being is identical with an act 
of communion, an act of ecstasis involving the hypostasising of persons as 
persons; 
the person in its ekstatic character reveals its being in a catholic, i. e. integral and undivided, way, 
and thus in its being ekstatic it becomes hypostatic, i. e. the bearer of its nature in its totality. 48 
This relational understanding of ousia enables us to think of the otherness of 
the Son and Spirit within the Godhead, homoousion with the Father. The gulf 
between created and uncreated which Gregory is so keen to emphasise is 
underlined by this view of substance, where the divine persons are homoousios 
and substantially distinct from the creaturely realm. To retain such a distinction 
'participation' cannot be understood in a substantial sense where human 
beings are concerned. Indeed we would suggest that one of the main points 
made in stating that God is an ousia in a categorical sense is that it claims "that 
God is not limited or prescribed by our own experience of Him, but exists in His 
own right... To characterise God as a substance is to stake a claim against 
reductionist theories which in effect represent God as dependent on human 
experience which He is invoked to explain". 49 Substance-talk seeks in part to 
47 T. F. Torrance argues that Gregory of Nazianzus adopts the originally Athanasian distinction 
between "ousia as referring to being in its internal relations and hypostasis as being in its objective 
relations. " See his Trinitarian Perspectives (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. 28. It is perhaps less 
important to argue endlessly about who is given credit for the onto-relational understanding of 
person and the constitutive nature of relations in structuring (the divine)ousia than it is to grasp 
the enduring importance and significance of such insights. 
48 J. Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p. 408. Zizioulas goes on, "Ekstasis and 
hypostasis represent two basic aspects of Personhood, and it is not to be regarded as a mere 
accident that both of these words have been historically applied to the notion of Person". Ibid. 
49 G. C. Stead, Divine Substance (Oxford: OUP, 1977), p. 273. 
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retain God's independence from creation and His creatures, it seeks to stress 
God's limitlessness, His uncontainability and His transcendence of creation. 
One way of developing these ideas is by understanding the divine persons as- 
related in an eternal perichoretic union, a relationship ontologically distinct 
from our relationship of participation in God. The distinctiveness lies in the fact 
that perichoresis involves a unity understood as ontological interpenetration 
mutually constituting the divine persons (a substantial constitution) whereas 
participation involves a one-way dependence which stresses God's role in 
realising and sustaining human beings but where there is no substantial 
identity5O 
. 
It is Gregory of Nazianzus who first gave an account of the intra- 
trinitarian perichoresis as mutual containment and interpenetration grounding 
rather than undermining personal distinctions. 51 (This perichoresis can allow 
for the economic taxis of the Trinity without suggesting inequalities within the 
Trinity). Both perichoresis and participation can be understood dynamically, 
Gregory of Nyssa making room for God's transcendence and our development 
by understanding the dynamic of participation as "a ceaseless growing into 
what is always and already greater and does not itself either grow or diminish: 
the fullness of the divine eludes us because it is further 'back' than our furthest 
and remotest origins, and beyond all imaginable futures". 52 
That Gregory was keen to distinguish created and uncreated realms within this 
framework can be seen by his transformation of the Platonic notion of 
participation whereby he focuses primarily not on the sensible/intelligible 
50 Writing of the divine persons, Hilary explained that'although these Beings do not dwell apart, 
they retain their separate existence and condition and can reciprocally contain one another, so 
that One permanently envelopes, and is also permanently enveloped by, the Other whom he yet 
envelopes'. De Trinitate 3.1. Because God is both without and within all things Hilary claims there 
is a sense to this mutual containing which there would not be with natural objects. T. F. Torrance 
notes that perichoresis derives from chorein meaning both `to make room' and 'to contain'; "thus 
developed, the notion of perichoresis has an active nuance as mutual movement as well as 
mutual indwelling, which gives expression to the dynamic nature of the consubstantial 
Communion between the three divine Persons, in which their differentiating properties instead of 
separating them actually serve their oneness with one another". See his Trinitarian Perspectives, 
p. 141. 
51 Gregory Nazianzus, Oratio 18.42; 22.4; Epistula 101.6. In their eagerness to refute the charge 
of tritheism Gregory of Nyssa and Basil argued for the Father's Monarchia and even argued for 
interrelations between the divine persons which built a kind of chain of dependence between the 
Persons. Gregory of Nazianzus was rightly alarmed by such thought which could easily suggest a 
divine hierarchy militating against the equality of the divine Persons. (For references see 
T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, pp. 31-32. ) 
52 Williams Arius: Heresy and Tradition, p. 243. 
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realms but on the created/uncreated realms. In Gregory 
instead of serving to construct the descending hierarchy within the divine world, as in later 
Platonism, it (participation) serves to exclude any intermediary nature between the Uncreated and 
Created beings. The transposition effects also the content of the notion, even on a purely 
philosophical level. Its negative implications (causal dependence, composition, change, 
temporality) are more clearly developed; at the same time it has received a more personal and 
dynamic character. New is also the realisation of the connection between participation and 
limitation, especially between essential possession and positive infinity. 53 
This distinction of created and uncreated helped ensure that his notion of 
participation did not lead to the removal of creatureliness through sharing in the 
divine life, but rather led to seeing participation as the dynamic involving the 
continual pushing back of fallen creaturely limits allowing us to be who we were 
meant to be: 
the partaking of the divine perfections is both the foundation and the unfolding of the Image of 
God in man; lost by sin, it is restored fundamentally by our sacramental and moral participation of 
Redemption in Christ. Spiritual life consists in an ever growing participation of Divine Goodness, 
i. e. in an infinite progress of our knowledge of and union with God; and this progress is to 
continue to all eternity. 54 
Remarks such as those above help answer those critics who see in the notion of 
participation an assimilation of human nature into the divine nature without 
remainder. Gregory and the other Cappadocians also sought to protect God's 
transcendence together with the reality of our involvement with God using the 
terminology of essence and energies. Observing the tension between the 
scriptural assertion that the pure in heart will see God (Mt. 5: 8) and St. Paul's 
assertion that "no one ever saw or can see God" (1 Tim. 6: 16), Gregory 
commented that "He who by nature is invisible becomes visible through his 
energies, appearing in what is around him". 55 The essence of God is 
unknowable and unnameable whereas we are able to participate in the 
energies or movement (kinesis) of God ad extra. (Essence here refers to the 
quidditas of God, energy refers to the manner, way or activity of God ad extra). A 
common criticism of this terminology is that it suggests we do not have any 
contact with God as God essentially is, but rather have to do with a secondary 
reality, God's energies. But if we understand the energy of God as God as He 
essentially is in His movement towards us and if we accept the link between 
53 Balas, M ouaza Oeou, p. 163. 
54 Balas, Mezouaia e ou, p. 161. 
55 In J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (New York: St. Vladimir's Press, 1975), 
p. 94. 
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epistemology and ontology implicit in Cappadocian theology, then this criticism 
loses some of its force. As creatures we do not have epistemic access to the 
essence of God, such epistemic access depending on an ontological 
(perichoretic) union whose reality would remove those parameters defining our 
creatureliness. Such epistemic access as we do have is grounded in the 
ontological difference between creature and Creator and is respectful of this 
difference. Thus participation in God's energies implies a true knowledge and 
relation with God as He is, but one which maintains an ontological (and 
epistemological) distance between God and his creatures. As Zizioulas puts it, 
"with the help of apophatic theology we may say that, although the Economic 
Trinity is the Immanent Trinity, the Immanent Trinity is not exhausted by the 
Economic Trinity". 56 Where there is room for confusion is in remarks such as the 
following from Georgios Mantzaridis; ".. God as existence can come into contact 
and communion with men and yet remain non-participable and inaccessible to 
them as essence". 57 The point we are making is that God, of His own gracious 
will is participable, but that this participation is distinct from the perichoretic 
union of the divine persons. The self-constituting nature of the perichoretic 
union makes it appropriate to refer to the essence of God in the context of the 
perichoretic union but not (given that creation is unnecessary to God) in the 
context of creation's participation in God. On this understanding 'essence' is not 
indicative of some substance in which the Trinitarian persons share but denotes 
rather the singular nature of the intra-divine communion of persons, this 
communion being the essence of God. 
The ontology of the Cappadocians has enabled us to understand substance 
relationally and provides the means of distinguishing between the Trinitarian 
perichoresis and our participation in God. Even though Gregory lapses 
occasionally (and somewhat confusingly) into speaking of the Son's 
participation in the Father, that he was aware of the distinction between our 
relation with God and those relations within the Trinity is clear from his 
apophatic emphases, the language of essence and energies and his stress on 
understanding our relation to God as one of non-substantial participation. Such 
participation includes the notions of dependence, infinite development, 
56 J. D. Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an Ecumenical Study', in 
The Forgotten Trinity, ed, A. I. C. Heron (London: BCC, 1991), p. 24. 
57G. I. Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man (New York: St. Vladimir's Press, 1984), p. 106 
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intellectual, ethical and sacramental progress. Gregory himself did not develop 
these insights in such a way as to bring into bold relief perichoretic and 
participatory relations but such a contrast promises to be a fruitful way forward 
in discussing participation. We should also mention that Gregory's thought is 
not without its drawbacks. It might be asked of him whether he has undermined 
the significance of the eschaton by stressing the on-going development of 
participation beginning at baptism. Further, his Platonic realism taken together 
with his stress on the individual's progressive participation seem to lead away 
from the Biblical notion of participation as including a sense of corporate 
solidarity. But even taking these points into account, Gregory's theology and 
that of the Cappadocians more generally mark a considerable advance in 
developing the notion of participation. 
3.6 Augustine 
If Augustine is often portrayed as a theologian concerned with the depths to 
which human beings have fallen through sin, he is also concerned with the 
heights to which human beings may be raised by God's grace and it is in 
relation to the latter that Augustine writes of participation (and indeed 
deification). With Augustine we see both important continuities and differences 
from the theologians we have already considered. Augustine's use of 
'deification' reminds us once more that such terminology is not to be 
immediately dismissed as indicative of elevating the creature beyond his rightful 
place and an infringement of God's transcendence. Rather the term can 
indicate our access in and through the humanity of Christ to that relation with 
the triune God which is so utterly beyond us apart from grace, and which so far 
surpasses our comprehension and expectation as to be worthy of such radical 
denotation. 58 Apart from Christ's Incarnation we would in our fallenness be 
unable to realise our capacity for God, and only through Christ are such 
capabilities reformed (See e. g. De Trin. IV, 2,4). But if Incarnation opens up the 
way for participation in God and deification, how does Augustine see human 
58 "We too were made by his grace what we were not, that is, sons of God. Yet we were something 
else, and this much inferior, that is sons of men. Therefore he descended that we might ascend, 
and remaining in his nature was made a partaker (particeps) of our nature, that we remaining in our 
nature might be made partakers (participes) of his nature. But not simply this; for his participation 
(participatio) in our nature did not make him worse, while participating in his nature makes us better 
"(ep. 140.4,10). 
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beings realising that goal? One central requirement is belonging to the Church: 
All who are reborn are made His members, and Christ alone who is born of Mary is one Christ, and 
with His Body the one Christ is the Head. Therefore it was His will to say: No man hath ascended 
into heaven but He that descended out of heaven. No man has therefore ascended except 
Christ. If you wish to ascend, be in the Body of Christ (Serm. 294,10,10). 
It is in the Church that we partake of the likeness of Christ's humanity so that 
through baptism it becomes possible for us to have our deformity healed (cf. In 
Ep. lohan. Tr. 5,6). Not that participation is automatic for Augustine upon 
baptism (as is the remission of sins), but faith to the end of the baptised 
member's life can assure the Christian of reformation to the image of God and 
deification (De Trin. XIV, 17,23). To understand the importance of the Church 
here we need to remember that for Augustine our fallenness is not simply the 
consequence of our individual irresponsibility but also a result of our common 
humanity as derived from Adam, whose sin of pride in turning away from God to 
himself deformed humanity collectively. So as Bonner notes "it was from the 
notion of the coinherence of fallen humanity in Adam that Augustine derived his 
vision of the coinherence of redeemed humanity in the Body of Christ". 59 
But such a redemption does not restore us to that relationship with God which is 
our true fulfilment in itself, rather it provides us with sure ground to build on. 
Apart from such ground our efforts to reach God will lead either to despair 
because of our sinfulness or an ascent corrupted (and thus flawed) by pride. 
The Incarnation, embodying as it does God's graceful humility, enables human 
beings to be persuaded to that humility appropriate to their station and 
propitiatory to their ascent. 60 The humility of Christ in his Incarnation gives the 
clue to the way we realise our participation in God through Christ and that 
participation has intellectual, spiritual, moral and aesthetic dimensions. To 
begin6l with the way of participation involves a movement of introversion (as 
well as acts of charity and obedience), the acquiring of true self-knowledge, 
59 G. Bonner, God's Decree and Man's Destiny (London: Variorium Reprints, 1987), article III, 
p. 502. 
60 Augustine often writes as if the humility of Christ is the most striking feature of the Incarnation, 
see e. g. Ep. ad Gal. exp., 24. 
61 Our participation 'begins' for Augustine with our creation in effect, a participation not entirely 
lost through the Fall (De Civ. Dei XIV, 13). Our "sharing" in being is not however a sharing in God's 
essence. Augustine distinguishes our being from God's being because ours is a derived being; 
"heaven and earth are from God because He made them; but they are not of Him, since they are 
not of His substance" (On the Nature of the Goodl). 
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because only so can a human being have a proper idea of the image of God in 
himself, and only so can a human being come to love God, through loving the 
image of God within. This is why it is important for Augustine to discern a Trinity 
within the human being because (given his belief in a Trinitarian God), only a 
Trinitarian image within the human being can be a true image of God which can 
lead us on in our ascent to God. Augustine considers the Trinity of mens, notitia, 
and amor (mind, knowledge and love, cf. De Trin. IX) before focussing on what 
he sees to be the more precise model in the mens of memory, understanding 
and will (De Trin. X). Once Augustine has established the Trinitarian image in 
the human being to his own satisfaction, he turns to consider the importance of 
this image in our return to God. 
The Trinitarian image within us is not the end in itself but it points to the God 
who created us according to his image and with a capacity for Him: 
the reason why there is this image of the Trinity in the soul is not because it remembers and knows 
and loves itself, but because in this it manifests its capacity to remember, know and love Him by 
whom it has been made. 62 
The image of God within us reveals our capacity for God and the ability to 
participate in God (cf. De Trin. XIV, 8,11) and it is as we realise this capacity 
through God's grace and our cleaving to God through memory, will and 
understanding that "the mind will be raised to the participation of his being, 
truth and bliss... " (De Trin. XIX, 14,20). 
While Augustine exhorts Christians to love their neighbours as part and parcel 
of this discipleship, there is still ample room here to see in Augustine's remarks 
the disciplined Neoplatonist pursuing the Summum Bonum by way of 
'Christian' relations with others, culminating finally in the individual joining that 
elect band who have also demonstrated single-minded dedication to the Good. 
Perhaps this individualistic emphasis relates to Augustine's ontology, lacking as 
it does that aspect of Cappadocian ontology which sees relations as having 
ontological significance. (Here too we can see the limits of understanding the 
image of God in an individualistic way, without essential reference to 
relationships other than archetype-ectypyal relations, and perhaps a clue to a 
better, relational definition of the image of God within us). 
62 Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, p. 156. 
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On a more positive note, Augustine's understanding of free will leads us away 
from seeing free will as a kind of freedom from constraint or freedom of choice to 
a view which regards us as only being truly free in so far as we are turned to 
God in charity, obedience and contemplation. In this way our participation in 
God is based on God's (sustained) initiative, we are not regarded as 
participating in God in so far as we are free from constraint (which may involve 
trespassing creaturely boundaries), and our participation is not grounded in 
some autonomous will but in the graceful God who confirms and establishes 
our freedom. Of course Augustine pushed this notion too far in his enthusiasm 
for predestination, an enthusiasm fuelled perhaps by an awareness of his own 
desperate need of external aid and anxiety concerning the infinite depths of his 
inner world. 63 But we will consider human freedom in a way which could be 
described as a tempered notion of Augustine's view of free-will in our 
discussions of participation later, and so seek to build on the virtues of his 
notion, alert to the danger of crushing human autonomy. 
3.7 Pseudo-Dionysius 
Many of the theologians omitted from this brief survey of the use of 
'participation' in the patristic period echo meanings and theological concerns of 
those already mentioned. To give an example before moving on we might 
consider Pseudo-Dionysius (hereafter Dionysius). Dionysius' notion of 
participation is central to his thought and his treatment of the theme recalls 
many points from the earlier patristic history of the term. Participation in God is 
not to be understood as involving the division or diminishment of God, just as it 
is not an infringement of the divine transcendence. Participation depends upon 
the participant's capacity for participation and the receptivity of participants 
though it is initiated by the overflowing goodness of God. But peculiar to 
Dionysius is the detailed construction of triadic hierarchies through which God's 
revelation reaches us and by which we are lifted up to a greater participation in 
God (We already participate in God in a sense because of our being). These 
hierarchies channel the divine light down the hierarchies, illuminating the entire 
structure and enabling the possibility of likeness to God. But this need not imply 
(pace Meyendorff)) that our ascent is only achieved by way and mediation of 
the hierarchies because there is also in Dionysius an emphasis on the 
63 See P. Brown's Augustine of Hippo (California: University of California, 1967) p. 178, p. 407. 
61 
immediacy of an ecstatic, loving relationship with the divine in the particularity of 
each hierarchical position. As such it is paradoxically through conforming to 
one's position in the hierarchy and loving God in that particularity that one can 
ecstatically go 'beyond' the hierarchy in participating in God and be 'divinised'. 
The value of this approach is that it allows for a diversity of ways in which 
participation in God (and divinisation) can come about starting from many 
different hierarchical positions. As such it provides possibilities for overcoming 
the dangers of intellectual elitism, spiritual snobbery and the homogenisation of 
society. Negatively the approach may lend itself to a religious and sociopolitical 
quietism which accepts the status quo and one's position in it as divinely 
ordained. 
But more disturbing than problems associated with the Dionysian hierarchies is 
the (lack of a) place for creation in the participation envisaged by the 
Areopagite. (And again this weakness echoes weaknesses of earlier 
theologians such as Justin Martyr). When Dionysius uses symbolic theology to 
take aspects of the sensible realm as signifying elements of the divine realm he 
leaves himself open to the charge that in his thought this is the only worth of the 
sensible realm. So Meyendorff argues that "no tangible, ritual, or material reality 
can.. according to Dionysius, have any other relationship with the intelligible 
world than a symbolic one". 64 In favour of Meyendorff's view is the fact that the 
Eucharist symbolises "the union of our minds with God and with Christ ... 
Dionysius never formally presents Eucharistic communion as a participation in 
the body and blood of Christ". 65 Further the Dionysian hierarchies reflect the 
ascent from the realm of sense to that of intelligibles as Meyendorff points out. 
Even though we might argue that our ascent to God is not primarily up the 
hierarchy but into the hierarchy for Dionysius, this does not completely clear 
Dionysius of the charge brought by Meyendorff because Dionysius may still be 
operating with a Platonic sense-intelligible distinction when considering the 
participation of a particular member of the hierarchy in the divine. That this 
participation is understood in terms of the quest for spiritual knowledge which 
involves (finally) the negating of our 'symbolic knowledge' of the world in God 
and that this quest results finally in an ecstasis in which everything perceived 
64 Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, p. 106. 
65 R. Roques, L'univers dionysien. Structure hierarchique du monde se%on !e Pseudo-Denys 
(Paris: Aubier, 1954), p. 269. 
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and understood is left behind and in which union with him who is beyond all 
being and knowledge is sought (Mystical Theology I), all of this suggests that 
creation in the end has very little to say to the quester and vice versa. For 
Dionysius creation turns out to be no more than the means to an end, the end 
resembling more the Platonic heaven of intelligibles than that eschatological 
state envisaged by Paul when creation itself will be liberated for its true 
fulfilment (Rom. 8: 21f). 
3.8 Conclusion: Issues Arising 
A number of other theologians from the Patristic period could be mentioned but 
enough ground has been covered already to suggest some of the major 
doctrinal issues surrounding the notion of participation. These issues will 
provide a focus for our treatment of the notion as we trace its development 
through a particular strand of theological thought to the present-day. Such 
issues include ontology. We saw how Origen's thought marks a certain raising 
of awareness of the ontological issues involved, finally failing however to 
reconcile the 'worlds' of Being and Becoming. The difficulties in reconciling 
such worlds will exercise us later in this study, both in ontological terms and in 
terms of relating the `philosophical' attributes of God (e. g. eternal, immutable, 
impassible), with the God of personal agency known in and through Jesus 
Christ (as loving, merciful, righteous etc. ) 
A second, related ontological issue raised particularly by a consideration of 
Origen's use of participation is the relations of the persons of the Godhead. 
Origen suggests that while the Son 'participates' in the Father, this is in a 
manner qualitatively different to the way in which creatures might participate in 
the Godhead. For Arius however it seems to have been essential to distinguish 
the Father from the Son more clearly than the somewhat ambiguous term 
'participation' allowed for. But finally Arius' thinking suggests to us that perhaps 
the Son is found between the realm of Becoming to which we creatures belong 
and the realm of Being to which the Father belongs, an ontologically unstable 
creature "yet perfectly in communion with the realm of Being, morally stable by 
the confluence of God's prior grace and his own unfaltering response". Such a 
notion was unacceptable to those such as Athanasius who saw the 
63 
fundamental importance of the divinity of the Son in enabling our salvation. In 
asserting the consubstantiality of Father and Son together with their 
distinctiveness Athanasius appeared to be moving towards an understanding of 
God's substance which implied that substance possesses almost by definition a 
relational character. The Cappadocians' insights allowed for the development 
of an understanding of the relational character of substance and in their thought 
we can begin to see a distinction between the intra-divine perichoresis and the 
divine-human participation. This distinction safeguarded God's transcendence 
and distinguished the Son's relation to the Father from human relations with the 
Godhead. Again, as we proceed we will need to pay careful attention to the 
continuities and contrasts between the Trinitarian relations ad intra and the 
relations ad extra, with particular reference to the transcendence/immanence 
and otherness/relatedness of God and creation. 
The question of what exactly the early Church Fathers suggest we are 
participating in is connected with the understanding of relation as having 
substantial importance. The difficulties of those such as Justin Martyr and 
Origen (who are in danger of presenting monist ontologies) are surmounted by 
an understanding of our relatedness to God carrying ontic weight, so that the 
new relationship established in Christ provides the grounds of an ontologically 
different creation which participates in God through a specific relatedness and 
ways of relating which need not imply a substantial sharing of God's essence. 
While theologians such as Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine use the 
language of deification in writing of human participation in God, this does not 
mean abandoning parameters appropriate to our dependent, derived existence 
as creatures but implies the glorification of our humanity as embodied in the 
humanity of Jesus Christ. Here the image of God is important because it is the 
understanding of human creatures as being in the image of God which enables 
Origen, Gregory and Augustine (for example) to explain how it is that the 
possibility of participation in-God is open to human beings. One issue arising 
from this understanding concerns the reformation of the image of God and how 
far we effectively become like Christ as the reformation is realised and how far 
Christ becomes irrelevant as our participation proceeds. We shall argue 
presently that certain difficulties can be circumvented here if participation in God 
be understood as being enabled and sustained by Christ where Christ is 
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understood both in terms of his work and his person. 
The place of sacramental participation has been touched on in this chapter but 
requires further exploration, especially given the dangers of semi-mechanical 
conceptions of participation or anti-materialistic tendencies which can arise if 
such participation is not described carefully. Again, if participation is not an 
automatic consequence of Christ's work, the question of the place of our works 
in participating in God comes to the fore. Augustine so stresses the primacy of 
God's uplifting grace as to lose at times any sense of the value of human 
responsiveness or response-ability yet he rightly emphasises the priority of 
God's action and the secondary, responsive nature of human actions. Ways of 
understanding human freedom as built on and responsive to divine freedom 
might help develop that dimension of Patristic thought (evident for example in 
Origen) which understood that both human and divine freedom must be given 
their due if the integrity of both Creator and creature are not to be undermined. 
Further, our responsiveness weaves together intellectual, spiritual, moral and 
erotic strands and temptations to omit one or more of these strands must be 
avoided if we are to be true to that tradition within the early Church Fathers (and 
scripture) which understood participation as involving the whole human being. 
The participation of the whole human being could be taken as somewhat 
individualistic (as it sometimes seems to be in Augustine and Origen) if we fail 
to stress the importance of relationships horizontally (as well as vertically) in 
making a person who s/he is. This communal stress most clearly distinguishes 
Platonic and Pauline participation, and it also invites the notion of the Church as 
that place in particular where participation occurs, as Augustine suggests for 
example. However, membership of the Church need not imply participation in 
Christ in itself for Augustine, and wider issues arising from this include the 
questions of who is the 'participating' Church and whether participation in Christ 
occurs outside the realm of the Church and if it does, would that in any way 
undermine the Church's being and work? Finally the question of the 
relationship between individual, Church and world must be considered in 
relation to the notion of participation. The Platonic anti-materialist thrust to the 
notion of participation finds some echoes in certain of the early Fathers such as 
Dionysius and Augustine but there is also to be found in theologians such as 
Gregory of Nyssa the idea that through human beings authentically executing 
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their delegated authority over creation, creation is 'lifted up' to partake of the 
divine glory, being transfigured in the process. Undergirding such an idea 
would appear to be the hierarchy of levels we saw first in Platonic thought, but 
whereas in Platonic thought the aim is to ascend through the distinct levels, 
here creation, creature and Creator retain their distinctiveness while the former 
are fulfilled in realising relations to the Creator (in Christ through the Spirit) 
appropriate to their createdness. We will develop this (non-pantheistic) 
understanding of creation's participation in God later. 
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4. PARTICIPATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF JOHN CALVIN 
Calvin's many remarks concerning how our salvation has been achieved for us 
through Jesus Christ can cause us too easily to ignore another emphasis in his 
theology, namely the way in which our participation in this drama of salvation is 
of significance. This emphasis, together with important continuities with the 
thought of Fathers such as Gregory of Nazianzus (in for example aspects of his 
doctrine of the Trinity), make Calvin an appropriate theologian with whom to 
develop our discussion. ' Recently a number of theologians have drawn 
attention to the somewhat neglected issue of participationACalvin's thought2 
and our aim here will be to consider Calvin's notion of participation with 
particular reference to; the way in which the person of Christ grounds the notion; 
the relationship between human activity and divine activity, human and divine 
freedom in the working out of the notion; the way the connection between 
justification and sanctification is understood. In so doing we hope to 
demonstrate the fecundity of Calvin's thought for realising a contemporary 
understanding of the notion sensitive to a range of theological concerns. 
At the beginning of Book II of The Institutes of the Christian Religion 3 Calvin 
summarises the epistemological condition of the human being; 
First, he should consider for what purpose he was created and endowed with no mean gifts. By 
this knowledge he should arouse himself to meditation upon divine worship and the future life. 
Secondly, he should weigh his own abilities - or rather, lack of abilities. When he perceives this 
lack, he should lie prostrate in extreme confusion, so to speak, reduced to nought. The first 
consideration tends to make him recognise the nature of his duty; the second, the extent of his 
ability to carry it out4. 
Calvin focuses in Book II on the second aspect of the human condition, and thus 
1 See for example T. F. Torrance's'The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Gregory Nazianzen and John 
Calvin', in his Trinitarian Perspectives, pp. 21-40. While Calvin's appreciation of Augustine is well- 
known, in relation to Calvin's Trinitarian thought Torrance argues (perhaps too strongly) that "at 
every essential point the basic conceptions that Calvin wants to adduce come from Gregory, and 
from Gregory's theological hero Athanasius the Great". Ibid., p. 22 
2 E. g. Trevor Hart's'Humankind in Christ and Christ in Humankind: Salvation as Participation in our 
Substitute in the Theology of John Calvin', SJT Vol. 42 (1989), 67-84. Also J. B. Torrance's'The 
Vicarious Humanity and Priesthood of Christ in the Theology of John Calvin' in Calvinus Ecclesiae 
Doctor (1978) 69-84, and other articles by Torrance. 
3 Unless otherwise stated the Institutes referred to are the 1559 edition, Library of Christian 
Classics, vols. 20-21, ed. J. T. McNeill, trans. F. L. Battles (London: Westminster Press, 1960). 
4 Institutes Il. i. 3 
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on the absolute need human beings have of God's unconditioned and primary 
intervention to save them. While elsewhere Calvin sees the danger of 
complacency and ethical quietism (e. g. Institutes Il. ii. 1), here the predominant 
point for Calvin is that we simply cannot achieve the 'good' without and apart 
from God: 
.. much as man 
desires to follow what is good, still he does not follow it. There is no man to whom 
eternal blessedness is not pleasing, yet no man aspires to it except by the impulsion of the Holy 
Spirit. 5 
The inability of human beings to bring about their own salvation is not a cause 
for dejection and despondency for Calvin because "we see that our whole 
salvation and all its parts are comprehended in Christ (Acts 4: 12)". 6 For Calvin 
"the whole of our salvation is not to be sought anywhere else than in Christ"7. 
Thus we can immediately see the central significance of Christology in Calvin's 
thought and it is with Calvin's Christology that we will begin to see how it is that 
our participation in Christ (through the Holy Spirit) comes about. 
4.1 Christ and Human Participation in God 
Calvin's christology stands within the orthodoxy of Chalcedon, both the divinity8 
and humanity9 of Christ being affirmed in their fullness. The unity of Christ's 
person is stressed and Calvin is careful to steer a course between seeing the 
two natures as fused or as separated. lo Calvin lists three particular aspects to 
Christ's salvific work; the prophetic office, kingship and priesthood. Calvin's 
treatment at this point recalls the way in which in Hebrews the relation between 
Christ and the church is understood in terms of participation in Christ's various 
roles. Of particular interest is Calvin's treatment of-Christ's priestly role and our 
relation to it. Christ alone is able in his holiness to intervene as priest on our 
behalf to appease God's wrath and obtain God's favour. The sacrifice required 
for expiation of sins was Christ himself, who by the sacrifice of his death blotted 
5 Institutes 11.11.26 
6 Institutes I I. xvi. 19 
7 Commentary on John 3.16. Unless otherwise stated references to Calvin's commentaries are 
taken from Calvin's Commentaries, eds. T. F. & D. W. Torrance (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1959). 
8 E. g. Institutes i. xiii. 7-13 
9 E. g. Institutes Il. xiii. 1-4 
10 Institutes II. xiv. 4 
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out humanity's guilt and made satisfaction for humanity's sins (cf. Heb. 9: 22). By 
his priestly role Christ has given us access to the Father because through Christ 
we have had our sins washed away, Christ "sanctifies us and obtains for us that 
grace from which the uncleanness of out transgressions and vices debars us". 1" 
Further, Christ "justifies his rightful name of Priest by his continual task of 
intercession"12 so that through Him our prayers may be received and in Him the 
Father is rendered "favourable and propitious toward us". 13 Calvin is emphatic 
that Christ is the only true priest, the single perpetual priest, that his is the one 
efficacious, unique sacrifice which assuages God's wrath and enables access 
to the Father. So too with Christ's mediatorship, "He (Paul) does not claim for 
Christ the honour of a mediator so that others may at the same time share it with 
Him, but he maintains that all the others were rejected when the office was 
placed upon Christ". 14 The church's priests are those who participate in the 
priesthood of Christ and only in the efficacy of Christ's expiation, sacrifice, 
propitiation and intercession are the church's priestly ministrations efficacious. 15 
A brief look at Calvin's description of Christ as prophet, king and priest might 
suggest to the reader that our salvation has already been wrought for us in 
Christ. Such a conclusion requires some qualification however because we find 
in Calvin both an emphasis on Christ's conclusive salvation of human beings 
and an emphasis on our 'growing into' this salvation. This can be seen for 
example in the way in which we are to enter into, participate in Christ's 
prophetic office, kingly power and priestly ministry. Even from the perspective of 
Christ as priest, where Christ has been shown to play the vital role in dealing 
with the sin and guilt of humanity, paying our debt and enabling a new 
fellowship for human beings with God through Himself, even here there is a 
'prospective' dimension to salvation as well as a 'retrospective' dimension16 : 
11 Institutes II. xvi. 6 
12 Comm. on Hebrews p. 101; and further ".. all prayers which are not supported by the 
intercession of Christ are rejected", ' ibid., p. 102. 
13 Institutes II. xi. 6 
14 Comm. on Hebrews, ibid., p. 122 
15 This line of thought immediately shows the significance of worship in understanding 
participation. Worship rendered to God is primarily worship rendered by the one true priest Jesus 
Christ, a continuing, vicarious activity into which we are drawn as participants who in Christ, 
through the Spirit are enabled to worship. 
16 Hart notes that the terms 'retrospective atonement' and 'prospective atonement' are 
anachronistic in their application to Calvin, but he suggests that the substance of the distinction is 
clear in Calvin's writings, see his'Humankind in Christ and Christ in Humankind', p. 70. 
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atonement does not consist simply in a debt paid, or in the non-reckoning of sin and guilt alone. 
The wider context is a prospective one, the establishing of humanity in a new relationship with 
God, the exaltation of humanity to a previously unknown glory. 1 7 
Concerning this prospective dimension Calvin wrote that humankind is given to 
share in the sonship of Christ because, "becoming Son of Man with us, he has 
made us sons of God with him;... by his descent to earth, he has prepared an 
ascent to heaven for us;... by taking on our mortality, he has conferred 
immortality upon us.. "18 
Further, in relation to the retrospective/prospective dimensions of atonement it 
can be argued that Calvin distinguishes "that which Christ has done 'for us' 
(substitution) and that which he does 'in us' (participation)". 19 To justify this 
point one can argue (with Hart) that while Calvin does appear at times to 
suggest that Christ has done everything for us (thus potentially excluding the 
sense of an active participation of humanity in the grace of God), yet for Calvin 
'substitution' or 'Christ for us' are not so much the final words as the primary 
words. 20 To see this more clearly we must analyse Calvin's understanding of 
salvation more closely. 
An essential part of salvation for Calvin is the recreating of human nature in 
Christ. It is also vital that Christ's redemptive action is understood as being 
carried out "according to his human nature" because it is precisely the human 
righteousness of Christ that enables us as humans to stand justified before the 
throne of grace. We are in the first instance "clothed" with the righteousness of 
Christ, yet this does not imply a fictitious, weak or tenuous sharing of Christ's 
righteousness; ".. you see that our righteousness is not in us but in Christ, that 
we possess it only because we are partakers in Christ; indeed, with him we 
possess all its riches". 21 Christ's humanity enables his substitution for us to be 
understood "not in any sense which excludes us from the reality of grace, but 
rather in such a way that we are implicated in all that he does and has and is". 22 
So while the language of substitution has as a primary reference Christ, as the 
17 T. Hart, 'Humankind in Christ and Christ in Humankind', p. 74 
18 Institutes IV. xvii. 2 
19 Hart, ibid., p. 70 
20 Hart, ibid., p. 76 
21 Institutes III. xi. 23 
22 Hart, ibid., p. 79. 
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human being who stands in the place of all others before the Father, there is a 
secondary reference whereby it applies to us, in that we are sanctified, 
obedient, perfect, righteous sons of God; 
This is a present reality which rests on a past action. Yet we have not moved beyond the language 
of substitution in saying this, for what we are now we are only'in Christ'. 23 
However there is also an application of the language of redemption in Calvin 
couched not in the past tense like the first two references, but couched in the 
present and future tenses and often in the imperative mood. Such a reference is 
subordinate to the other two and never separated from them. Hart explains: 
this is not to deny its importance in any way, but rather to recognise that the 'sanctification' which 
we'put on' in the Christian life is (a) something which we already possess, and (b) not a reality 
separate from Christ, but rather a participation in Christ, a result of Christ in us. 24 
The combination of these three references enable Calvin to be true to the 
biblical dialectic between the `already' and the 'not yet' and their concurrence is 
clear in some of Calvin's statements such as the following concerning Christ: 
we have been adopted unto him as sons and heirs by our heavenly Father (cf. Rom. 8: 17; Gal. 
4: 5-7); that we have been reconciled through his blood (Rom. 5: 9-10);... that thus ingrafted into 
him (cf. Rom. 11: 19) we are already, in a manner, partakers of eternal life, having entered in the 
Kingdom of God through hope. Yet more: we experience such participation in him that, although 
we are still foolish in ourselves, he is our wisdom before God, while we are sinners, he is our 
righteousness... In brief, because all things are ours and we have all things in him, in us there is 
nothing. Upon this foundation, I say, we must be built if we would grow into a holy temple to the 
Lord (cf. Eph. 2: 21). 25 
There is here a sense of our becoming what we are in Christ, a becoming which 
is primarily but not necessarily entirely the work of Christ in us. This position 
steers a middle course between two dangerous extremes. With one extreme 
Christ is seen as having done everything for us, covering human beings with his 
righteousness, potentially turning grace into a fiction rather than making us 
really righteous. With the other extreme our active role in appropriating the new 
humanity established in Christ is stressed in a way which may endanger the 
complete sufficiency of Christ's once-for-all redemptive ministry. Both positions 
23 Hart, 'Humankind in Christ and Christ in Humankind', p. 80 
24 Hart, ibid., p. 80 
25 Institutes III. xv. 6 
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can be understood as mistakenly separating Christ's work and person, so that 
salvation is defined for both in terms of humanity's participation in certain 
'benefits' procured by Christ's work. Thus both views may be described as 
'extrinsecist': 
one makes grace something external to our being, and the other tears it away from its ontological 
moorings in the humanity of the Saviour. Thus both ultimately rob his humanness of its true 
mediatorial significance. 26 
Calvin's theology does not separate Christ's person and work however, and the 
key here is the humanity of Christ which is not merely of instrumental value but 
which is the very substance of salvation; "He (Christ) is said to have made 
through this body a way to ascend into heaven because He consecrated 
Himself to God in that body "27 ; Christ makes us "participants not only in all his 
benefits but also in himself"28. It is Christ in His very person who then 
reconciles human beings and God and in whose very person we share this 
reconciliation. 29 Because we are united to Christ by Christ's humanity, we are 
united to the human Son of God, and share in his human sonship. 30 Through 
our union with the humanity of Christ forged out by Christ we also share in the 
love of the Father for the Son; ".. there is no danger that we shall be cut off from 
the love of God; for this foundation cannot be overturned - that we are loved 
because the Father has loved him". 31 Thus Calvin links our participation in the 
humanity of Christ with our participation in the life of the Triune God by arguing 
that our participation in Christ implies that we share in the same love of the 
Father for the Son and, empowered by the Spirit, reciprocate this love in our 
26 Hart, ibid., p. 69 
27 Comm on Hebrews p. 120 
28 Institutes III. ii. 24 
29 Hart notes the implications of rooting the self-giving of God in the person of Christ for 
ecumenism. A' typical' Protestant understanding is criticised by some Catholics as presenting our 
justification rather like a cloak covering a corpse, whereas grace is a real gift, a justification making 
man really just. On the other hand the Catholic perspective is criticised for endangering the 
complete sufficiency of Christ's once-for-all redemptive ministry and for its high estimate of the 
redeemed individual who is yet sinful. By locating God's grace in the relation to the person of 
Christ however there is the possibility of overcoming this impasse. What Hart does not make 
sufficiently clear however is the kind of ontology which needs to underpin such a position. One 
such ontology would be akin to certain Cappadocian ideas outlined earlier which gives room for 
real ontic weight to be ascribed to our relatedness to Christ while allowing a distinction between 
the way we now are and the (hoped-for) eschatological conformity of our way of being to what we 
already are in relation to God in Christ. 
30 Institutes Il. xii. 2 
31 Commentary on John 17: 23 
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filial obedience to the Father. 
It might be argued that this analysis of Calvin's thought which is suggestive of 
our participation in the humanity of Christ still leaves open the question of 
whether Christ's 'substitution' is the final or the primary word in Calvin's 
theology. Are we simply adopted as sons and participators because of Jesus 
Christ or is this an adoption and participation which comes about in Jesus 
Christ, in whom we come to participate more and more by means of the Holy 
Spirit, for example? To see more clearly where Calvin stands on this question 
we must examine his theological anthropology and underlying ontological 
assumptions, in particular his doctrine of the Imago Del. 
4.2 The Imago Dei 
God created us "after his image (Gen. 1: 27) that he might arouse our minds both 
to zeal for virtue and to meditation upon eternal life". 32 The soul and its powers 
are the seat of the image for Calvin, conceived as 'mind and heart', although 
"there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which some sparks did not 
glow". 33 Calvin explains what he means by calling the human being in respect 
of his soul God's image: 
the integrity with which Adam was endowed is expressed by this word, when he had full 
possession of right understanding, when he had his affections kept within the bounds of reason, 
all his senses tempered in the right order, and he truly referred his excellence to exceptional gifts 
bestowed upon him by his Maker. 34 
Adam's fall was such that "even though we grant that God's image was not 
totally annihilated and destroyed in him, yet it was so corrupted that whatever 
remains is frightful deformity". 35 With Christ comes "the beginning of our 
recovery of salvation ... 
for the reason that> -restores us to true and complete 
integrity"36 ; Christ is described as our "prototype"37 and He "rose for the 
32 Institutes 11.1.1 
33 Institutes I. xv. 3. 
34 Institutes I. xv. 3. (This statement shows Calvin's notion of sou, to consist of two aspects, 
understanding, or the intellect, and will). 
35 Institutes I. xv. 4 
36 Institutes I. xv. 4. Further, ".. the end of regeneration is that Christ should reform us to God's 
image", ibid. 
37 Institutes III. xxv. 3 
73 
purpose of making us... partakers of the same glory with Himself". 38 The 
change which is wrought in Christ is not one that blurs the distinction between 
Creator and creatures for Calvin; our transformation is one of quality not 
essence and we are made to "conform to God, not by an inf lowing of substance, 
but by the grace and power of the Spirit... who surely works in us without 
rendering us consubstantial with God". 39 And this regeneration is one involving 
our bodies as well as our souls40 and the whole of creation as well as human 
creatures. 41 
Why then do those in whom the image has been restored continue to be 
tempted and to sin? 
... this restoration 
does not take place in one moment or one day or one year; but through 
continual and sometimes even slow advances God wipes out in his elect the corruptions of the 
flesh, cleanses them of guilt, consecrates them to himself as temples renewing all their minds to 
true purity that they may practice repentance throughout their lives and know that this warfare will 
end only at death. 42 
So the process of renewal of the image of God in the elect is a gradual one and 
only at death will the renewal be effected fully. (In this way Calvin argues 
against those such as Servetus who taught a form of 'realised eschatology'43). 
It is the Holy Spirit who is involved in this temporal process of renewal, a 
renewal founded and effected in Christ as the Spirit conforms us perfectly to the 
regeneration of humanity realised in Christ. 
All of this suggests that it is right to see an ongoing, future-oriented dimension to 
Calvin's thought and in understanding 'substitution' and all parts of our 
salvation being wrought in Christ as the primary rather than the final or 
38 Calvin's Commentaries, '1 Thessalonians', p. 340 (1: 10) 
39 Institutes I. xv. 5 
40 See e. g. Institutes III. xxv. 8 
41 Heinrich Quistorp points out that Calvin "is able to say much about the heavenly glory which is 
promised to Christians but only little about the new earth over which they are to reign with their 
Lord", Calvin's Doctrine of the Last Things, trans. Harold Knight (Richmond: John Knox Press, 
1955), p. 181. However it would not be fair to Calvin to assert more strongly that he lacks any 
sense of the redemption of the cosmos or that what sense he has of it suggests a complete 
discontinuity with the original creation ; "the elements of the world... are to be consumed, only 
that they may be renovated, their substance still remaining the same", Catholic Epistles, p. 421 (2 
Pet 3: 10). 
42 Institutes IIl. iii. 9 
43 Institutes Il. ix. 3 
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exclusive elements within Calvin's theology. Justification and sanctification both 
stem from Jesus Christ on this account, our justification resting in the humanity 
of Christ and the reconciliation of our humanity in Him with God, while our 
sanctification is also at all points dependent on our relationship with God 
established in Jesus Christ. There is no room here for understanding our 
sanctification or process of renewal apart from Christ (in work and person) 
because it is only as related to Christ (through the Spirit) that we are enabled to 
realise our reconciliation with God and to begin to grasp progressively the new 
creation we are in Christ. We can explore fruitfully some of the tensions which 
arise because of Calvin's dual emphasis on what has already been achieved 
and what remains to be consummated soteriologically by considering the 
process of renewal. 
4.3 Sanctification 
The process of renewal is one involving "mortification of the flesh and 
vivification of the spirit"44, the two aspects of repentance for Calvin. Both of 
these aspects of repentance "happen to us by participation in Christ"45 and we 
share in Christ's new life just as we share in his death, the death of our "old 
man". Calvin is not saying here that only by our repentance do we come by the 
fruits of Christ's salvific work because the very mortification of our old nature 
depends upon our being "violently slain by the sword of the Spirit and brought 
to nought". 46 But while Calvin is careful to found our repentance on God's and 
in particular on the Spirit's initiative47, he does seem to find a part for us to play 
in repentance, in struggling against that "smouldering cinder of evil" which 
remains in us and which constantly seeks to allure us and spur us to commit sin. 
This smouldering cinder helps us to learn better of our own weakness 
according to Calvin48 but while its presence indicates that sin still dwells in the 
regenerate, yet it has ceased to reign in them; thus sin remains "not to rule over 
them, but to humble them by, the consciousness of their own weakness". 49 
44 Institutes IIl. iii. 8 
45 Institutes IIl. iii. 9 
46 Institutes 111.111.8 For Calvin the beginning of repentance is a turning to God that "arises from a 
pure and earnest fear of him" (Ill. iii. 5), but this very fear is due to the Spirit's work for "wherever the 
fear of God flourishes, the Spirit has worked toward the salvation of man" (IIl. iii. 21). 
47 Calvin describes the Spirit as urging us to repentance for example, Institutes IIl. iii. 16 
48 Institutes 111.111.10 
49 Institutes MAO 1 
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One might wonder whether this repentance is part of the process of participation 
in Christ. It does seem to be a participation in the salvation wrought by Christ 
because Calvin interprets "repentance as regeneration, whose sole end is to 
restore in us the image of God that had been disfigured and all but obliterated 
through Adam's transgression"50. On the other hand it is not a participation in 
the salvation wrought by Christ in the sense that it does not influence those who 
are regenerate to be so regenerated. However Calvin does write at times as if 
we do have it within ourselves and our actions to fall away from our ongoing 
regeneration (an idea we found earlier in Hebrews). While encumbered by our 
fleshly bodies we are it seems always susceptible to backsliding and 
perseverance is essential if we are to come into that inheritance which has 
been forged out for us in Christ. Calvin makes a particularly notable remark in 
relation to this point in his commentary on Heb. 3: 14: 
He (Paul) praises them for having begun well. But in case they indulge themselves with the 
indifference of the flesh on the pretext of the grace which they have obtained, he says that there 
is need for perseverance. Most people only taste the Gospel... and do not think to progress.. 
they turn their course in another direction... Christ has given Himself to us to enjoy on this 
condition, that we preserve to the moment of death this great blessing by the same faith by which 
we were brought to partake of Him. 51 
From comments such as these it seems clear that we are able to participate in 
Christ insofar as we persevere in the faith we have graciously received, insofar 
as we remember in all humility how utterly dependent on God for our salvation 
we are, insofar as we acknowledge our own sinfulness and God's just wrath 
and bountiful mercy in our lifelong repentance. Our participation is always to be 
understood as a response, a response to the free and gracious initiative of God 
towards us, and even our response is founded on the work of God in us and 
reflects to His greater glory rather than giving us any cause for credit 52 
But our participation in Christ also has a 'horizontal' dimension to it for Calvin. 
According to Calvin scripture teaches us that "all the gifts we possess have 
been bestowed by God and entrusted to us on condition that they be distributed 
50 Institutes III. iii. 9 
51 Calvin's commentaries, Hebrews I Peter, 11 Peter, ibid., p. 42 The emphasis on our 
perseverance makes Calvin's remarks on our own assurance of salvation through faith ring rather 
hollow, and this emphasis is somewhat ironic in view of his criticism of the Council of Trent's 
doctrine of faith, that it denied that anyone could be assured of salvation while he lived. 
52 Calvin is always alert to the sin of self-congratulation and pride; see for example Institutes IIl. vii. 4 
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for our neighbours' benefit (cf. 1 Peter 4: 10)". 53 And we cannot dismiss our 
responsibility for our neighbour on the grounds that s/he is not worthy of our 
service for "the image of God, which recommends him to you, is worthy of your 
giving yourself and all your possessions". 54 As we act in this way we 'exercise' 
the image of God within us in the sense that we follow God's pattern of 
extending His grace to the world as we reach out to our neighbours. And 
through this action we come more to realise that which has been wrought in us 
as we become what we are in Christ. In relation to this though conceiving of 
action in a downward direction T. F. Torrance writes that: 
the expression come down has, for Calvin, particular importance, for it means that a true 
knowledge of man is not only reflexive of the divine self-revelation but also of the divine action in 
grace. There is no true knowledge of man, therefore, unless it is conceived as grounded upon 
the downward motion of grace. 55 
This being the case we can see how Calvin links the 'horizontal' and 'vertical' 
dimensions of participation in God in a way which avoids both ethical 
indifference and Pelagianism. As Cooper points out, Calvin's "perception of the 
image of God as participation in the downward action of grace, combined with 
his emphasis on mankind as image, opens up the neighbour as an appropriate 
and necessary recipient of reverence for Christ" 56 But while participation is 
conceived here as activity which mirrors the divine activity Calvin asserts that 
there is a 'natural' (i. e. created) character to the image of God so that this image 
is not crystallised purely as or out of a dynamic ecstasis towards others (e. g. 
Institutes I. xv. 3). 
4.4 The Ecclesial Community 
God has not left us without the necessary support and encouragement to foster 
our participation in Christ says Calvin and since "in our ignorance and sloth... 
we need outward helps to beget and increase faith within us, and advance to its 
goal, God has also added these aids that he may provide for our weakness". 57 
53 Institutes III. vii. 5 
54 Institutes III. vii. 6. 
55 T. F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949)p. 14 
56 D. J. C. Cooper'The Theology of Image in Eastern Orthodoxy and John Calvin', SJT vol. 35 
(1982), p. 237. 
57 Institutes IV. i. 1 
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The aids God grants us are given us within the treasure of the church, where the 
gospel rightly preached and the sacraments duly administered enable us to be 
taught God's will and prescribe "a way for us, though still far off, to draw near to 
him". 58 Given this ecciesiological emphasis in Calvin's thought and the way in 
which the church provides a context for our participation in Christ and our 
renewal (as can be seen in Calvin's treatment of the prophetic, kingly and 
priestly roles of Christ), it is worth exploring his doctrine of the church further. 
The "contradiction" between the fallen condition of humanity and God's 
intention for creation is resolved by Calvin only by God's salvation of the church: 
the prophet concludes that the whole order of nature would be subverted, unless God preserved 
the church. For the creation of the world would serve no purpose if there were no people to call 
upon God. 59 
Calvin speaks of Abraham as the "father of the church", because it is with 
Abraham that God made his covenantal promises and by which the people of 
Israel were separated as a peculiar people, a church. Participation in the 
covenant is not to be taken for granted however because while God is always 
true to His covenantal promises, human beings may break themselves off from 
the covenant, the covenant being a gift which comes with certain obligations 
and demands. Calvin details how the people of Israel as a body finally forfeit the 
covenantal protection of God, but how also God in his faithfulness to the 
covenant preserves a remnant, a remnant whose constitution involves a 
second, secret election of God; 
there was a twofold election of God; since speaking generally he chose the whole family of 
Abraham... But the other was secret, because God took to himself out of that multitude those 
whom he wished: and these are the sons of promise, these are the remnants of gratuitous 
favour. 60 
Both the "general" first election and the "particular" following election promise 
salvation but as Milner points out the "particular" election can be distinguished 
from the "general" election on three counts; "first, it has to do with individuals, 
rather than groups or nations; second, it is not only offered, but assigned; and 
third, it carries with it a certainty which does not admit of doubt". 61 
58 Institutes I. i. 1 
59 Comm. Ps. 115.17 
60 Comm. Eze. 16.3 
61 B. C. Milner, Calvin's Doctrine of the church (Leiden: Brill, 1970), p. 54 
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We become aware of our own election in and through the general election by 
realising the covenantal promises for ourselves; in other words it is by faith that 
our election is known because "we shall have a right definition of faith if we say 
that it is a firm and certain knowledge of the divine benevolence toward us, 
which, founded on the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, is revealed in our 
minds and sealed in our hearts by the Holy Spirit". 62 This way of realising our 
election suggests that we can have no assurance of another's salvation. 
Further, the only way in which we might gauge the true and not merely 
temporary character of our own faith is by perseverance, so that election must 
be "proved" throughout the "whole course of life" and is only finally confirmed 
upon our deaths6a 
The second, secret election which Calvin adheres to leads him to speak of 
invisible and visible churches. The invisible church are the secretly elect, those 
"who are children of God by grace of adoption and true members of Christ by 
sanctification of the Holy Spirit". 64 On the other hand the visible church is the 
church as we see it, a church in which there are "mingled many hypocrites who 
have nothing of Christ but the name and outward appearance". 65 While this 
"particular" election might at first sight suggest an individualistic approach, we 
should note that this election is an "engrafting" on to the Body of Christ, an 
action on the individual but one which acts by placing the individual in a 
particular context and set of relationships; 
it is not sufficient, indeed, for us to comprehend in mind and thought the multitude of the elect, 
unless we consider the unity of the church as that into which we are convinced we have been 
truly engrafted. For no hope of future inheritance remains to us unless we have been united with 
all othermembers under Christ, our Head. 66 
Elsewhere Calvin states that we cannot be Christians without being "brothers" 
and our very incorporation into Christ through the Spirit places us in a 
fellowship of love with fellow members; thus "God shows himself as present, 
62 institutes 111. ii. 7 
63 This is not to say that from God's perspective He is undecided about our election, but rather 
that "the elect will persevere, but only those who persevere know - only in their persevering - that 
they are of the elect". Milner, ibid., p. 65 
64 Institutes IV. i. 7 
65 Institutes IVA. 7 
66 Institutes IV. i. 2 
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when by his Spirit he forms our hearts so that they entertain brotherly love... 
then by love we prove that we have God abiding in us". 67 Indeed such is the 
unity of the body that Calvin can suggest that "what has befallen the church 
ought to affect us in the same manner as if it had befallen each of us 
individually"68 and that 
no increase is advantageous which does not bear a just proportion to the whole body. That man is 
mistaken who desires his own separate growth. 69 
There is little room here for individualism, and Calvin understands our election 
as one involving our participation in the church as the Body of Christ, a 
participation entailing particularly love and intercession for fellow members. 70 
We do not wish to collapse the distinction between election and participation in 
the Body of Christ here, but we do wish to stress that the election of the 
individual has as its confirmation, concrete manifestation and implication, 
participation in the Body of Christ. Calvin can even speak occasionally of such 
participation being the means of preserving our election for "so powerful is 
participation in the church that it keeps us in the society of God". 71 
Our being engrafted into the Body of Christ has a dialectical quality about it for 
Calvin. While on the one hand our regeneration through Christ into which we 
enter through the Spirit is something achieved for us completely, once and for 
all, yet "we are daily gathered by the gospel into the fold of Christ". 72 Faith is in 
need of repeated refreshment and nurture and this is granted as we belong to 
and are united in the Body of Christ, in which we are regenerated. Calvin's 
dialectic extends here to seeing the church as being in one sense sinless and 
in another yet sinful: 
They sin not who remain in Christ ... 
Christ by his Spirit does not perfectly renew us in a day or a 
moment... It cannot then be but that the faithful are exposed to sin as long as they live in the 
world; but as far as the kingdom of-Christ prevails in them, sin is abolished. 73 
67 Comm. 1 John 4.12 
68 Comm. Is. 22.4 
69 Comm. Eph. 4.16 
70 See Milner, ibid., pp. 185-187 for the importance of sumpatheia and mutual intercession in 
Calvin's ecclesiology. 
71 Institutes IV. i. 3 
72 Comm. John 11.51 
73 Comm. /John 3.5 
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Again we see here the tension between the salvation brought by Christ and our 
participation in Christ, the tension between the 'now' and the 'not yet'. Whether 
this tension is in fact a plain contradiction remains to be seen but there is the 
possibility of understanding this dialectic as follows; we are to grasp the fact that 
we have been saved and regenerated and so participate in this actuality by our 
way of being, a participation which will bring home to us the reality of that 
salvation wrought in Christ and an appreciation of God's initiating, directing 
and completing of our regeneration in Christ through the Spirit. 
The church is the scene of our regeneration and the ongoing context of 
humanity's restoration for "the restoration of the church shall be of such a nature 
as to be perpetual". 74 Just as the restoration of the image of God within us is not 
in all ways already effected but involves a gradual renovation over time, so too 
the church "is not so much an institution in history in which the restoration of 
order has been accomplished, as it is itself the history of that restoration". 75 This 
history of restoration proceeds concretely by the preaching and hearing of the 
Gospel primarily for "God breathes faith into us only by the instrument of his 
gospel, as Paul points out that "faith comes from hearing" (Rom. 10: 17)". 76 The 
second mark of the church and instrument by which we are drawn more closely 
to God is the sacraments; indeed "wherever we see the Word of God purely 
preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to Christ's 
institution, there, it is not to be doubted, a church of God exists". 77 Calvin is clear 
however about the priority of the Gospel: 
.. assurance of salvation 
does not depend upon participation in the sacrament, as if justification 
consisted in it. For we know that justification is lodged in Christ alone, and that it is communicated 
to us no less by the preaching of the gospel than by the seal of the sacrament, and without the 
latter can stand unimpaired. 78 
Calvin's view of the importance of the sacraments is not without relevance to the 
discussion of participation because Calvin is keen to reject the view that 
74 Comm. Is. 66.72 
75 Milner, Calvin's Doctrine of the church, ibid., p. 47 
76 Institutes IV. i. 5; God "also provides for our weakness in that he prefers to address us in human 
fashion through interpreters in order to draw us to himself, rather than to thunder at us and drive 
us away", ibid. 
77 Institutes IV. i. 9 
78 Institutes IV. xiv. 14 
81 
participation in Christ is an automatic benefit of sacramental practices. Calvin 
felt that the Roman Church tied grace to the sacraments in a way which denied 
the sovereign freedom of the Spirit of God whereas "the sacraments properly 
fulfil their office only when the Spirit, that inward teacher, comes to them, by 
whose power alone hearts are penetrated and affections moved". 79 Similarly 
McDonnell can write of Calvin's Eucharistic Lord that he "is the sovereign Lord, 
the uncommitted who is never so committed as to lose the freedom of his 
lordship". 80 This might suggest that Calvin denies a "real" presence of Christ to 
the consecrated bread and wine, but such a remark needs qualification. For 
Calvin the focus of his Eucharistic reflections tends not to be so much how 
objectively bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ but rather how 
that body and blood become, in the Supper, ours. Crucially Calvin maintains 
that "we maintain no other presence than that of a relationship". 81 For Calvin the 
body of Christ remains at the right hand of the Father in heaven, interceding for 
us, underlining humanity's forgiveness and acceptability in Christ to God. Yet 
we do participate in this very body in the Eucharist because the Spirit lifts us to 
heaven to participate in Christ. 82 
But what use is the participation in Christ through the Spirit in the Eucharist, if 
we are able by faith apart from the sacraments to be joined with Christ? Calvin 
suggests a number of different purposes which the Eucharist serves; by it we 
are not united to Christ (faith does that) but it is "to seal and confirm that promise 
by which he (Christ) testifies that his flesh is food indeed and his blood is drink 
(Jn. 6: 56), which feed us unto eternal life (Jn. 6: 55)". 83 Thus the Eucharist has 
the role of assuring the faithful of Christ's promises. 84 By the Eucharist we are 
"nourished unto eternal life", sustained and "refreshed", and Calvin assigns to 
the particular ministry of the sacraments generally the "confirmation and 
79 Institutes IV. xiv. 9 
80 J. McDonnell, John Calvin, the church, and the Eucharist (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 
1967), p. 363 
81 Institutes IV. xvii. 13 
82 See Calvin's A short Treatise on the Lord's Supper (1541), in Calvin's Tracts and Treatises 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), vol. 2, p. 280. 
83 Institutes IV. xvii. 4 
84 As T. H. L. Parker paraphrases it, it is not that the Word of God's promise is weak. "What is weak is 
our faith in the promise. The sacraments are intended to establish our weak faith in the firm and 
faithful promise of God". See his Calvin. An Introduction to His Thought (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1995), p. 148 
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increase of faith". 85 Most significantly Calvin suggests that in the Eucharist ; 
.. we are quickened 
by the true partaking of him; and he has therefore designated this partaking by 
the words "eating" and "drinking", in order that no one should think that the life that we receive 
from him is received by mere knowledge. As it is not the seeing but the eating of bread that 
suffices to feed the body, so the soul must truly and deeply become partaker of Christ that it may 
be quickened to spiritual life by his power... this eating is the result and effect of faith.... For even 
though the apostle teaches that "Christ dwells in our hearts through faith" (Eph. 3: 17), no one will 
interpret this indwelling to be faith, but all feel that he is there expressing a remarkable effect of 
faith, for through this believers gain Christ abiding in them. 86 
This passage is of significance because it suggests that in the Eucharist we 
come by a mode of participation in Christ, an "indwelling" of Christ, which is 
distinct from that union of Christ which occurs in faith, although this "indwelling" 
follows on from and is an effect of faith. While assurance of salvation and 
justification do not rest upon participation in the sacrament, such participation 
brings with it benefits to our faith and a distinctive sense of our unity with Christ 
such that "by true partaking of him, his life passes into us and is made ours - just 
as bread when taken as food imparts vigour to the body". 87 It is almost as if the 
embodying of our faith in the Lord's Supper brings with it a quality of 
communion with God in Christ otherwise absent. 
We noted above how Calvin points out that the faithful are to open the bosom of 
their hearts to embrace the Eucharistic Lord, a comment suggesting believers 
have an active part to play in participation in Christ and the renewal of the 
image of God. Other comments Calvin makes suggest this too; for example 
Calvin notes as we have seen that our persistence in the faith is required if we 
are to reach that full measure of union with Christ which is realised at death, just 
as repentance, humility and service of our neighbour also effect our progress 
towards our heavenly perfection. And yet Calvin is also adamant that there can 
be no human "additions" to God's salvific grace, that God's grace is "efficacious 
of itself"88, that our perseverance is exclusively God's work89, that all that 
happens does so according to God's predetermined plan. 90 Again we see these 
85 Institutes IV. xiv. 9 
86 Institutes IV. xvii. 5 
87 Institutes IV. xvii. 5 
88 Institutes II. iii. 10 
89 Institutes II . 
iii. 11 
90 E. g. Institutes I. xvi. 4 
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two strands of Calvin's thought in tension, and it is this area of Calvin's thought 
where we find the greatest strains between Christ's salvation of humanity and 
our participation in that salvation. The issue of freedom in Calvin's theology 
provides a useful focus in discussing these strains and it is to this issue that we 
will now turn our attention. 
4.5 Divine and Human Freedom 
Calvin, like (certainly the older) Augustine before him, suggests that the human 
will is such that, apart from grace, it cannot help but will ill. Calvin draws an 
interesting distinction here between necessity and compulsion9l, Calvin 
suggesting that we sin necessarily but not compulsively. By this Calvin seems to 
mean that human beings sin necessarily in that our freedom cannot of itself be 
exercised in such a way that we embrace the good with any consistency or 
constancy, our will cannot help but exercise itself in a negative way; but there is 
no compulsion to our sinning in the sense of it involving the sort of external 
coercion which would imply a lack of responsibility for our sins on our part. 
Such an awareness of our inability to help ourselves leads Calvin to attack 
those such as Pelagius who "lodged the first cause of salvation in man's 
merit". 92 We should rather follow Paul, says Calvin, for in his writings "we see 
how, not simply content to have given God due praise for our salvation, he 
expressly excludes us from all participation in it. It is as if he were saying that 
not a whit remains to man to glory in, for the whole of salvation comes from 
God". 93 Thus it is God who arouses love and zeal for righteousness within us by 
"bending, forming, and directing, our hearts to righteousness. He completes his 
work, moreover, by confirming us to perseverance". 94 But although our freedom 
to will the good is founded, directed, sustained and actualised by God, Calvin 
does seem to speak of a certain contribution to this process on our part; 
(for if it is said) that after we have by the Lord's power once for all been brought to obey 
righteousness, we go forward by our own power and are inclined to follow the action of grace, I do 
not gainsay it. For it is very certain that where God's grace reigns, there is readiness to obey it. 95 
91 Institutes II. iii. 6 
92 Institutes 11. iii. 7 
93 Institutes 11. iii. 6 
94 Institutes 11. iii. 6 
95 Institutes I1. iii. 11 
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But even this is qualified by Calvin in that such an inclination on our part is 
founded and nourished by the Spirit. The importance of this is that for Calvin 
there is no sense here of our independent contribution to the work of salvation, 
no ability of ours isolated from God which God needs to cooperate with in order 
to effect his purposes for us, nothing within us which can realise the good apart 
from God and relationship to Him. If Calvin leaves room for our cooperation with 
God, it is with God that the priority lies and it is a cooperation in which we can 
be involved only by God's initiative and sustaining graciousness. One reason 
why this is so is that Calvin will not allow any infringement of God's sovereignty 
and control of creation. A guiding axiom for Calvin is that people "are not so free 
to choose that God's will does not rule over their freedom". 96 Unfortunately 
Calvin draws from this in places a conclusion which is potentially somewhat at 
odds with the suggestion above that there is space for a human contribution to 
salvation in Calvin's thought. In stressing God's power and freedom over 
creation Calvin writes that people "are so in his power that he causes them to 
be inclined where and when he will, either to bestow benefits, or to inflict 
punishments - indeed by his most secret but most righteous judgment". 97 This is 
the sort of statement which leads to the criticism that we have a 'puppeteer' God 
here, a structure of thought which implies God's direct responsibility for evil, and 
which might promote ethical laxity and fatalism. These are of course familiar 
and well-rehearsed criticisms of Calvin's theology. 
In the end Calvin does not resolve the seemingly contradictory assertions he 
gives when speaking of human freedom and its place in our participation in the 
salvation wrought in Christ. While at times it appears that we are at least 
capable of placing ourselves outside salvation by lacking persistence, humility 
and/or due regard for our neighbour, at other times it appears that even such 
decisions and actions as these are primarily and positively decreed by our 
sovereign God. We should perhaps not be surprised at finding such a dialectic 
in Calvin's thought, it is but one of many. Partee notes for example how Calvin 
vacillated between the supralapsarians and the infralapsarians writing that 
"Calvin taught that sin was positively decreed (with the supralapsarians) when 
he was dealing with the doctrine of God; and permissively decreed (with the 
infralapsarians) when he was dealing with the doctrine of man". 98 The former 
96 Institutes II. iv. 7 
97 Institutes I1. iv. 7 
98 C. Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1977), p. 143 
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implied that God was the author of sin, which Calvin denied, while the latter 
denied God's sovereignty if stress was laid on permission (or it led back to the 
supralapsarian position if stress was laid on the permissive decree). Wendel 
gives a list of "dialectical opposites" he sees Calvin affirming, a list including 
God's wrath/love, humanity's complete justification/ incomplete regeneration, 
gratitude/contempt for earthly goods, God's omnipotence/ human responsibility. 
Wendel concludes that "it would be better, we think, to confess that Calvin's is 
not a closed system elaborated round a central idea, but that it draws together, 
one after another, a whole series of Biblical ideas, some of which can only with 
difficulty be reconciled ...... 99 
There seems little doubt in the light of such 
dialectics as these that Calvin's thought is not so much 'systematic' as it is 
primarily scriptural and confessional, and it involves affirmations of what Calvin 
takes to be the scriptural witness to revelation, affirmations which Calvin will not 
compromise for the sake of all-too-human, reasonable canons of consistency 
and coherency. 
4.6 Binding the Person and Work of Christ 
Scholars such as Hart and J. B. Torrance have pointed out the seriousness with 
which Calvin treats the notion of participation against those who would turn 
Calvin into a Calvinistloo, but they offer no suggestions as to how we might 
move beyond the dialectical impasse created thereby (and which we mentioned 
above). The key lies perhaps with the humanity of Christ, a focus for 
participation which may combine the emphases of substitution and response- 
ability. In terms of substitution we can understand the Incarnation in terms of the 
Word's ontological transformation of humanness. By becoming incarnate and 
living a life of obedience to the will of the Father the Son perfects humanity, 
particularly in terms of right relatedness to the Father, other creatures and the 
creation. The universal significance of Christ here lies in the way in which our 
humanity is now related to God in and through Christ. Such a relation is of 
ontological significance in making humanity a new creation, a new creation 
'hidden in Christ'. To say it is of ontological significance assumes as we have 
99 F. Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought (London: William 
Collins Sons, 1963). 
100 Followers of Calvin such as Beza elevated the concept of the double decree and 
predestination in Calvin, an elevation leaving precious little room to make sense of Calvin's notion 
of participation. 
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previously made clear that what we are is defined to some extent by who we are 
in relation to and what manner of relationship is involved. As God's creatures 
we have always been related to the Creator but the manner of that relationship 
is transformed by Christ's incarnation among us. This is not the transformation 
of God's anger into love however, as if it was God who needed reconciling to 
the world rather than vice versa. God's constancy to His covenant undergirds 
and informs the transformation of our relationship with God, a relationship 
liberating us from guilt, being-for-ourselves and death, liberating us for God and 
our neighbours. While atonement focuses on the transformation of the divine- 
human relationship in Christ however, participation focuses on the way of our 
relationship with God through Christ as grounded in this transformation and in 
particular on human beings' relationship to the humanity of Christ, a humanity 
which proleptically reveals the perfection, fulfilment and beauty of God and 
ourselves in God. With the life, death and resurrection of Christ humanity is 
ontologically changed, reconciled, reunited and now stands related to its 
potential destiny, meaning and hope, in Christ. This new creation is revealed to 
us as we live it out in worship and in the life of communities of mutual respect, 
love and service, when what we are in Christ is truly affirmed by the way we are 
in the world. This could be understood as our participation in God, as we 
become what we will be finally through the Holy Spirit. 
But does this approach, focusing on the transformation of our human-ness, not 
disregard the importance of Christ's life as a life of obedience, obedience even 
unto death, death on a cross (Phil. 2: 8)? We can speak of the "steady working 
out" of the hypostatic union or the incarnation in the life, death and resurrection 
of Christ but this in itself pays only lip-service to the cross which has abiding 
and central significance in the gospel narratives. The remarks of many of the 
Church Fathers seem to show this disregard; Athanasius stated that "The Logos 
became man so that we might become divinized" (De Inc. 54); Leo I said that 
"He became a man of our race so that we might become sharers of the divine 
nature"; Augustine wrote that Christ "descended that we might ascend, and 
remaining in his nature was made a partaker of our nature, that we remaining in 
our nature might be made partakers of his nature". The logic of Christ 
participating in our humanity enabling us to participate in his nature is not 
immediately clear. Nor is it obvious that the cross finds a place in such logic but 
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an understanding of some sort of admirabile commercium is rooted in the New 
Testament and it is there that the significance of Christ's work also becomes 
apparent. For example Christ becomes "sin" (2 Cor. 5: 21), a "curse" (Gal. 3: 13), 
poor for our sake (2 Cor. 8: 9), that we might share in God's covenant 
righteousness, receive the blessing of Abraham and become rich through His 
poverty. Christ's action is deliberate (e. g. Rom. 8: 32, Jn. 10: 17), by it we are 
liberated (e. g. Rom. 7, Jn. 8: 44,1 Thess. 1: 10), drawn into intimate relation with 
God (e. g. Eph. 1: 5ff, 1 Cor. 12, Rom. 8: 1 Off) and all this is due to God's love (e. g. 
Jn. 3: 16, Rom. 8: 32-39). 1O1 From this strand of scripture we might infer that it is 
not simply the fact of Incarnation that provides for our access to the Godhead 
but also the way of that Incarnation, Christ's life, death and resurrection. In 
particular the weight of scripture is on the passion and cross of Christ, so that if 
we wish to understand the logic of the admirabile commercium we must attend 
to the atonement. Space does not permit a detailed exposition of atonement 
theory here but what is important is to bring out the way in which, following 
scripture and Calvin's102 cue, we must bring the person and work of Christ 
together in our understanding of participation and earth participation in Christ's 
atoning obedience. Such obedience unto death effected the new creation we 
are in Christ, a new creation we are called to participate in progressively by our 
way of being. 
Briefly then, by faith we understand Jesus' death in part as a vicarious 
acknowledgement of God's righteous judgment on human sin, enabling us to 
participate in that acknowledgement. The cross is that place where appropriate 
human repentance can be accomplished in union with Christ because here is 
crystallised our rejection of God, God's judgement on sin and God's 
transcending loving forgiveness. Human beings by faith see the cross as the 
fruits of their covenant-breaking, the judgment of God on their waywardness 
and yet as the ultimate expression of God's love for them, the love of a God who 
calls them back from destruction by taking their destruction on Himself as a 
means both of affirming His righteousness and as a means of drawing human 
101 For a more detailed consideration see Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Theodrama, Vol. IV, pp. 240ff 
102 T. H. L. Parker for example notes that "it is quite clear that for Calvin salvation is won by the 
whole course of obedience', with the Cross as the culmination, as the supreme test of his 
obedience". See his Calvin, p. 72 
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beings to Himself (in the Son). 103 Our acknowledgement of all this cannot be 
simply an epistemological acknowledgement, as if repentance and faith were 
merely intellectual acts of assent. (Calvin stressed that faith is the response of 
the whole person, cf. Institutes lll. 2.8f). Rather this acknowledgement must 
involve our entire being and its relationships to God and other human beings. 
Such an acknowledgement is marked by joy and freedom for the forgiveness 
given, a sense of the value of human life in the sight of God, a realisation of the 
holiness and righteousness of God, a grasp of the tremendous unity and 
ecstatic love that binds the persons of the Trinity, humility and the urge to 
reparation, to realising our fulfilment in Christ. 
Jesus' crucifixion provides the hope that the response of the human covenant- 
partner to God is not necessarily and always flawed. This does not mean that 
we as human beings, now having been transformed by Christ's life and 
Incarnation are perfectly able to keep the covenant. (That much is empirically 
vouchsafed! ) Neither does it mean that simply as we imitate Christ we will fulfil 
the covenant. Rather it suggests that we may realise our fulfilment as covenant- 
partners in Christ, through the timely and perfecting operation of the Spirit. 
While such a fulfilment remains to be actualised fully eschatologically, yet we 
are able now (proleptically and through the Spirit) as we acknowledge that only 
in Christ are we forgiven and reconciled, to live lives which reflect Christ's 
mode of loving, a mode of loving in which the human fulfils the covenant. We 
continue to slip back from this mode of loving and as we do we must return to 
the place of the cross, to realise once again our forgiveness and the context in 
which it is forged. True acknowledgement of our reconciliation is not to be 
separated here from compassionate responsibility to our neighbour. It is not that 
loving our neighbour is a condition for reconciliation, but that without such 
compassion we have shown ourselves that we have not grasped the 
implications of the cross in terms of the love of God for each human being, 
including ourselves. The model of participation in Christ is helpful here 
because it retains a sense of our dependence on the reconciling, forgiving, 
love-inspiring Christ while also leaving room for a sense of our separateness in 
103 We would distance ourselves here from any unbiblical notion of substituted punishment. 
Such a view fails to appreciate that the atonement occurs within the context of the loving 
relationships of God towards the world and between Father and Son. The Son vicariously repents 
on our behalf, according a perfect human Amen to the judgment of God on human sin, but this is 
realised within a deeper 'collaboration' of Father and Son seeking to reconcile the world to God. 
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relatedness to this Christ. Further, it invites an understanding of discipleship as 
an ongoing collaboration continuously initiated and in-formed by Christ 
(through the Spirit). To separate participation from the work of Christ and in 
particular the cross is to invite for example sloth (if we glibly assume a kind of 
'cheap grace'), despair (because of our continued sinfulness) or pride (as we 
congratulate ourselves on our adherence to the imitatio Christi). Hubris is 
undermined as we understand our service of God and one another as a being 
taken up into the movement of Christ towards the Father and our neighbour (a 
movement realised in the Spirit), a movement grounded in Christ's liberating 
work. Despair is alleviated as we continually return to the source of our 
forgiveness and hope at the foot of the cross. Sloth is challenged as we 
appreciate that the one who brings new life to us is simultaneously the one who 
brings our neighbours in need to us. 
4.7 Freedom in the Spirit 
Returning to our discussion of the new creation we are in Christ, as Calvin was 
only too aware, our behaviour is often somewhat at odds with this new creation, 
and this requires some explanation. Following Calvin we should perhaps begin 
not with the priority of human 'freedom' but with God in explaining such 
behaviour. Perhaps such behaviour can be seen as indicating something of the 
personal and spatio-temporal room we are afforded by the person of the Holy 
Spirit, space which is vital if our otherness is to be affirmed. However it is not 
enough simply to affirm our otherness as the freedom (of choice) of embracing 
our salvation, because this would simply stress our otherness at the expense of 
our relatedness to God. God binds Himself to us, relates Himself to us, whether 
we like it or not. The space afforded our otherness does not necessarily and 
primarily imply a freedom finally to accept or reject God but rather involves a 
freedom concerning the timing and particular manner in which that relationship 
comes to be perfected eschätologically. And this is a freedom both of the human 
being and of the Spirit. In this way the freedom of the Spirit is affirmed and when 
the truly personal nature of the Spirit is understood a conception of human 
freedom as a being set free for the Father by relationship with the Spirit through 
Christ can be affirmed. 
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What might our freedom look like within this framework? There appear to be two 
immediate possibilities. The first would be to accept Calvin's primary notion of 
human freedom, an account which suggests we cannot but err in isolation from 
God's influence. One philosophy of freedom that would undergird such a 
position is compatibilism, which suggests that causal determinism and human 
freedom are somehow compatible. 104 If this were so, then God's 
predetermined plan need not conflict with our responsibility before God. What 
might this freedom look like then? Fergusson suggests that here it might be that 
.. a voluntary action is one which 
is explained by factors which are internal to the agent's 
constitution. In this way, it is entirely accounted for by the sum total of dispositions internal to an 
agent prior to the moment of each mental and physical act. The notion that there is some extra 
ingredient called 'freedom of the will', which enables the agent to retain the possibility of choosing 
otherwise, is deemed irrelevant and illusory. Such an account of the will would not render action 
free but only random and indeterminate. 105 
On this account "the concept of 'freedom' is usually reserved to describe the 
quality of life in which the Holy Spirit enables the believer to will what is truly 
good". 106 We are set free for God by the Holy Spirit who provides the will and 
desire, and who actually effects this liberation. The trouble with this view of 
freedom is that it sits uneasily with our own experience of feeling able to choose 
freely, and external coercion has been replaced by internal determinism in such 
a way as to invalidate the authenticity of such experience. It also leaves the 
problem of who is responsible for evil actions; if the Spirit does not provide the 
necessary conditions for a human being's doing the good, then is the Spirit not 
ultimately responsible for the evil actions that otherwise result? Finally there is 
the question of how far our otherness is truly affirmed under this model of 
human freedom. If our freedom takes shape within the relationship to the 
personal other which is the Holy Spirit then simultaneous with that relatedness 
is a separatedness which is in danger of being lost with the compatibilist 
account of freedom. It is however a big step from this statement to the 
assumption that separatedness must imply ultimate freedom of choice; what is 
called for is an account of human separateness and freedom in relation to God 
which does not deny the sovereign freedom of God to save His creatures as He 
104 A recent attempt to defend this position has been put forward by P. HeIm, see his The 
Providence of God (Leicester: IVP, 1993) 
105 D. Fergusson, 'Predestination: A Scottish Perspective', in SJT, vol. 46, No. 4 (1993), p. 475 
106 Ibid., p. 475 
91 
wills but which neither collapses nor (potentially) severs the Creator-creature 
relationship by its account of human freedom. 
A second possibility would be to say that Calvin is wrong to assume 
axiomatically that God's freedom is always and essentially in precedence over 
human freedom. Such an axiom already implies a certain compulsion to God's 
freedom. God is not free, under Calvin's scheme, to elevate human freedom, to 
allow Himself to be pushed around by human beings as it were, which it could 
be argued is in a sense, precisely what does happen in the story of the cross. 
McDonnell, speaking particularly in respect of the sacraments, is right to point 
out that "God is not bound; what is more, God cannot bind himself! Calvin will 
not permit it! "107 So the second possibility would be to suggest that God allows 
our freedom some space, that God leaves us the freedom to reject Him, that 
God effects a salvation for us which depends on our free acceptance of it, a 
position which provides at least for the possibility of (eventually) universal 
salvation and which entails moral responsibility. In this way we are set free for 
God, but it remains for us to embrace this freedom. 
There are of course different nuances that can be put on these two positions. 
Looking at the second and our preferred possibility for example, we need not 
regard our freedom to embrace or shun God's offer as implying the innate ability 
to hear God's Word or an ability to appropriate God independent of God's will. 
We can take from Calvin the idea that the Holy Spirit creates the conditions for a 
genuine decision before Christ so that it is only as God relates to us that we are 
enabled to embrace God's call. The sort of freedom advocated by this possibility 
would involve a libertarian account of choice; 
(this kind of freedom) can be approached negatively by arguing that an action is a free action if it 
has no complete explanation in terms of the agent's personality, brain-state or genetic make-up. It 
is a free action only if we can say that even in the presence of these conditioning factors the agent 
could have acted otherwise. 108 
Such an approach must beware of lapsing into the kind of synergism which 
would "lose sight of the preeminence of grace and the divine over-ruling of 
107 McDonnell, John Calvin, the church, and the Eucharist(Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1967), p. 370 
108 Fergusson, 'Predestination', p. 477 
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human affairs". 109 We can avoid such dangers however and build on Irving's 
suggestive thought. By understanding the divine over-ruling of human affairs in 
terms of an assurance of our perfecting in Christ eschatologically through the 
Spirit we can retain a sense of the Creator's oversight of creation. By 
understanding the preeminence of grace as the particular and historical activity 
of the Holy Spirit who creates the conditions for our responsiveness without 
coercing itilO we can retain a relational account of God's activity which is not 
primarily synergistic but dependent on God's initiative. Accounts of this 
relationship such as "I, yet not I but the grace of God" can be seen from this 
perspective not as debasing our humanity but as acknowledging the glory of the 
human being to rest in the dependent relation of creature to Creator. 1 ' (And 
here we might note that Calvin was right to guard against accounts of human 
goodness which neglected the major and primary role played by God in such 
goodness; his keenness to guard against human pride, arrogance and self- 
congratulation was a keenness to protect our freedom too, freedom which stood 
in danger of being fettered with the chains of hubris by false accounts of human 
response-ability. 1'12) 
109 Ibid., p. 478 
110 The immediate question arising here is what it means to say that "God creates the conditions 
for us to respond"? Perhaps we could understand the Spirit as drawing out of us an ec-static way 
of being in relation to others (i. e. the Father through Christ, and our neighbours), a way of being 
that we appear to have initiated but which we may realise is not simply of our own creation. Any 
account of such a development in terms of ascribing certain features of this development to the 
Spirit and certain features to the human being is flawed because (a) we cannot tie the sovereign 
Spirit only to specific functions and (b) it is precisely in the rich ambiguity of the Spirit's working and 
ours that God protects human freedom and (c) to separate Spirit and human being in such a 
functional way is potentially to dissolve a personal relationship into mechanical co-operation. By 
enabling changes in our modes of relationship the Spirit affects the "l" in terms of reforming 
patterns of responses, hierarchies of desires and so on. (But this account is not individualistic 
because it involves individuals in relation to others, divine and human. ) The Spirit does not coerce 
because it is possible for former patterns of relating to be reverted to (although in the light of the 
experience of the Spirit it is never quite 'reversion'). This suggests that the work of the Spirit can 
be set at nought provisionally (and perhaps even finally), but this is because the Spirit so allows 
this possibility in acting in a personal, relational way. (It would still be possible to give an account 
here of universalism in that the Spirit might so continue to re-form patterns of relationality as to 
make for the inevitability of our 'right-relating' and perfection as children of God). 
111 Such a position resists the perennial temptation to dissolve the vertical into the horizontal and 
it retains (with Barth) an ethical seriousness which "takes both God as one who is actively engaged 
in personal relationship with his human creatures, and the human moral agent as one whose basic 
identity is given in that relationship". N. Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth's Ethics 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 165 
112 Calvin rejects the criticisms of those who say he is hostile to good works, and he argues that 
his hostility is aimed rather at our reliance upon them, our glorying in them or our ascribing 
salvation to them, see Institutes IIl. xvii. 1 
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4.8 Conclusion 
Our study of Calvin has revealed that the notion of participation is an important 
one for him. While Calvin is keen to stress the completeness of our salvation in 
Christ, he understands participation as a sharing (in Christ's humanity), which is 
not primarily an imitatio Christi, not so much a sharing in Christ's way of being 
towards others as it is an obedient correspondence to that person whose 
humanity is our salvation and which provides our horizon of meaning and 
purpose. This 'obedient correspondence' can be seen as we participate in 
Christ's prophetic, kingly and priestly roles for example, not in prophesying, 
ruling or atoning of ourselves, but in following Christ as prophet, king and priest. 
Our humble, penitent and joyful response to the event of the cross is a central 
strand of this obedient correspondence, because it is there that we find our 
reconciliation to God effected and manifest. Further, participation is about our 
becoming (the new human beings who we are in Christ, through the Holy 
Spirit), which involves in part reflecting that downward action of grace we see in 
the Triune God in our service of those made in God's image, our neighbours. 
Participation is In the humanity of Christ, in the sense that Christ's humanity 
enables our reconciliation to God and in relation to Christ's humanity (through 
the Spirit) we are enabled to become the human beings God intended us to be. 
This participation is not about an abstract association of our humanity with the 
Form of Christ's 'new' humanity, but is about being related to the person and 
work of Christ, understanding ourselves from and acting upon the events of 
Christ's life (paradigmatically the cross) which tell us who we have been, are 
and will be (hopefully) in Christ. Further, it seems that this participation in 
Christ's humanity is our participation in the life of the Triune God. How we 
participate is through the effects of faith, faith which is graciously given primarily 
in the Gospel. In the sacraments we find nourishment and reassurance for our 
faith, as well as realising in the Eucharist a special mode of participation in 
terms of the indwelling of Christ. Humility, repentance and service of our 
neighbour all express our participation in Christ's humanity and enhance the 
renovation of the image of God within us. Where we participate is particularly 
the church, that place where the gospel is properly preached and heard, where 
the sacraments are rightly administered, where we intercede and serve our 
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brethren and where true worship is rendered to God. Who it is that participates 
is however not for us to know precisely, we can only be assured of our own part 
in the salvation wrought by Christ. And finally when we participate is in a sense 
now, in that what we are we already are in Christ, but it is also in a sense a 
complete participation only beyond death, when all hindrances and stumbling- 
blocks to union with God in Christ are finally cast aside. The notion of 
participation sits somewhat uncomfortably with other elements of Calvin's 
theology and in particular the manner in which he expounds God's sovereign 
freedom and control of creation. This having been said, Calvin's thought is 
richly suggestive and we have seen in the latter part of this chapter how aspects 
of his theology can contribute to building up a view of participation which may 
retain God's oversight of creation and a sense of our responsiveness without 
lapsing either into pure determinism or synergism. 
For Calvin the relationship between justification and sanctification is bonded in 
the work and person of Christ, so that at no point can our renovation be torn 
from its ontological roots in Christ and because our justification is also a calling 
to become what we are in Christ neither is there room for cheap grace. 
Participation in Christ is often associated with the process of sanctification, a 
progressive participation in God which we develop increasingly as we more 
and more obediently respond to Christ. This is a one-sided understanding 
whose danger is that of overstressing our role in the process of regeneration 
separated from justification, a danger which the colloquial use of 'participation' 
exacerbates, emphasising as it does the participant's active, even proactive, 
involvement. Calvin's wisdom in holding justification and sanctification more 
tightly together through Christ is helpful' 13 because he gives us a clue here to a 
better view of participation which is not so much about degrees of sanctification 
apart from justification as it is about degrees of realisation of what we are to 
become in Christ, rooted in the primary realisation of what we are already in 
Christ. On this understanding our participation is initiated and sustained by our 
reconciliation with God in Christ, but this is a participation which we grasp 
113 While Calvin holds these together, he reacts against Osiander's (supposed) confusion of 
justification and sanctification. Osiander took the noun 'righteousness' and the verb 'to justify' in 
the sense of being made righteous through the indwelling of the Divine essence, as well as in the 
sense of pardoning sin. The danger of such a confusion is that Christians are robbed of their 
assurance as traces of their sinfulness continue to emerge. Any good we do cannot ease this 
anxiety; no portion of righteousness sets our consciences at peace until it has been determined 
that we are pleasing to God, because we are entirely righteous before him". Institutes III. xi. 11. 
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intermittently and whose reality is properly responded to and glimpsed better as 
we conform to Christ; even so the reality will be manifest fully only 
eschatologically. As we conform progressively in obedience to Christ we realise 
the Pauline paradox 'I, yet not I, but the grace of God', recognising that our 
conforming to Christ is in fact primarily Christ conforming us to Himself and so 
we are referred back constantly to God's initiative (and paradigmatically to our 
justification), in the process of sanctification. Only with these qualifications can 
we speak of degrees of participation, which is not to do with grades of 
achievement but with a progressive realisation and embracing of God's 
beneficent mercy and intention for us, despite ourselves. In one sense our 
uplifting is complete in our justification in Christ, but it remains for us to embrace 
this uplifting in the personal, spatio-temporal space provided pneumatologically 
by God. Participation is about this embracing, grounded in the person and work 
of Christ, participation which does not undermine eschatology but which 
provides for a deeper yearning for the eschaton, when He will be all in all and 
finally address those stumbling-blocks and stubborn barriers we erect to keep 
ourselves apart from God and one another. 
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5. PARTICIPATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
The question of how we know that we are participating in Christ is not one 
Calvin can answer other than by recourse to "the inner testimony of the Spirit" 
within the individual. Undergirding this position is Calvin's second 'secret', 
individualised election, that election through which God continues to bind 
himself to the covenant but not an election visibly identifiable with a specific 
group of the elect. Authentic faith realises the assurance of the Spirit, and does 
so individually, albeit within the context of the worshipping community in which, 
Calvin points out, the believer is to be embedded. Despite his stress on the 
corporate nature of the Christian life, in worship and in ethics, Calvin has here 
an epistemology which might be considered as individualistically conceived, so 
that claims to participate in Christ could be criticised as being nothing but 
personal opinion, an idiosyncratic bias - subjectivist (in the common meaning of 
that word). The only experience that can affirm an individual's participation is 
his own 'private' experience. The lack of clear criteria based on observation and 
empirical data means for one such as Hume that the idea of participation must 
be consigned to the flames (unless one was to regard participation as logically 
conceived, so that for example to be human is by definition to participate in God 
because human beings bear the (perhaps sullied) image of God). 
Given the combined stress on relationship with God and relationships within 
community in the concept of participation, the notion might help us beyond an 
understanding of our knowledge of God and assurance as individualistically 
conceived. The notion lends itself to tying self-knowledge to knowledge of God 
because to participate in God is in some way to share in God, be affected, 
transformed or moved by God, and in appreciating this we realise self- 
knowledge as well as God-awareness. ' The issue to be addressed is how we 
know that we participate in God - can we go further than Calvin's 'inner 
assurance' or not? And associated with this question is the wider issue of how 
we know we are dealing with God at all. (In addition, assuming what we know 
relates to who we are, and that we can at least argue that our way of being is 
shaped by and shapes what we perceive, how we understand our environment 
and being aware of the network of relationships in which we are set, then the 
1 We have seen how Calvin and others stressed the relation of these two types of knowledge; 
see e. g. Institutes 1.0-2. 
97 
question of knowing of our participation in God relates to the question of how, if 
at all, we are ontologically affected by participation). 
5.1 Aspects of Kant's Epistemology 
To begin to answer this question it will be useful to survey some historical 
moments in the wider philosophical scene. Kant (1724-1804) held that our 
moral consciousness is not without significance, and that if moral evaluations 
are not meaningless then some degree of free-will has to be a reality. Further 
the moral agent "judges that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious 
that he ought, and he recognises that he is free, a fact which, but for the moral 
law, he would never have known" 2. This means that some part of our being is 
free of the empirical world of matter in motion governed by scientific laws for 
Kant, because it must be possible for us to move some of the material objects in 
that world (such as our bodies) 'at will' if moral consciousness is trustworthy. 
Now while our motivations for action and the exercise of our freedom may be 
conditioned by passions, desires, and intuitions, Kant held that "what 
distinguished us in our capacity as moral beings was the ability to act in 
defiance of the promptings of 'sensuous' inclination and to be determined in 
what we did solely by principles which we ourselves prescribed". 3. Indeed Kant 
believed that 'practical reason' was possible, that not only could reason 
constrain and justify the choice of means, but also the choice of ends upon 
which it depends. But this is only objective reason if the choice of ends of action 
is made irrespective of passions, interests and desires, and an action is 
objectively rational only as reason prompts me to act. If I am motivated by 
'passions' then reason has not determined my goals, but if reason is to be 
practical, if reason is to motivate action, then it must issue in imperatives, 
determining what an agent does. Or, as Kant put it, "Reason, with its practical 
law, determines the will immediately"4. The ability to be motivated by reason 
alone Kant called the autonomy of the will, an autonomy he contrasts with the 
'heteronomy' of the agent whose will is subject to external causes (i. e. causes 
founded on anything other than reason). Only the noble soul, able to overcome 
2 (. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and other Works on the theory of Ethics, tr. 
(London: Longmans, Green, 1879), p. 165 
3 P. Gardiner, Kierkegaard (Oxford: OUP, 1988), p. 20 
4 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 156 
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the promptings of self-interest and desire for the sake of reason, is worthy of our 
respect for Kant, and only such a soul is truly free, being free from external 
influences in (rationally) determining his ends. This exclusive authority of 
reason takes practical shape in the form of categorical imperatives, imperatives 
which make real and unconditional demands and whose foundation lies in 
reason alone. The categorical imperative is independent of the empirical 
conditions and particularity of rational agents in that it could be adopted by any 
rational agent, whatever his circumstances. It can be formulated as 'act only 
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law'. 
In our moral consciousness we are aware then of certain promptings and by 
assessing whether these qualify as categorical imperatives we can ascertain 
the reasonable nature (or otherwise) of such motivations. Our moral 
consciousness also makes us aware of our duty to promote what Kant called 
the Summum Bonum, the 'highest good', and the associated obligation of 
pursuing our moral perfection as individuals. The former goal is not realistically 
realisable on our own, and yet it presented itself to us as something we were 
morally obliged to further. For Kant this suggested that its achievement must be 
regarded as attainable and this demanded the postulation of a supersensible 
agency capable of ensuring our efforts would not be in vain; 'the highest good is 
possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme cause of nature' as 
he puts it in his Critique of Practical Reason, and this - in so far as it acted 
'through understanding and will' - could only be God. Thus Kant's God appears 
as the benign insurance agent, the deus ex machina who ensures the final fruit 
of our moral pursuits. Similarly Kant postulated the immortality of the soul, for 
only on such an assumption could the goal of moral perfection be realised, 
through 'endless progress'. Such postulations as the existence of God and 
immortality of the soul could not of course be epistemologically vouchsafed, but 
were founded rather on the 'faith of pure practical reason', securely founded 
itself on the authoritative deliverances of moral consciousness. 
Kant's understanding of practical reason and its realisation in performing 
categorical imperatives, together with his suggestion of a God who ensures 
such performances are not finally flawed, can be used to argue for 
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understanding participation in God as the exercise of practical reason in 
following categorical imperatives. We participate in universal reason, reason 
which is akin to some Platonic Form in being that in which we share actively as 
individuals as we exercise our reason, but which does not share the 
transcendence of the Platonic Form in that such universal reason is immanent 
within each of us, would that we might realise it. 
To speak of participation in God as the exercise of practical reason in following 
categorical imperatives is of course a quite un-Kantian (and unbiblical) way of 
speaking, but Kant's thought at least leaves open the possibility of viewing 
things in this way. No epistemological certainty can be attached to such a claim, 
but there is, as a Kantian might say, room within Kant's epistemological 
framework to believe that this is the case. Furthermore, it is a belief which is 
afforded support by moral consciousness and practical reason, reasonable 
support not so apparent as with those doctrines of participation justified simply 
by the inward testimony of the Spirit. However one difficulty with such a position 
is that participation depends upon the exercise of freedom in contrast to 
inclination, instinct and natural drives, and it thus becomes a perpetual struggle. 
A second problem is that no concrete norms for action can be immediately 
deduced from Kant's thought; Kant has left us with a theory which gives us the 
moral law in its bare, universal form, without telling us what we ought to do. All 
we know is that we must abide by the principle of consistency or non- 
contradiction. 
5.2 Hegelian Participation in Geist 
Difficulties with Kant such as the two just mentioned are taken up by 
G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) who nevertheless felt a deep affinity with Kant and 
followed him in believing human beings to be unfree when acting from 
particular innate or socially conditioned desires, in believing that freedom is 
found in what is universal, in believing that reason is essentially universal and 
in seeing a connection between freedom and the development of the individual 
conscience. But while having such affinities with Kant, Hegel also felt drawn to a 
conception of life which might be termed 'expressivist', which reacted against 
the dissecting of the human being into body and soul, spirit and nature, 
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utilitarian conceptions of society and perspectives on nature which saw it as 
being there simply for human purposes. Against such tendencies expressivism 
stressed unity and wholeness (believing the human being could not be defined 
in its parts without distorting human reality and without breaking down the unity 
of being whose very wholeness enabled self-expression and self-fulfilment). 
Expressivism also emphasised freedom, not as independence in relation to 
external authority, nature, desires etc. but primarily as authentic self-expression. 
Freedom here becomes synonymous with self-realisation. Again expressivism 
looked for a deeper sense of communion with nature than was .. 
offered by 
many Enlightenment thinkers, seeking an interchange with a larger life rather 
than simply a rational vision of order. And finally Expressivism sought a greater 
communion between human beings than the Enlightenment vision granted of a 
society "made up of atomistic, morally self-sufficient subjects who enter into 
external relations with each other, seeking either advantage or the defence of 
civil rights". 5 The communion with one's fellow human beings must be deeper 
than this, and rest on a unity of shared natures, feelings and purposes, or so 
'expressivists' hoped. The uniting of the concerns of expressivism with the free, 
rational, moral Kantian subject, this is one way of understanding Hegel's task. 
We shall see how Hegel develops this synthesis, paying particular regard to the 
way in which a notion of participation in God and our knowledge of such 
participation can be drawn out of his thought. 
Hegel recognises certain oppositions which his thought needs to overcome. 
The knowing subject needs to be distinguished from the known object, and yet 
also needs to know the object thoroughly, bridging the gap between himself 
and the object. Again, we are to be free as rational agents which can mean 
suppressing our desires and inclinations, and yet we are to act out of motives 
which are really our own, so that to understand freedom in a way which 
opposes natural inclination is defective. Our development of self-consciousness 
requires that we distinguish ourselves from our community and yet we develop 
largely through interaction with others, so that we seem to need both individual 
independence and integration into a larger life. Finally there is the opposition 
between the free person and his/her fate, between what we do and what 
happens to us or, if one posits a cosmic spirit whose purposes unfold within 
history then between this infinite spirit and finite spirit, between the demands of 
5C. Taylor, Hegel(Cambridge: CUP, 1975), p. 28 
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human autonomy and those of participation in the current of a larger life. 
For such oppositions to be overcome we cannot simply return to some primitive 
state of unity between subject and nature. Rather Hegel thought that we must 
retain the fruits of the separations (such as our self-conscious rational 
autonomy) while looking to reconcile such fruits with a unity with nature, society 
and 'God'. Hegel believed that such a reconciliation of opposites was possible 
and that 
.. each 
item in these basic dichotomies when thoroughly understood shows itself to be not only 
opposed to but identical with its opposite. And when we examine things more deeply we shall see 
that this is so because at base the very relations of opposition and identity are inseparably linked 
to each other. They cannot be utterly distinguished because neither can exist on its own, that is, 
maintain itself as the sole relation holding between a given pair of terms. 6 
To see more clearly what Hegel means we might consider the case of the 
rational subject who cannot exist without being embodied. Reason requires 
embodiment as a precondition of its realisation, and yet this very embodiment 
reason has to struggle against if it is to be realised. In a sense then "the subject 
is both identical with and opposed to his embodiment". 7 Hegel considers the 
subject from the point of view of conditions of existence (embodiment) and from 
the point of view of the goals of reason and freedom; these are in conflict (Hegel 
would say even more strongly that they are in contradiction), and the relations of 
identity and opposition are held together in a temporal pattern; "primitive identity 
must give way to division which inevitably arises since the subject cannot but 
contain the seed of division within himself". 8 But reconciliation can follow on 
from the identity and division, as the subject makes over nature so as to reflect 
the human being's higher aspirations, to be an expression of reason and as the 
rational subject sees nature itself as part of a rational plan. Reconciliation 
involves the rational subject identifying "himself with this larger reason, the 
rational plan underlying the whole, and as such no longer sees himself as 
opposed to a nature which has itself been made over to be an apt expression of 
rationalit'. 9 Hegel reserved the term 'reason' (Vernunft) for this identification, 
this realisation of being part of a larger plan and identifying with it, using 
6 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 80 
7 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 85 
8 C. Tayior, Hegel, p. 86 
9C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 86 
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'understanding' (Verstand) for the perspective on things as divided or opposing. 
The larger rational plan is that of Geist ('Mind' or 'Spirit") for Hegel. Geist or 
cosmic Spirit is understood as 'Subject' for Hegel, undergirding and 
manifesting itself in all reality. 'Subject' for Hegel is inescapably in need of 
expressing itself through a medium (embodiment) and is necessarily rational. 
The universe is for Hegel the "embodiment of the totality of the 'life-functions' of 
God, that is the conditions of his existence"lo, an expression of God", that 
which is posited by God in order to manifest what God is. This is not to say that 
God is what God is and then He decides to manifest Himself to the world and in 
the world; rather through the process of embodiment in the world (and in world- 
history) God comes to realise Himself, achieving a conscious grasp of his own 
nature: 
The cosmic subject is such that he is both identical and non-identical to the world. There is identity 
in that Geist cannot exist without the world; and yet also opposition for the world as externality 
represents a dispersal, an unconsciousness which Geist has to overcome to be itself, to fulfil its 
goal as self-conscious reason. 12 
The goal is Geist's self-realisation, self-consciousness or freedom, because for 
Hegel freedom consists in being bei sich selbst, sufficient to oneself : 
In other words being free is being related only to oneself, the lack of freedom is dependence on 
something else, something which is not T. Being thus self-related is, in the case of Geist, being 
self-conscious, and so it transpires that the purpose of the world is for Geist to achieve full 
awareness of its own naturel3 . 
In Hegelian language, Geist is to become for itself what it is in itself. 
If the goal is self-consciousness, then Geist requires that it be set over and 
against an object as subject in order to reach that goal. This is because Hegel 
adopts Fichte's and Kant's notion that consciousness is necessarily bipolar, 
10C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 88 
11 Craig rightly qualifies the identification of Geist and God in Hegel because "we must remember 
Hegel's penchant for the notion of 'identity-in-difference', and the fact that nature is equally to be 
seen as the Idea's'Other' - similarly, nature and mind are 'Others' too, as well as being identifiable. 
From this perspective it is therefore proper to say that God is not one out of Idea, nature and Geist, 
to the exclusion of others, but that each is a part or aspect of him". See E. Craig's The Mind of God 
and the Works of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 179 
12 C. Taylor, Hegel, p. 42 
13 E. Craig, The Mind of God, p. 199 
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requiring the distinction of subject and object. Full awareness requires the 
existence of finite spirits through which awareness can be realised then, 
because to be set over and against objects is to be limited by something other 
and hence on Hegel's definition of the finite, to be finite. (For Hegel finitude 
means limited by something, whereas infinite means having no limits, not in the 
sense of going on forever but as including everything). We saw a little earlier 
that in the process of separation and reconciliation in a higher synthesis of 
nature and reason the human being came to see himself as part of a larger 
rational plan; now we can see that rational human beings are the very vehicles 
through whom this rational plan (of Geist coming to self-consciousness) is 
realised. Indeed human beings participate in the purposes of Geist as they 
come to realise their part in the process of Geist's embodiment of its own nature 
and journey to self-knowledge. But as well as coming to know itself, Geist is 
also making itself, through its activity, what it has implicitly always been; "Geist 
is only what it makes itself, and it makes itself what it potentially is". 14 So 
Hegel's philosophy is as much "Be Thyself" as it is "Know Thyself" in terms of 
Geist, and Geist's activity is not just "the acquisition of self-knowledge, nor just 
of creation, but of the self-creation of the creator, and whoever participates in it 
has a share in the making of God". 15 (And so here we see an intimate 
connection between ontology and epistemology in Hegelian thought, the goal 
of full self-consciousness being also the route to completed self-creation for 
Geist. Presumably this is also the case for human beings, i. e. as they realise 
their vocation in enabling Geist's self-realisation they too come to be self- 
conscious in a way quite different from their originary ontological condition). 
Human beings participate in this activity of 'making God' both unwittingly and 
wittingly, both passively and actively. This is a typical example of Hegel's dual 
perspective. On the one hand "while such business of reality appears as the 
action and so as the work of Individuals, these are in respect of the substantial 
content of their work tools''. 16 Ön the other hand, 
if we accept ... that we are to think of 
individuals as means, nonetheless there is a side of them 
which we hesitate just to think of only in these terms, even when measured against the highest 
14 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibtree (New York: Dover, 1956), 
Introduction, C (a) 
15 Craig, The Mind of God, p. 203 
16 Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part III, para. 551 
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standard, because it is simply not something inferior, but rather something in them which is itself 
eternal, divine. 17 
Our reason, that divine element within us, enables us to "participate in that 
purpose of reason itself"18 , and so we are not only tools to be cast aside when 
Geist can finally gaze upon itself in all its rational, self-conscious splendour 
because Geist as such is not conscious. It becomes conscious of itself only in 
our minds so human minds must be the necessary vehicle of God's self- 
knowledge. And we realise our true purpose as Geist realises itself, only then 
realising that this was our true purpose all along, to become the vehicles of the 
self-knowledge of universal Spirit. Our final realisation of our role in the 
movement of Geist through history is properly grasped only philosophically, 
because only philosophy is able to grasp accurately the truth in a conceptually 
clear way. For Hegel, "Philosophy is knowledge, and it is through knowledge 
that man first realises his original vocation, to be the image of God. "19 
5.3 Hegel's Critique of Christianity 
Hegel claims that Christianity when properly understood is nothing else than a 
profound representation of the self-realisation of Geist in history. The movement 
of consciousness to self-consciousness through self-recognition in the other 
and a resulting reconciliation and synthesis with the other is a dynamic Hegel 
perceives in the narrative of Jesus Christ, the God-man. For Hegel the 
Incarnation is not the mystery of one person in two natures, but rather a unique 
realisation of mutual divine-human self-recognition in otherness: 
Incarnation implies that the absolute is not simply substance, but has the structure of self- 
consciousness. God's self-knowledge involves self-recognition in other, and is the result of 
mediation by others20. 
The Spirit here is the dynamic. process by which the event of Incarnation comes 
to be realised as much more than an historical moment, but as a 
consciousness, a certainty of the unity and union of divine and human natures, 
17 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Introduction, B(b) 
18 Ibid. 
19 Craig, The Mind of God, p. 180 
20 R. R. Williams' article'Hegelianism' in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Modern Christian Thought, 
ed. A. E. McGrath (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 255 
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a consciousness with which the church or Spiritual Community begins; "and it is 
this consciousness which constitutes the truth upon which the Spiritual 
Community is founded". 21 The reconciliation of God with the world in Christ is 
shown by the fact that what is human is not alien to God's nature but this 
otherness, finitude and self-differentiation is actually a moment in God Himself 
(albeit a vanishing moment). And this grasp of reconciliation is also an 
awareness of the Trinitarian God, who is "but is at the same time the Other, the 
self-differentiating, the Other in the sense that this Other is God Himself and has 
potentially the divine nature in it, and that the abolishing of this difference, of this 
otherness, this return, this love, is Spirit". 22 
The locus of this process of return is, at least in The Philosophy of Religion, the 
Spiritual Community23, whose actual, permanent existence is an eternal 
becoming "which is based on the fact that it is the very nature of Spirit to know 
itself as eternal, to liberate itself so as to form those finite flashes of light which 
make the individual consciousness, and then to collect itself again out of this 
finitude and comprehend itself"24; (in so doing the knowledge of its essence and 
consequently the divine self-consciousness appear in finite consciousness). But 
the Incarnation is duly qualified by this description, because it appears merely 
as a disappearing moment and as nothing essential, permanent or absolute. 
And further, while the persons of the church "reach the truth and appropriate it 
for themselves, and through it the Holy Spirit comes to be in them as real, actual 
and present, and has its abode in them"25, yet there is still disunion and 
differentiation between the community and the divine Idea. 
What the Christian religion fails to understand is that the unity of the Spiritual 
Community and the divine idea, the presence of the Spirit, occurs now in all its 
fullness; the Spiritual Community still sees the divine idea as an Other outside 
of consciousness given partly through authority and partly appropriated in acts 
21 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, ed. and trans. by E. B. Spiers and J. Burdon Sanderson 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1895), vol. III, p. 99 
22 Ibid., p. 100 
23 Hegel identifies the church as the Spiritual community in that "in the Spiritual community as 
actually existing, the church is emphatically the institution in virtue of which the persons 
composing it reach the truth and appropriate it for themselves, and through it the Holy Spirit 
comes to be in them as real, actual and present, and has its abode in them". Ibid., p. 124 
24 Ibid., p. 124 
25 Ibid., p. 124 
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of devotion; "to put it otherwise, the moment of communion is merely a single 
moment, or the divine Idea, the divine content is not actually seen, but is only 
represented in the mind". 26 With the Spiritual Community 
.. the 
Now or actuality of communion as thus represented is transferred partly to a region beyond, 
to a heaven beyond the present, partly to the past and partly to the future. Spirit, however, is 
above all things present, and demands a real and complete presence; it demands more than love 
merely, than sad ideas or mental pictures, it demands that the content should itself be present, or 
that the feeling, the sensation experienced should be developed and expanded. 27 
The Christian religion is vaguely aware of the divine Idea through the 
'Vorstellungen' of God but such imagery, cognitive representations and pictorial 
ideas as religion contains always mean that its thought is restricted to 
understanding ('Verstand') and not reason. Such thought lacks the dialectical 
dimension because it has still not identified itself with the absolute, and hence 
with the Idea which goes over into its opposite and returns to itself. What is still 
required to be clearly and consciously known is that the reconciliation of God 
and human subject is actualised (as it is realised) in every human subject, that 
the movement of God in overcoming differences "signifies the telos of every 
human subject in the unity of universal self-consciousness". 28 
It is only in philosophy that Hegel believed the reconciliation could be realised 
with conceptual clarity and where an elucidation of the truths of faith could be 
realised in the form of the concept (Begriff) rather than in the form of 
representation (Vorstellung), images and symbols. This is an elucidation of truth 
in the form proper to truth for Hegel. 29 Whether Hegel's claim to preserve the 
truths of orthodox Christianity through his speculative philosophy is valid is 
questionable, and given his transformation of the Incarnation from a particular 
historical individual into a doctrine of divine-human community, his rejection of 
a two-nature Christology and eschatology, the necessity of creation to God and 
other conceptual 'clarifications' of faith, his claim seems somewhat far-fetched. 
In any case it is only in philosophy that Hegel believed the reconciliation could 
be properly set forth, a reconciliation of God with Himself and Nature, which 
26 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. III, p. 134 
27 Ibid., p. 134-135 
28 C. Marsh, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Theological Critique of Hegel' in SJT Vol. 45, no. 4 (1992), 
p. 433 
29 See Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, pp. 148-149 
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shows that Nature, 'Other-Being' is divine and "that it partly belongs to the very 
nature of finite Spirit to rise into the state of reconciliation, and that it partly 
reaches this state of reconciliation in the history of the world". 30 
5.4 Criticisms of Hegelian Participation 
It is a commonplace criticism of Hegel that he leaves insufficient room for 
distinguishing the Creator and creation, persons human and divine. Difference 
and otherness are moments within the social-historical process of Geist's 
movement to self-realisation, moments to be overcome, sublated. To be fair to 
Hegel however it should be noted that Hegel believed that nothing of us is 
abandoned when we realise our true roles as vehicles of Geist. The difference 
between finite and infinite Spirit is not abolished but rather ultimate unity retains 
the differences within it. This is why Hegel uses terms for the resolution of 
differences such as 'reconciliation' (Versöhnung), and Aufhebung to refer to the 
dialectical transition in which a lower stage is both annulled and preserved in a 
higher one. Even so, this attempt to preserve unity in difference is hardly 
'preservation' ultimately. The world of external physical things and finite spirits 
distorts the embodiment of Geist even as it externally presents it, and this is only 
corrected by external reality's necessary demise. Hence the necessity of death 
as the ultimate disappearance of any external reality. External reality is not 
preserved, nor are human beings in their particularity, although Geist continues 
to manifest itself in the ongoing movement of affirmation and denial. 
We have seen that from the Hegelian perspective human beings participate in 
God as they become the vehicles of God's self-knowledge and share in the 
divine self-knowing. Further, we have seen that human beings participate in the 
making of God in a sense, so that participation has both epistemological and 
ontological dimensions. Considered epistemologically, one could say that 
human beings not only participate in the divine thought but that God's thought is 
no more than what is in our minds, "our consciousness is the consciousness of 
deity". 31 And when is our thought the divine thought? When exactly do we know 
that we are participating in God in other words? When are our thoughts 'true 
Thought'? In The Logic Hegel attempts to follow the development of the 
30 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol-111, p. 149 
31 Craig, The Mind of God, p. 180 
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conceptual structure of the Idea, beginning with its origins in the concept of 
being. Hegel would like to show that there is really only one way in which the 
categories of the Logic can develop but as Craig points out, 
if the Logic convinces us, it does so in virtue of the fact that the transitions from category to 
category seem to us to meet certain standards. But whether these be the standards or only our 
standards it cannot itself tell us. 32 
We cannot it seems be sure that our thoughts belong to the self-consciousness 
of the Idea or that our thoughts are merely opinions and fancies. That Hegel 
assumes an identity between our thoughts and Thought allows him to argue 
that what we take to be real is in fact all that is real: 
the 'identity' between our mental processes and those which sustain reality guarantees the 
coincidence of the properties really instantiated with those available to our thought; the possibility 
that our minds are thus alienated from the real was not one that Hegel was tuned to. 33 
For Hegel the concept produces the truth - for such is subjective freedom - but 
at the same time it recognises this truth not as something produced, but as the 
true existing in and for itself. But this happy coincidence of a non-foundationalist 
positing and the object possessing in itself a reality independent of such 
positing is assumed by Hegel's metaphysical structure, rather than 
demonstrated. Perhaps Hegel lacks a high enough doctrine of self-delusion 
and too readily equates our thoughts with Thought, our grasp of reality as the 
Idea's sustaining grasp of reality, our view of the Real with the Real. 
Under the Hegelian scheme participation in God is no longer simply about the 
fulfilment of God's purposes for humanity but it is also about fulfilling God's 
purposes for Himself. Participation in God by free, rational beings in terms of 
self-conscious awareness of Reality as it is, is necessary to the self-realisation 
of God. Humanity is divinized, and divinity humanised, not only in the 
particularity of the Incarnate Son of God but finally universally. Participation 
here has the elements of practice, agency and process about it, as well as the 
dimension of intellectual insight. Geist is concerned with working its purpose 
out, coming to consciousness of that which lies within it. Correspondingly the 
human being is called to participate in this process and indeed such 
32 Craig, The Mind of God, p. 11 
33 Craig, The Mind of God, p. 194 
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participation is essential to Geist's purposes. Because "Geist is only what it 
makes itself, and it makes itself what it potentially is", 34 the involvement of 
rational creatures in this process means that human beings are essential 
participants in the making of God (and we have seen that this participation is 
both witting and unwitting for Hegel). Interestingly our participation in God is 
both that process by which we come to know God and that activity by which we 
carry out his purposes, a fusion of two tasks which we will take up later. 
It would be wrong to assert that Hegelian participation is restricted to purely 
intellectual acts of right thinking because Hegel stresses how our actions in 
history bring about Geist's self-realisation. While Geist rises to self- 
consciousness in our minds, this process of Geist's self-realisation is also one 
realised historically, more and less adequately in the various human societies 
developed. Society's structure may reflect the various moments of the idea's 
process of self-realisation (unmediated unity, separation, mediated unity), and 
we are called to be participants in a society which is articulated according to the 
Idea. Without detailing Hegel's understanding of such a society, we might note 
in passing that concretely this means firstly that the human being must be 
recognised as a rational subject and given the rights of an autonomous 
individual. Secondly the state must be ruled by a law treating all alike. But 
thirdly (and going beyond Kant here), Hegel sees a set of obligations relating to 
furthering and sustaining a society founded on the idea and labelled by him as 
Sittlichkeit. We have obligations to the community to which we belong and our 
rational, free execution of such obligations enable Geist's self-expression. Not 
only is the individual serving Geist's purposes by pursuing such obligations, but 
the individual is serving a larger goal which is also the ground of his identity: 
for Hegel everything that man is he owes to the state; only in it can he find his essence. All value 
that a man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state. 35 
Particularly significant in Hegel's discussion of Sittlichkeit and the advancement 
of the state is the way human social action comes to the fore. Participation 
involves active, ethical involvement in society and Craig is right to note that 
Hegel contributed greatly to that style of thought which "by stressing human 
34 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Introduction C(a) 
35 Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1955), p. 1 11 
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autonomy and creativity, turns the philosophical spotlight away from the divine 
mind and the knowledge of its works and on to the works of marl'. 36 Even so we 
should remember that Hegel's 'cunning reason' runs ahead of human activity 
ensuring that the history of the universe unfolds according to an inner purpose. 
This removes some of the potency of human activity because although there is 
contingency in human action, such contingency itself serves to realise the 
necessary plan of things so that, to speak theologically, God in His providence 
gives rein to human passions and interests but nevertheless ensures that what 
happens is the fulfilment of His intentions. It is however a short step from 
Hegel's thought to some examples of Process theology, where the "cunning of 
reason" is replaced by a (terrifying) human responsibility for making God the 
God He will be. 
5.5 Bonhoeffer: The Quest for Unity Without Loss of Identity 
Hegel's emphasis on the Spiritual Community as the place of human/divine 
reconciliation and the locus of epistemological access to God and God's 
purposes would be more acceptable to orthodox Christianity if the Spiritual 
Community was less the State and more the church. Again the Spirit's role in 
overcoming alienation between human beings and God and between human 
beings is attractive, but Hegel fails to retain the distinctiveness of Creator and 
creatures in this process. Further, Hegel provides important groundwork for 
understanding the vital nature of reciprocal recognition of others essential for 
dialogue, development and emancipation but he finally undermines this stress 
on intersubjectivity with his all-consuming Absolute Subject. One theologian 
who can be seen as building on Hegel's thoughts in a way which seeks to 
overcome such objections is D. Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer retains personal 
differences but argues for a unity in Christ of God and humanity, and he sees 
the church as the place of God's epistemological self-disclosure. 
5.6 The Community of Christ 
For the early Bonhoeffer the cor curvum in se of the individual is broken open in 
the act of faith in Christ; 
36 Craig, The Mind of God, p. 174 
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In the act of belief, which Christ himself creates within me, inasmuch as he gives me the Holy 
Spirit, who hears and believes within me, he also proves himself the free Lord of my existence. 
Christ "is" only in faith, yet he "is" master of my faith. 37 
Such an analysis immediately eliminates individualism because the cor curvum 
in se is broken open both to the neighbour and God; "existence in this sense 
(existence which undergoes impact from beyond itself) is existence in social 
relation, existence in relation to Christ". 38 In contrast to Hegel, for Bonhoeffer 
"the differences between self and other are not epistemologically overcome, but 
are recognised as part of the concrete whole of revelation". 39 For Bonhoeffer 
there is a unity which contains a constitutive difference between persons rather 
than a unity within which differences are finally sublated in the absolute 
subject's self-consciousness; for Bonhoeffer "the one who is united with me in 
what we intend is structurally just as separate from me as the one who is not so 
united with me. Between us there is the boundary of those who have been 
created as individual persons". 40 The thou alone provides a real boundary 
through which deadly isolation can be broken and genuine sociality 
established, a boundary in no way nullified but acknowledged in the Spirit- 
inspired movement towards the thou. Further, the thou of the neighbour and the 
thou of God belong together for Bonhoeffer: 
Social community is in essence given with community with God. The latter is not what leads to the 
former. Community with God is not without social community, nor is social community without 
community with God. 41 
Like Hegel, the community is the place of reconciliation of humanity and God, 
but this reconciliation is understood in a way which protects the distinctiveness 
of both human beings and God. 
It is Christology which enables Bonhoeffer to speak of the unity of the difference 
of the I and the other, of human beings and God, because for Bonhoeffer Christ 
37 D. Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, trans. B. Noble (London: Collins, 1962), p. 141 
38 D. Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, p. 127 
39 C. Marsh, 'Bonhoeffer's Critique of Hegel', p. 435 
40 D, Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communfo, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith et al. (London: Collins, 
1963), p. 54 
41 This passage appears on p. 37 of the German edition of Sanctorum Communio but was not 
translated for the English edition which put in its place material from the appendix of the German 
edition. See Ernst Feil's The Theology Of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 
p. 208, n. 10 
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is the subject of this unity. Marsh notes how Bonhoeffer explains this point by 
addressing the problem of the divine knowing, explaining Bonhoeffer's 
enigmatic statement that "God is in revelation only in the act of understanding 
Godself"42 as meaning "that the subject of the act of the divine knowing is God 
Godself; what is being revealed is Christ existing as community, and thus 'my 
knowledge of God is bound up with whether God has known me in Christ"'. 43 
The fact that the locus is community makes for separateness because of the 
personal-structural character of community while God is not lost to us in His 
transcendence because God here is not primarily bei sich selbst but bei uns. 
Two differences between Bonhoeffer's analysis and Hegel's should be noted. 
First God freely binds his knowing in communal form, without the community 
being a prerequisite for God's own understanding of Himself. Second, God's act 
of self-understanding is not realised simply in the human I but in the community, 
so that revelation has an essentially communal reference. 
The community Bonhoeff er has in mind here is not the 'Constantinian' 
community of Hegelianism but one "where testimony is given to the foundation 
of all reality in Jesus Christ"44, and reconciliation in this community is 
understood by Bonhoeff er not in terms of the rational mastery of philosophical 
thinking but rather primarily in terms of an ethical responsibility towards others. 
Bonhoeffer stresses the importance of the actus directus in contrast to the actus 
reflectus in the Christian community, indeed "the knowledge of Jesus is entirely 
transformed into action, without any reflection upon the human self". 45 Not of 
course that we are released from a responsible weighing up of what actions 
might be appropriate but 
that we finally do not know whether we are good or evil and are, therefore, dependent on grace is 
42 Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, p. 92 
43 Marsh, ibid., p. 440 One wonders whether Origen's development of the stoical understanding 
of God containing the universe lies behind this analysis ultimately. Origen spoke of God 
containing the universe by comprehending it and in that act of comprehension lies both the 
delimitation of that which is comprehended and its creation. (On this understanding what is not 
comprehended by God does not exist nor have limits). This understanding lends itself to the idea 
of our recreation in Christ because now we are known in and through the incarnate, crucified and 
risen Christ we are a new creation. However not only are we as creatures a new creation, but also 
our faith is a new creation, faith being God's gift of knowledge of who He is in Christ and who we 
are to Him in Christ. This faithful knowledge is relational, personal and propositional but precisely 
as God's knowledge primarily we cannot rip it from its roots in God and adopt such knowledge 
independently of relation (in worship and service) to God. Faith is the gracious correlate of God's 
knowing us in Christ. 
44 D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Macmillan Collier ed., 1986), p. 202 
45 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 34 
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part and parcel of responsible, historical action.. The responsible person lives by God's grace into 
whose hands his or her action is placed. 46 
In this way Bonhoeff er seeks to distinguish the ideologue from the responsible 
person; "when the deed is performed with a responsible weighing up of all the 
personal and objective circumstances and in the awareness that God has 
become human and that it is God who has become human, then this deed is 
delivered up solely to God at the moment of its performance". 47 The 
circumstances are provided by the context in which we find ourselves, and there 
are no programmes, ideals or laws which necessarily apply, other than 
obedience to Christ. As Marsh explains Bonhoeffer wants the concreteness of 
community to be in its purest expression responsible action, not consummate 
thinking: "He (Bonhoeffer) wants theology to be primarily nachfolgen, a 
responsiveness prior to nachdenken ". 48 
But while active obedience to Christ is the way in which God and community are 
known to be reconciled in Christ and the manner of participation in that 
knowledge, this ethical orientation is not focused on the appropriation of the 
other whom one serves in a higher synthesis involving a greater self- 
consciousness, but remains focused on the other, not "to return as a recovered 
I, but to remain, as an extended self, always more than 1". 49 None of this entails 
that in order to be part of the reconciled community is to be ethical; we are 
already reconciled for "the world is not divided between Christ and the devil, 
but, whether it recognises it or not, it is solely and entirely the world of Christ". 50 
The church bears witness to Christ and the reconciliation of the world with God 
through Him, it is the place, "the space in the world, at which the reign of Jesus 
Christ over the whole world is evidenced and proclaimed". 51 The ethical 
dimension refers to the way in which that reign is witnessed to and it is primarily 
about Christ's becoming real and taking form in us rather than being about our 
conformation to Christ52 -' 
46 Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. E. Bethge (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1958-74), 
vol. 111, p. 461 
47 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 235 
48 Marsh, 'Bonhoeff er's Critique of Hegel', p. 446 
49 Marsh, 'Bonhoeff er's Critique of Hegel', p. 446 
50 Ethics, p. 204 
51 Ethics, p. 202 
52Ethics, p. 79 
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5.7 Bonhoefferian Participation 
How then are we to understand our participation in God from a Bonhoefferian 
perspective? Bonhoeff er writes in note form; 
Encounter with Jesus Christ. The experience that a transformation of all human life is given in the 
fact that 'Jesus is there only for others'. His 'being there for others' is the experience of 
transcendence. It is only this 'being there for others', maintained till death, that is the ground of his 
omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. Faith is participation (das Teilnehmen) in this 
being of Jesus (incarnation, cross and resurrection). Our relation to God is not a'religious' 
relationship to the highest, most powerful, and best Being imaginable - that is not authentic 
transcendence - but our relation to God is a new life in 'existence for others', through participation 
(Teilnahme) in the being of Jesus. 53 
In his earlier work Bonhoeffer stressed how this being-for-others, this ex-centric 
orientation towards others, was faith itself, where the cor curvum in se is broken 
open by Christ's call to which we respond with obedient service which "proves 
to be an act of faith in the word of Christ". 54 God's call is not isolated to particular 
individuals in a way that excludes relatedness to others, because the very 
knowing that one is called occurs within a communal context (socially, 
linguistically and liturgically), and the architecture of the call is a structure of 
relations orientating one ex-centrically towards others in a way which enables 
the transformed individual identity to emerge. The response to this call is an act 
of obedient faithfulness, of faithful obedience, and is our active participation in 
Christ. Faith for Bonhoeffer is in its inner meaning action, obedience to Christ, 
and the very act of believing is for Bonhoeff er our participation in Christ's way of 
being. Bonhoeffer is able to combine here the individuality of Christ's call to us 
and Christ's presence to us as it is mediated and dwells among us. McFadyen 
explains that 
Christ is present in genuine individuality. But if individuality is one's spirit of communication, the 
way one enters into relations and is for others, then, by very definition, this individual 
conformation is best understood frQm its relatedness rather than from its isolation... 'Being in 
Christ' or'Christ in me' indicate not an isolated individuality but an individual's ex-centric 
constitution in answer to an extrinsic call, an orientation on that which is individually transcendent. 
The presence of Christ is not an indication of an essence but a movement with others towards 
'Christ between us'. 55 
53 D, Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, trans. R. Fuller et al. (New York, Macmillan, 
1972), (hereafter LPP), p. 381 
54 D. Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. Fuller (New York, Macmillan, 1963), p. 72 
55 A. McFadyen, 'The Call to Discipleship: Reflections on Bonhoeffer's Theme 50 Years On' in 
SJT, vol. 43, no. 4 (1990), p. 477 
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In the light of this analysis Christ's presence to us is to be understood as that 
presence, "that formative ground of the dynamic movement in which we 
transcend ourselves and, in this transcendence, become ourselves". 56 And yet 
Christ is also the one who draws us out of ourselves in a transcendent 
movement so that "Christ is therefore 'in' us as the ground of this self- 
transcendence, as a centre within us pushing us outwards, and as a centre 
beyond us pulling us towards God and others". 57 Bonhoeffer's statement that 
"Christ stands between us, and we can only get into touch with our neighbours 
through him"58 reminds us that for Bonhoeffer genuine relationships in which 
the transcendence of another is respected can only be assured as the other's 
presence is mediated by Christ; indeed only through Christ can we engage with 
the authentic otherness of neighbour and God at all. 
Whereas for Hegel the engagement with otherness occurs within the state, 
through various historical epochs and successive modes of consciousness, for 
(certainly the early Bonhoeff er) the locus is the church, that place where our 
transformed individual identities emerge from our ex-centric orientation and 
where our relations are 'redeemed'. Word and sacrament provide ways in 
which the form of the community is created and such a community is revelatory 
because "the Word is also itself community in so far as the community is itself 
revelation and the Word wills to have the form of a created body". 59 Community 
becomes the mode of existence of the one who is present in his exaltation and 
humiliation6o. 
Bonhoeff er has little place for pneumatology according to our summary so far. 
Bonhoeffer's later, suggestive reflections in his Letters and Papers from Prison 
are also lacking a considered pneumatology, an omission which neglects that 
person of the Trinity concerned with establishing communion for the "Spirit 
56 Ibid., p. 477 
57 Ibid., p. 478. Zizioulas understands this ek-static movement as the very ground of our freedom 
and personhood; ".. personhood implies the 'openness of being', and even more than that, the 
ek-stasis of being, i. e. a movement towards communion which leads to a transcendence of the 
boundaries of the 'self' and thus to freedom". See his "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity". 
Whether Zizioulas is as able as Bonhoeffer to distinguish persons human and divine given his 
undergirding ontology is however questionable. 
58 Bonhoeffer, Cost of Discipleship, p. 88 
59 D. Bonhoeff er, Christology, trans. E. H. Robertson (London; Collins, 1966), p. 60 
60 Ibid., p. 62 
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relates to one another beings and realms that are opposed or separate". 61 And 
within this the Spirit affirms the particularity of those He so relates so that "God 
the Spirit is the source of autonomy, not homogeneity, because by his action 
human beings are constituted in their uniqueness and particular networks of 
relationality". 62 Hegel contributed to an understanding of Spirit as enabling self- 
transcendence but which did not preserve particularity finally while Bonhoeffer, 
who spoke occasionally of our 'transcendence', did not link this with the Spirit's 
initiating and enabling action. The earlier Bonhoeffer is more alert to the 
significance of pneumatology, stressing the way in which the Spirit imparts true 
knowledge of Christ's being and will, of how because of the Spirit "we are not 
without knowledge of Christ and of the gifts which God has given us in him (1 
Cor. 2: 12, Eph. 1: 9). The gift which the Holy Spirit creates in us is not 
uncertainty, but assurance and discernment". 63 Again the role of the Spirit in 
relation to Christ is central to the notion of ethics and participation for 
Bonhoeffer; 
The place which in all other ethics is occupied by the antithesis of 'should be' and 'is', idea and 
accomplishment, motive and performance, is occupied in Christian ethics by the relation of reality 
and realisation, past and present, history and event (faith), or, to replace the equivocal concept by 
the unambiguous name, the relation of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The question of good 
becomes the participation in the divine reality which is revealed in Christ. 64 
The Spirit acts by making us aware of the personal Other, in particular Christ; 
the Spirit elicits a decision from us concerning that which is Other, and with the 
Spirit there is a "continuous substitution of the principle of self-sacrifice on 
behalf of another for the natural drive of self-interest and dominance". 65 
Bonhoeff er did not elaborate on his pneumatology in a manner which would 
reassure us that the Spirit helps to safeguard the particularity of those whom the 
Spirit engages, but there is room to build on his remarks in a way which does 
aff irm individuality within community, individuality which the Hegelian Geist in 
contrast finally absorbs in its-universal self-consciousness. 
Participation for Bonhoeffer then involves active obedience focused on the 
61 C. Gunton, The One, the Three, and the Many (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p. 181 
62 Ibid., p. 184 
63 Bonhoeffer, Cost of Discipleship, p. 259 
64 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 190 
65 John V. Taylor, The Go-Between God, p. 109 
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Incarnate Christ and human beings outside of oneself; it involves concrete 
decisions, encounters, risk-taking and wholesale commitment. There is a 
particular emphasis on participation in the sufferings of God (which echoes one 
aspect of the theme of participation in Paul's writings, and in theologians such 
as Augustine and Calvin), as a way of "allowing oneself to be caught up into the 
way of Jesus Christ". 66 The context we find ourselves in is emphasised, and 
there are no timeless or contextless prescriptions or legal criteria which we can 
follow which will assure us of our participation in God. 
5.8 An Epistemology of Participation 
So how do we know ewe are participating 
in God? Jüngel has noted how 
Bonhoeffer's theology of the cross suggests the dialectic of presence and 
absence in the divine being's relation to the world, God being the One who 
explodes the alternative of presence and absence67; the omnipresence of God 
has to be understood now "on the basis of his very presence on the cross of 
Jesus and not without a Christologically established removal of God". 68 God is 
the God who would have us know that we must manage our lives without him - 
and this is the God before whom we stand for Bonhoeffer; "before God and with 
God we live without God". 69 This raises even more sharply the question of 
awareness of our participation in God. Thielicke asks the pertinent question of 
"How in a positive sense does God become experienceable anew in the 
changed modern situation? 70 The beginnings of an answer to these kinds of 
questions appears to rest on our active commitment. We can neither experience 
nor know God or our participation in God without personally committing 
ourselves to Him in the way we lead our lives. To commit ourselves is to 
participate in Christ and particularly to participate in Christ's sufferings and 
66 Bonhoeff er, LPP, p. 361 This militates against the Nietzschen claim that religious and in 
particular Christian truth-claims are ill part about manipulation and the disguised bid for power. And 
the example of Bonhoeff er's personal resistance militates against Nietzsche's charge that 
Christian theology is motivated by desires for comfort, security, passivity and self-aff irmation. 
Christianity may sometimes breed mediocrity and scandalous passive resignation but this is not 
necessarily authentic Christianity. Nor is it authentic participation, which we have seen throughout 
the Christian tradition carrys a stress on sharing in the sufferings of Christ, not out of a slave- 
mentality but out of a faithful commitment to God's promises. 
67 E. Jüngel, God as the Mysteryof the World (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1983), p. 62 
68 Ibid., p. 63 
69 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p. 360 
70 Jüngel, ibid., p. 63, n. 20 
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powerlessness for Bonhoeffer, and also to know that we are so participating in 
Christ. To see this we are not to understand knowledge in the sense of a subject 
understanding an object from a distance, but against a background of personal 
knowledge such as that which Michael Polanyi has set out. 
Polanyi assumes that all rational discourse takes place within a tradition that 
accepts some things as given, and in Christianity it is certain beliefs that are 
given (albeit beliefs varying between traditions). There are those who are 
explicit about the beliefs on which they rely, and those who are unaware of it 
simply because they have accepted without reflective criticism the reigning 
dogma of their culture. (Both parties assume 'tacit' knowledge, knowledge of 
which we are not fully self-conscious which enables us to recognise faces in a 
crowd, to know a problem is such as to be worth pursuing, and so on. ) The 
former are the better-advised group because of course it is an illusion to 
assume we have available to us a kind of knowledge which does not rest on 
faith commitments. 71 We cannot keep an 'objective distance' if we would know 
the truths of faith because such truths are not to be known by spectators72 but 
by players; the knowledge involved here is not primarily 'knowledge that' but 
knowledge by acquaintance; knowledge is relational (in terms of relating the 
knower and the known) before it is propositional. A key metaphor for Polanyi is 
'indwelling'; we know the world around us by indwelling our bodies, tools and 
language. These are tacitly known, a set of particulars of which we are only 
subsidiarily aware, as we attend from them to other parts of the world, which can 
become known because we indwell such 'apparatus'. Polanyi speaks of the 
71 Roy Clouser in his book The Myth of Religious Neutrality (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1991), shows in detail how major theories in Mathematics, Physics and Psychology rest on 
presuppositions which are fundamentally theological in the sense that they posit the existence 
(not demonstrable a priori) of some reality on which everything else depends and which is not 
dependent on anything else. Without some such starting-point, systematic thought cannot 
begin. 
72 Using Polanyi's approach implicitly undermines that school of thought which understands the 
telos of participation in ocular terms, as some kind of beatific vision. In our view this notion, rooted 
in a particular reading of Platonic contemplation, lacks that sense of engaged relationality which is 
at the heart of the notion. Philosophically, epistemological interpretations of the world understood 
through visual metaphor have been seriously (if excessively) criticised by R. Rorty, see his 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton, 1979). What the visual metaphor does 
convey however is something of the aesthetic quality of participation. Consequently we would not 
wish to exclude the metaphor entirely. Rather, as I. T. Ramsey might have put it, such language 
requires qualifying by other language and should not be used in isolation from or in priority over 
other models. See his Religious Language. An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases 
(London: SCM, 1957). 
119 
"personal participation" of the knower in acts of understanding as the knower 
indwells certain tools or particulars as extensions of bodily equipment through 
which comprehension of the objects of focal awareness is achieved. 73 Polanyi 
argues that 
such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality; a 
contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an indeterminate range of yet unknown 
(and perhaps yet inconceivable) true implications. It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of 
the personal and the objective as Personal Knowledge. Personal Knowledge is an intellectual 
commitment, and as such is inherently hazardous. Only affirmations that could be false can be said 
to convey objective knowledge of this kind. 74 
Polanyi applies his understanding of tacit knowing to the case of learning, 
arguing that we have tacit knowledge which dwells in our awareness of 
particulars while bearing on an entity which the particulars jointly constitute. In 
order to share this indwelling, the pupil must presume that a teaching which 
appears meaningless to start with has in fact a meaning which can be 
discovered by hitting on the same kind of indwelling as the teacher is practising. 
Such an effort is based for Polanyi on accepting the teacher's authority. 
Applying this to Christianity we might expect that the kind of teaching which 
Jesus gives is borne out in its truthfulness by 'indwelling' such teaching in the 
manner the teacher practices. This entails the sort of commitment which begins 
with a tacit knowledge of the 'rightness' of Jesus' witness and the clues 
provided by it to the nature of reality and our present and teleological state in it. 
Our tacit knowledge includes the tradition of Christianity as we find it in our 
worshipping communities. What triggers our participation in Christ here is the 
Holy Spirit, who enables us to commit ourselves to Christ and whose presence 
may be such that we are only tacitly aware of Him. Further, just as for Polanyi 
the world 'gives itself' to be known 'invading' our understanding, so too we can 
understand that God in Jesus Christ gives Himself to be known through the Holy 
Spirit. 75 
73 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. vii 
74 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. vii-viii 
75 Part of this gift is a desire and a trusting, positive appreciation of that to which one commits 
oneself. More broadly E. Farley reserves the term participation for a positive kind of wonder in 
which "we understand what is other in the mode of empathetic appreciation", a knowledge which 
moves beyond the merely egocentric and pragmatic and which is drawn by "the vulnerable and 
pathetic beauty of things". See his Good & Evil (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), p. 208. Ignoring the 
danger in Farley's thought that the mystery and beauty of the sacred is realised only through 
mediating worldly wonders, his stress on appreciation, aesthetic attraction and empathy with that 
which we seek to understand is an important reminder that our commitment is partly drawn out by 
the sheer attractiveness of God. 
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Participation in Christ is ever in danger of being corrupted by participators into 
an impersonal, static mode of being, such as might involve a disengaged 
ritualism and/or habitual actions which express regularised convention more 
than personal commitment. There is of course development in terms of 
participation, as for instance when "personal participation changes from an 
impetuous pouring out of oneself into channels of untried assumptions, into a 
confident holding of certain conclusions as part of one's interpretative 
framework". 76 But what is vital is that the development involves deepening of 
personal relations within the community and God, developments which must 
resist assimilation, control and epistemological reductionism (to merely 
propositional knowledge). Such temptations are resisted as the cor curvum in 
se is broken through by the Spirit enabling our commitment to God and 
neighbour in Christ, because Christ protects the transcendence of the Other and 
also provides the ontological ground for unity with the other. (The Incarnation 
bridges the divine-human divide, the cross enables God's forgiveness and our 
reconciliation with God, ourselves and others, the resurrection embodying the 
unbreakability and final assurance of this unity). The church here becomes the 
locus of participation because it is to this community that God has promised to 
bind Himself (freely though not necessarily exclusively) and in particular in His 
act of self-knowledge. The worshipping community is promised God's abiding 
presence and guidance in terms of the Spirit, who orientates the community 
towards Christ, enabling participation in Christ as worship is rightly rendered 
and fellow human beings are respected, affirmed, valued and served in their 
God-created, God-redeemed, God-purposed difference in unity. Participation in 
Christ includes both the Spirit's action in bringing us to faith in Christ and the 
inseparable commitment to Christ which expresses itself in ethics and praise. 
This active commitment brings in its wake the "knowledge of faith", an 
assurance derived from commitment to Christ through the Holy Spirit, bolstered 
by the indwelling of the Spirit who brings a sense of Christ's presence to us, 
and fostered by our worship-knd service, by which Christ takes form within us 
and through which we actively embrace ourselves as redeemed creatures. This 
knowledge is not the 'rational' certainty of objective knowledge, nor is it the 
certainty of a constantly sensed presence. This is rather a knowledge resting on 
beliefs and commitments which can be doubted, a knowledge of the gracious 
God who leads us into a knowledge of Him by a love which calls forth the 
76 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 172 
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commitment of faith. 
5.9 Conclusion 
We have noted how Hegel criticised Kant for the way in which the moral subject 
has no concrete norms of action to perform but is left freely and arbitrarily to 
create his own through the exercise of his rational autonomous will. A Kantian 
approach which might regard the goal as participation in that principle of reason 
immanent in all of us is replaced in Hegelian thought by the goal of Geist's self- 
realisation and self-knowledge which rational creatures are called to participate 
in and which participation also effects their self-realisation. Hegel advocates 
Geist's freedom as self-creation, being keen to show (though unconvincing in 
the event) the necessary steps of Geist's self-creation to self-consciousness, 
steps which give human beings a context and orientation for their thoughts and 
actions, steps which human beings wittingly and unwittingly participate in. But 
once the focus of such self-creation switches to the human being (as with Marx 
and some Hegelians ill at ease with Hegel's overarching ontology of Geist), one 
is left with a conception of freedom as self-dependence, a situationless freedom 
once again where human beings seek self-realisation and self-dependence 
over and against "imposed values'. The Nietzschen will to power comes to the 
fore in all its meaningless (because situationless) independence. 
Twentieth century philosophy has reacted by understanding the situation in 
which our freedom, our subjectivity is set. (Polanyi, Heidegger and others spring 
to mind). The massive developments in the philosophy of language can also be 
seen in part as seeking to define subjectivity in situation because, as Charles 
Taylor notes, once we go beyond seeing language merely as the referral of 
words to things and appreciate language as "the vehicle of a certain mode of 
consciousness which we achieve through speech"77, then we must ask how 
language relates to other mödes of awareness, how it is situated. Linguistic 
meaning depends for its understanding on the context in which it is set, and 
only by reflection on the context (practices, activities, states of affairs, etc. ) can 
understanding occur. 
Hegel's use of language is not simply descriptive, in that for example "revelation 
77C. Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p. 163 
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in religion and philosophy completes the realisation of the Absolute and does 
not simply portray iW'. 78 However the descriptive, conceptual goal (achieved 
through our role as vehicles of Geist's self-consciousness) shows the priority of 
the descriptive dimension for Hegel. And so Hegel shows himself to be 
worshipping descriptive, conceptual thought in the end, in all its 'glorious' self- 
sufficiency and conceptual clarity. We must take sides against Hegel here, 
believing that our explicit, reflected thought has roots in an implicit background 
of unreflected experience and understanding (with Polanyi et al. ) 
Bonhoeffer, with his stress on commitment, faithful obedience and obedient 
faithfulness would appear to provide a promising contrast to Hegel's thought. 
But (at least the later) Bonhoeffer shows an inverted Hegelianism in that he is 
so focused on a broad-based participation in Jesus' way of being-for-others that 
there seems little room left for the significance of the Vorstellungen' of Christian 
doctrine and theology. People serve God wittingly and/or unwittingly as they 
immerse themselves in life's problems and challenges, forwarding the purposes 
of God by their other-oriented participation in the world's complexities. 
Awareness of this as a participation in Christ is unnecessary once being in 
Christ is reduced to "existing for others". Bonhoeffer takes the secularity of 
modern culture so seriously as a proper way of being and speaking in the world 
in its integrity and otherness that the question of the significance of theological 
language and the forms of life in which Christian action are embedded is left 
hanging in mid-air; 
the questions to be answered would surely be: What do a church, a community, a sermon, a 
liturgy, a Christian life mean in a religionless world? ... 
How do we speak (or perhaps we cannot now 
even 'speak' as we used to) in a'secular' way about'God'?. 79 
Indeed why speak of God at all? 
The challenge is to understand our participation in Christ in a wholistic sense, 
as involving reason, ethical action and worship, retaining a sense of language 
as a vehicle of a mode of consciousness which provides a description of and 
enables (in conjunction with our actions etc. ) our active participation in God as 
we orient ourselves towards God and our neighbour in Christ through the Spirit. 
78 Ibid., p. 165 
79 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p. 280 
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We retain this wholistic sense only as we focus on participation in the 'whole' 
Christ, not simply an ethical following of the Bonhoefferian 'man-for-others' or a 
philosophical apprehending of an Hegelian example of divine-human self- 
recognition in (an)other leading to a higher divine-human synthesis. 
Bonhoeffer's Christ lacks that emphatic stress on the knowledge of the Father 
that the Son has8O, and our participation in Christ is as much about participation 
in the mutual knowing between the Father and the Son (through the Spirit) as it 
is about participation in Christ's obedient service. Incarnation includes the 
assumption of human mind and human word "in such a way that our human 
word is now renewed in him and sanctified to be the proper instrument of divine 
revelation, and .. truly understanding the human speech (lalia) of Jesus Christ is 
.. the faithful 
hearing of his eternal Word (logos)". 81 The way we speak and what 
we say is a vital part of our knowledge of God and our language is an integral 
part of our participation in God; it is not just that practice gives words their sense 
as Wittgenstein notes, though that is true, but that words, theological words, are 
so intertwined with our faithful actions that they both inform and give focus to our 
actions too. They are part of our actions. 82 It is almost as if Bonhoeffer is a part 
of that breach of word and world which Steiner notes is characteristic of 
modernity, as if we (the church) can jettison so much of the grammar by which 
we grasp 'God' and ourselves and the world, and still grasp the world in a 
meaningful way. Perhaps we could do so if language games functioned in 
isolation from each other, but we would dispute this (pace Lyotard), and argue 
that it has no basis in Wittgenstein's thought, as Fergus Kerr notes. 83 And 
perhaps we could do so if the relationship of language and ontology was loose- 
knit, if language of one sort or another were simply so many different garments 
overlaying reality. In this way we could conceive of participation in God 
occurring with the aid of language, but just as with Platonic participation the 
world is finally left behind, so with this scenario language is finally jettisoned 
and we are left with a nakedimmediacy. This intuitively appealing thought must 
80 E. g. Jn. 6: 46,7: 29,8: 55,10: 15,17: 25, Lk. 10: 22, Mt. 11: 27 
81 K. P. Seng, 'The Epistemological Significance of 'Oµoovmov' in the Theology of Thomas. F. 
Torrance', SJT, vol. 45, no. 3 (1992), p. 349 
82 J. L. Austin shows in particular how certain 'performatives' by their very utterance embody 
action. An example would be the words "I do" in the context of a wedding ceremony. See his How 
to do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). 
83 See Fergus Kerr's Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 31 
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be resisted as Wittgenstein noted (in a different context). Language is not a 
means to reality but an integral part of reality, part of the giftedness of our 
humanity, by which (in its proper use) we are oriented to one another without 
collapsing into one another, where immediacy is appropriately mediated. 
Language is part of the creation which is restored in Jesus Christ so that, as our 
words and minds are opened by the Spirit to the Word and participate in that 
Word, we share in Christ's knowing of the Father. 84 And it is the Spirit we rely 
upon for relating language to the truth about God 
who relates the divine Being to our forms of thought and speech and realises the relation of our 
forms of thought and speech to the Truth of God - what cannot be done by our thinking or stating 
is done by His action as Spirit as He lets the eternal Light of God shine through himself into our 
minds and enlightens our understanding that we may hear and discern God and think and speak 
truly of Him. 85 
Polanyi's epistemology can help us to see how knowledge of God arises within 
us as faithful commitment and acknowledgement of God which is a response to 
God's movement towards us in the Spirit as He enables us to participate in 
Christ, a participation involving knowledge. The relationship in which this 
knowledge occurs is not individualistic because the faithful community - with its 
traditions, language, structures of authority etc. - provides the framework for 
articulate knowledge. Our knowledge is prevented from degenerating into 
individualistic fantasies by a communal base which provides markers for our 
conceptuality and creativity. 86 Knowledge is not merely propositional, but 
forged primarily as knowledge by acquaintance, acquaintance realised in 
worship and in service of neighbour. (Consequently knowledge is much more 
84 T. F. Torrance reminds us that God is "pleased to accept our service and to confer upon our 
thought, as it falls under the action of His Spirit and Word, the truth of His own Being. By its very 
nature, therefore, theological activity has its objective basis not in itself but in God, and must never 
presume to find its truth in itself but only in Him. A genuine theology will always be open to the 
questioning and speaking of the Spirit so that it may never become an undertaking on its own but 
may ever be meek and obedient service to God's own testimony to Himself". See his God and 
Rationality (London: OUP, 1971), p. 181 f 
85T. F. Torrance, ibid., p. 186. E. Jüngel writes memorably of how the 'interpretation of revelation 
by language is an event in which language is "commandeered" by revelation', see his Doctrine of 
the Trinity, trans H. Harris (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1966), p. 13 
86 A. Thiselton argues for the stability of linguistic markers within the Christian tradition which are 
'backed' with patterns of life and service reflecting that integrity of word and deed embodied in 
Jesus Christ. See his Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self. On Meaning, Manipulation and 
Promise (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), pp. 33-43. Bonhoeffer's underplaying of such linguistic 
markers may have been rooted in part in his experience of the German Church's refusal to link 
such markers with a Christological pattern of service focused in particular on the Jewish people. 
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than revelation as communication, participatory knowledge having the broader 
context of communion about it, communion within which revelation occurs). But 
epistemological access could still be accused of being an individualistic quest, 
albeit a quest whose context is the faithful community. What undermines this 
criticism is the fact that knowledge is mediated by God through the community 
and if that knowledge is separated from the community it is also severed from its 
foundation in God and loses any claim to being knowledge of God (which can 
only occur as the correlate of God knowing us in Christ). Further, if God binds 
Himself to the community then we avoid both occasionalism and control of 
grace. The former is avoided because God is always tied in some way to the 
community (conflicting, comforting, clarifying.. ) and there is (perhaps) always 
someone somewhere hearing God's Word spoken to them within the 
community and the latter is avoided because we cannot tie this revelation to 
specific individuals or materials in specific contexts. 
Have we got any further than Calvin? Is a Polanyian version of the early 
Bonhoeffer not as subjectivistic as Calvin's inner assurance of the Holy Spirit? If 
epistemological certainty is the goal then one could argue we have got no 
further because a Polanyian understanding suggests that our knowing is a 
personal act occurring within a given framework of beliefs, relations and idioms. 
There can be 'universal intent' here but not 'pure objective knowledge'. 87 Even 
so perhaps we have got further, not in the sense of expressions ultimately that 
different from Calvinsbut in rejecting the misguided Enlightenment pursuit of 
necessary, certain objective knowledge, and in distinguishing personal 
knowledge from subjectivism. The charge of communal relativism remains 
however, and some would wish to see compelling rational foundations which 
are epistemologically more fundamental than a Christian affirmation that Jesus 
is Lord as a way of meeting such a charge. 88 But what might such rational 
foundations look like? And what exactly brings us to believe they are 
compelling? At some point we must bow to the fact that our knowledge of God is 
given to us by the act of the Spirit as we listen obediently to a Word that comes 
87 By'universal intent' Polanyi seeks to convey that the quest is for 'supra-personal' truth despite 
the fact that what we know is personal knowledge; we are committed, within a framework to that 
which we regard as impersonally given and this separates the responsible Polanyian truth-seeker 
from the subjectivist. See Personal Knowledge, pp. 300ff, esp. 322-324. 
88 We might recall at this point that Jesus often repudiated any challenge to ask for a higher 
authority or greater signs to authenticate his words and deeds - e. g. Mk. 8: 11-12, Mt. 12: 38-40, 
Lk. 20: 1-8 
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not from ourselves but from God. The question of course is at what point? God is 
not bound in relating to His creation to some undergirding rational foundations; 
He is Lord of such foundations. Given this, a better model than axiomatic 
foundations which are built on remains that of a circular interaction; commitment 
to Jesus Christ as Lord is derived from personal participation in a community in 
which such statements are understood and embodied, through personal 
relationship to Christ through the Spirit (as mediated in Word, sacrament, 
others.. ), through ethical activities arising from such commitment and so on. But 
these dimensions to nurturing our participation also have ramifications for our 
understanding of Christ's lordship and for Christian life together in the service of 
God and others. To ask for epistemological foundations outside of this circle 
(commitment to Jesus Christ as Lord <-> church <-> Personal participation in 
Christ <-> commitment to Jesus Christ as Lord) is to remain outside the circle. 
Either we enter the circle or we do not; and for Bonhoeffer we enter that circle as 
we obey Christ. 89 Our participation in God is inseparable from that process by 
which we come to know God and that activity by which we carry out his 
purposes to be who we are meant to be; a fusion of two tasks which we saw 
earlier in the quite different context of Hegelian thought. Only as we enter this 
circle does it become possible for us to realise that we are participating in 
Christ. And even here the ambiguity that comes with personal relationships 
allowing space and freedom can mean that such a realisation is experienced 
only hesitantly, occasionally and fleetingly. But beyond the merely experiential 
awareness of our participation there is the epistemological assurance that 
comes with tried and tested personal commitment, and beyond even this there 
is a resting place in the epistemological assurance of the church. 
On this account the reasonableness of Christian faith develops in and through 
commitment to Christian praxis. Such an approach shares similarities with 
Bernstein who recommends that the way of moving beyond objectivism and 
relativism "depends for its "reality and power" on dedicating ourselves to the 
practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual 
recognition that is founded in dialogical communities"90 J. Habermas complains 
89 "if you believe, take the first step, it leads to Jesus Christ. If you don't believe, take the first step 
all the same, for you are bidden to take it. No one wants to know about your faith or unbelief, your 
orders are to perform the act of obedience on the spot. Then you will find yourself in the situation 
where faith becomes possible and where faith exists in the true sense of the word. " The Cost of 
Discipleship, pp. 73-74. 
90 R. J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 231 
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of Bernstein that behind his argumentative strategy "there lies an absolutizing of 
the perspective of the participant which is complementary to Rorty's absolutizing 
of that of the observer". 91 However there is no such epistemological 
exclusivity92 on our account, although there is the possibility of epistemological 
privileging through the kinds of Christ-centred, Spirit-motivated practices which 
are pneumatologically and Christologically genuine93 derivative patterns of life 
and service. This should not seem so strange to Habermas. After all, Habermas 
appears to claim such epistemological privileging for that type of social 
interaction he terms 'communicative action'. 4 This epistemological approach 
carries within it a degree of openness and flexibility. But it is not the kind of 
openness Derrida advocates where we are constantly in flux, flitting from sign to 
sign in search of truth and meaning which is constantly beyond us as we are 
referred from cultural frame to cultural frame, from semiotic currency to semiotic 
currency, from purpose to purpose. Rather, as Thiselton argues drawing on 
Pannenberg, Moltmann and Wittgenstein amongst others, there is an 'open 
future' pointing to an unfulfilled hitherto 'not yet' rooted in God's promises and in 
continuity with the history of Israel and Jesus Christ. Further, as we commit 
ourselves to God and God's promises in this future, we also realise self- 
transformation and self-knowledge, our practice involving the reconstitution of 
self-identity 
.. as no longer the passive victim of forces of the past which 'situated' it within a network of pre- 
given roles and performances, but opens out a new future in which new purpose brings a'point' 
to its life. The self perceives its call and its value as one-who-is-loved within the larger narrative plot 
of God's loving purposes for the world, for society, and for the self. 95 
Such a transformation can be understood in terms of a conformation of the way 
91 See his'Questions and Counterquestions' in Habermas and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1985), p. 196 
92 What Habermas was particularly nervous of was the alarming way in which modern society has 
shown such ruthless selectivity in its use of processes of rationalization. Purposive-rational 
rationalization has prevailed, that monological, teleological, goal-oriented rationality which could 
lead to 'pathologies of modernity' (such as the Nazi horror) if not balanced with other 
rationalizations such as'communicative rationalization' - involving actions oriented towards 
understanding, mutuality and consensual action rather than the goals of efficiency and success. 
For an excellent introduction to this aspect of Habermas' work see R. J. Bernstein's The New 
Constellation (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), esp. pp. 199-230. 
93 While detailed criteria for such genuineness are to be avoided lest legalism result, certain 
markers in the Christian tradition provide useful checks. Fruits of the Spirit, loving others as 
oneself, communal inclusivity and humility are examples. 
94 See e. g. R. J. Bernstein, Objectivism and Relativism, p. 185 
95 A. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, p. 160 
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of our being to the what of our being in Christ, an epistemological-ontological 
transformation describing participation in God. 
How do we know if we are dealing with God or delusion in all of this? We do not 
necessarily. However a number of points can be made. First, pre-judgements 
are required if understanding is to be reached. 96 Theistic prejudgements entail 
a prior commitment to theism and such prejudgements are open to scrutiny in 
the light of consequential understanding. For example the self-transformation 
resulting from commitment suggested above may provide confirmation that 
certain states of affairs (such as the Lordship of Christ) are the case. It is 
arguable further that Christian prejudgements carry within them the notion of 
hermeneutical suspicion concerning the potentially self-serving, manipulative, 
deluded motivations of such assumptions. Second, foreclosing unrealised 
possibilities beyond one's horizon as unreality engenders a self-fulfilling 
philosophy of imprisonment. Risky acts of trust and provisional commitments 
may lead to "the discovery of patterns of promise and fulfilment which seldom 
exhaustively match expectations, but instantiate both continuity and room for 
novelty". 97 Third, if encountering others and Otherness is a real possibility (see 
next chapter on this), then Schelling's insight that a fundamental element of 
self-consciousness is the awareness of a contrast between Self and Other 
suggests that there may be value (in terms of self-knowledge) in pursuing 
relationship to an undergirding, transcending Other. 98 
Some of the most interesting contemporary epistemological discussions focus 
on a 'third' way of going beyond epistemological objectivism and relativism (e. g. 
Bernstein, Macintyre), both of which have been shown to face serious criticisms. 
We have located our own thoughts within this third way and would argue 
tentatively that our understanding of participation coheres with such an 
epistemology, indicating some theological possibilities of such a third way. 99 
96 ".. prejudgements and prejudices have a threefold temporal character: they are handed down 
to us through tradition; they are constitutive of what we are now (and are in the process of 
becoming); and they are anticipatory - always open to future testing and transformation". 
R. J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, pp. 140-141. 
97 A. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, p. 161 
98 Hans-Georg Gadamer stands squarely in this tradition when he states that "only through others 
do we gain true knowledge of ourselves". See his'The Problem of Historical Consciousness', in 
Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, eds. P. Rabinow and W. M. Sullivan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979), p. 107 
99 See T. Hart's Faith Thinking. The Dynamics of Christian Theology (London: SPCK, 1995) for a 
good introduction to this approach as applied to theology in general. 
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This third way seeks to retain a sense of personal relationship, trusting 
commitment and spatio-temporal room for human and divine freedom which 
objectivism could not offer. It also seeks to retain a critical purchase on truth- 
claimslOO , 
God's coherency and transcendence in a manner unavailable to 
relativism. Our approach also seeks to provide the possibility of overcoming the 
dangers of divorcing faith and action, separating the individual and the 
community which come with a subjectivist interpretation of the "inner testimony 
of the Spirit". The inner testimony of the Spirit is simply one aspect of an 
wholistic participation which is embedded in an ecclesial life and personal 
obedience to Christ. Knowledge of our participation in Christ is in part an 
awareness of our abiding in Christ, but this abiding is nurtured only as it is 
exercised in all aspects of our lives (ecclesial, ethical, social... ). Knowledge by 
acquaintance is primary here, although 'knowledge about' is a vital component 
of such knowledge. We cannot expect to come by this 'knowledge by 
acquaintance' except by way of allowing Christ to take form in us. And this 
entails personal commitment, not mere intellectual appreciation. 
goo We agree with A. Maclntyre in rejecting the idea that incommensurability between traditions 
entails giving up the universality of truth claims made within a given tradition. See his Whose 
Justice, Which Rationality (London: Duckworth, 1988), esp pp. 349-369 
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6. PARTICIPATION AND OTHERNESS 
The mode of our participation in Christ still requires some filling out. We have 
spoken quite broadly of how participation in Christ involves obedience to Him 
as the Spirit communicates the Word to us, in worship, word and ethical action, 
but we must attend more closely to the ways in which our participation in Christ 
is enabled and realised, and in particular to the place of sacramental 
participation in Christ. It also remains for us to examine in detail how it is that 
participation avoids infringing God's transcendent otherness, an infringement 
which we saw Hegelian thought was guilty of and which is an ever-present 
danger where the notion of participation is insufficiently well-defined. How can 
we speak of participation in God without losing those creaturely limits which 
define us as creatures and not Creator, without creating an overarching 
ontology to which both Creator and creatures are subject, without leaving the 
world behind and without losing all continuity with all that has been? These are 
some of the questions that inevitably arise when we confront the issue of 
participation with an understanding of God's Otherness to the fore. We shall 
address such questions in this chapter as they arise in our conversations with a 
number of theologians for whom Otherness and/or conceptions of participation 
have been leitmotifs. 
6.1 Kierkegaard: Otherness and the Paradox of Faith 
According to Kierkegaard there is an absolute qualitative difference between 
human beings and God, a difference making a love-relationship between the 
parties difficult to conceive by analogy to human love-relationships because the 
latter involve human beings who "stand essentially on the same level, and the 
differences between them are accidental"1. Kierkegaard suggests that the 
principle of equality in love can only express itself in the relationship between 
God and human beings by means of the absolute difference, the form this takes 
being humility, "the humility that frankly admits its human lowliness with humble 
cheerfulness before God, trusting that God knows all this better than himself"2. 
One practical upshot of this humility is the suffering of true religiosity, a suffering 
1 S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (hereafter CUP), tr. D. F. Swenson and 
W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 439 
2 Ibid., p. 440 
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which is rooted in being 
.. related to 
God in an absolutely decisive manner, and to be unable to find any decisive external 
expression for this... This inability is rooted in the necessary relativity of the most decisive of 
external expression, in its being both too much and too little; it is too much because it involves a 
certain presumptuousness over against other men, and it is too little because it is after all a worldly 
expression3. 
Already from this we can see how difficult it is for Kierkegaard to fill out a rightly- 
ordered relationship between God and human beings with any particular 
content from the human side beyond an awareness of the inadequacy of our 
supposedly God-directed expressions, and this is precisely because of the way 
in which Kierkegaard conceives the absolute qualitative difference between 
human beings and God. 
It is almost as if the chasm between the divine and the human is so great that 
we are left focusing in awe on the immensity of the gulf between God and 
humanity rather than focusing on the Godhead. One might expect that the 
various bipolarities that come together in Kierkegaard's thought would bolster 
the idea of difference, bipolarities of eternity and temporality, of truths of reason 
and truths of fact, of infinity and finitude. But in fact Kierkegaard sees the human 
self as a"synthesis of infinity and finitude, the temporal and the eternal, freedom 
and necessity... " 4. The human self is, for Kierkegaard, the union of psychic and 
somatic elements effected by self-consciousness, a union by which the psycho- 
physical synthesis transcends itself as nature and asserts itself as spirit. The self 
as spirit is the natural synthesis of body and soul become conscious of itself and 
free with respect to itself. Freedom (or self-consciousness, the terms seem 
finally synonymous in Kierkegaard as Mackey notes5), cannot be defined, 
derived or demonstrated by a study of human nature, for definition, derivation 
and demonstration are equivalent to determination, and a freedom determined 
by nature is a contradiction in terms. Such freedom is also a source of anxiety, 
an anxiety related to 'something that is nothing', which represents "freedom's 
actuality as the possibility of possibility"6. Kierkegaard suggests that every 
3 Ibid., p. 440 
4 S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (hereafter SD), tr. H. V. and E. H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1962), p146. 
5 L. Mackey, Kierkegaard: a kind of Poet (Philadelphia: Uni. of Pennsylvania, 1971), p. 135 
6 S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, tr. A. Thomte and A. B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), pp. 42-43 
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individual is aware of a tension between his current conception of who he is 
and the presence of alternatives that are in some sense available to him; 
indeed for Kierkegaard there is not a living being who "does not secretly 
harbour an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, ... an anxiety about some 
possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself"7. Such anxiety does not 
only reflect the possibility of sin however, but also prefigures a recognition of the 
fact that the realisation of one's true identity as an individual self lies in one's 
relating, not to earthly or temporal realities which can deflect one from one's 
proper goal, but to the eternal, the divine: 
Rightly understood, human existence takes the form of a'constant striving', seeking a fulfilment 
that lies beyond the temporal sphere and which is attainable only by our freely committing 
ourselves to a power that transcends objective knowledge and rational comprehension; in so 
'willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it'8. 
This analysis suggests that faith rather than sin might issue from a response to 
anxiety, depending on how we exercise our freedom. So our freedom is the 
possibility of our relation to the eternal, eternity holding the place of the future 
for existing human beings9. Individual existence is perfected in proportion to a 
person's unique perspective on, and sharing in, God's eternal being. But this 
being must be sought after, and this participation must be gained through free 
acts, having temporal duration and being subject to temporal risks and 
temptations. (Thus time and eternity conspire to give freedom its mystery and 
depth. ) 
There is a strong sense here of becoming that which we potentially are, a sense 
of transcending the purely natural, finite and contingent. Not that this 
degenerates into some Platonic flight from the world or crude deification 
because Kierkegaard is careful to flag up the fact that the human being is 
.. a synthesis of 
infinity and finitude, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity. In short, 
a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. So regarded man is not yet a self. 10 
As Mackey puts it, for Kierkegaard if we try to understand man as he is, we fail 
7 SD, p. 22 
8 SD, p. 49 
9 CUP, p. 271 
10 SD, p. 146 
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because man is not; 
immediately man is nothing but a lack (of a given self), a prospect (of acquiring himself as spirit), 
and a friction (between nature and freedom as the conditions of spiritual selfhood)... The force of 
Kierkegaard's paradoxes is to define human nature by pointing up the impossibility of defining it 
11 
For Kierkegaard transcendence does not lead away from actuality in its human 
mode but gives a new meaning to what is concrete, temporal and contingent. It 
does this by confessing the presence of the eternal being in the fullness of time 
and as Maluntschuk points out, for Kierkegaard the human being encounters 
"the eternal as the transcendent outside himself and also as the eternal within 
himself"12. As we grow in relation to God, so we grow in relation to ourselves, 
and the movement towards the transcendent and toward the eternal within 
together form the movement of faith. 
If we ask how we are to go about this transcending whereby we realise our 
synthesised selves, our relationship to our eternal self and God, we begin to 
see the difficulties Kierkegaard has in overcoming the infinite qualitative 
difference of God and human beings in terms of relating them. Eternity is not 
some goal for Kierkegaard, but rather that which "is able to exist and to be 
grasped within every change"13. The eternal defies objectification and 
Kierkegaard, in his search for that which is changeless in the human being, 
concludes that it is only purity in heart which provides the perspective of eternity 
in man's doing and deciding; 
this consciousness (of considering one's life before God) is the fundamental condition for 
truthfully willing only one thing. For he who is not himself a unity is never really anything wholly and 
decisively... For after all, what is eternity's accounting other than that the voice of conscience is 
forever installed with its eternal right to be the exclusive voice. 14 
As Sutherland puts it 
the one thing which we must will is the perspective of eternity on these (e. g. wisdom, foolishness, 
talents, wealth) and, of course, the perspective of eternity is not a vantage point (goal) to be 
11 LMackey, Kierkegaard, p. 137 
12 Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 310 
13 S. Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, tr. W. Lowrie (London: Collins, 1966), p. 36 
14 Ibid., p. 184 
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achieved., it is a manner of living realised only in the appropriation of it1 5 
But if we press Kierkegaard to show us how, more concretely, we might 
exercise our freedom to embrace our God and the selves we really are we find 
Kierkegaard to be a poor guide. "Be pure in heart", "will one thing", but will what, 
and be pure in heart with respect to what? We have here form without content, 
unless we are simply to follow the voice of conscience and the path of 
Kierkegaardian inwardness. Kierkegaard writes that "only when the individual 
turns to his inner self, and hence only in the inwardness of self-activity, does he 
have his attention roused, and is enabled to see God. "16 Not only is such a path 
dangerously individualistic in being open to self-delusion, but it suggests that 
relationship to God is absolutely non-social, having little reference to our 
neighbour. Latterly Kierkegaard began to redress this imbalance, seeing that 
love of neighbour was rooted in the love of God, but Kierkegaard's fear of 
autonomous, apotheosized social organisms may have prevented him from 
accepting the visible and corporate forms which it could be argued the 'I-Thou' 
relationship assumes at the level of human community17. His lack of an 
ecclesiology is consistent with his view of a God who is found inwardly, but it is 
also suggestive of a God unconcerned with the fabric of relationships and 
community-life in this world, a God busy forging individual relationships with 
believers which will find completion in eternity. Kierkegaard's understanding of 
the individual in his particularity needs tempering with a deeper exploration of 
the individual in his relationality. The very foundations of our conscience, our 
freedom and our self-consciousness are informed by (and inform) our 
relationships to others and God. As such, we cannot consider the 'inwardness 
of self-activity' in isolation from our relationships. Kierkegaard is surely right to 
defend the particularity of the temporal individual, a particularity whose 
significance and eternal possibility was revealed in the incarnation. But 
particularity lies not in isolation or privacy, but is constituted by and in 
relationships. 
But while Kierkegaard's approach lacks enough of a sense of particularity in 
relationship, he does point the way to an understanding of transcendence, of 
15 S. Sutherland, Faith and Ambiguity (London: SCM, 1984), p. 73 
16 CUP, p. 218 
17 See J. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University, 1953), p. 293, n. 21 
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relating to otherness, which calls us neither to escape our temporal shells with 
some eternal essence and be reunited to the eternal God, nor to deny that 
which is other and simply to lose ourselves in our own depths. How is it that the 
Kierkegaardian approaches God's Otherness? Only it would seem by becoming 
aware of one's sinfulness and impotence before God, a situation in which faith 
is possible. Collins notes that it is the Incarnation which 
.. respects the proper reality of both eternity and temporal existence, transcendence and immanence. Yet it also removes from the absolute its aloofness and impersonality, and from the 
finite its incapacity to present man with a substance of enduring happiness. This substance is 
given to us in faith, which is man's supreme inward act of free dedication to the good and the holy. 
The subject matter of faith is nothing other than the most pregnant form of actuality; the temporal 
coming of the Son of God in the flesh. Kierkegaard is led to refer to Christ unqualifiedly as "the 
existential", meaning thereby that, in His person, time and eternity are freely joined in all their 
strong contrasts and their demands upon human intelligence and willl 8. 
And it is faith that enables our relationship with God rather than reason because 
reason inevitably conceives God in its own image and likeness; Reason "cannot 
absolutely transcend itself, and hence conceives only such a superiority over 
itself as it can conceive by means of itself"l9. Kierkegaard goes as far as 
suggesting that faith is opposed to reason, that one must believe against the 
understanding, and that this is especially true of the incarnation; "that which in 
accordance with its nature is eternal comes into existence in time, is born, 
grows up, and dies - this is a breach with all thinking"20. And how is such faith 
established? In Philosophical Fragments (hereafter PF) we find an emphasis 
on the enabling condition for faith, some kind of inner transformation through 
the miraculous power of divine grace. In CUP however, where the main concern 
is said to be with what it means to become a Christian, the emphasis is almost 
exclusively upon the stance adopted by the human subject. Faith here 
presupposes 'inwardness' as a fundamental condition. By inwardness 
Kierkegaard did not mean introspective reflection - which would be to come 
close to an observational outlook Kierkegaard associated with objectivity. 
Rather, 
it manifests itself in self-commitment and the spirit in which such commitment is undertaken; a 
person exhibits inwardness through the resolutions he forms, the sincerity with which he 
identifies them, and the degree to which they govern his approach to the situations that confront 
him. 21 
18 Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 165 
79 S. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, tr. D. F. Swenson, rev. H. V. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 55 
20 CUP, p. 513 
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Inwardness is a clue to seeing how revelation is possible for Kierkegaard. 
There is no 'direct' revelation for Kierkegaard, indeed the true God cannot 
become directly recognisable; "Direct recognizableness is what the merely 
human, what the men to whom he came, would pray for as an indescribable 
relief"22. Kierkegaard's famous parable of the king and the humble maiden in 
PF elaborates on his understanding of revelation, but this still leaves open the 
question of how the eye of faith penetrates to the hidden revelation. Perhaps it 
is only through inwardness for "in his relation to an eternal happiness the 
individual has to do solely with himself in inwardness"23. Such inwardness is 
personal, private and loses something in being communicated, for "inwardness 
cannot be directly communicated, for its direct expression is precisely 
externality, its direction being outward, not inward" 24. As such Kierkegaard is 
appropriately vague about inwardness in his writings. We may see symptoms of 
inwardness in sincerity, commitment and intensity of zeal, but to attempt to 
express, define or comprehend inwardness may be to empty it of its essence. If 
it is through inwardness that we come to recognise ourselves and God, this 
route is shrouded in mystery, and open only to the individual exister in isolation. 
Such a view has caused some theologians (such as Barth, C. D. IV. 1, p. 689) to 
criticise Kierkegaard for his personal and private understanding of the Christian 
experience. 
Kierkegaard's thought announces some of the major themes concerning 
Otherness; the qualitative difference assumed of that which is other, the 
problems in assuming that reason can span the gulf and the difficulties in 
articulating difference without reducing it to the same. Transcendence is 
another key theme. We are called to go beyond ourselves and Kierkegaard 
seems to suggest that perhaps the most we can do in this process of ourselves 
is to remove the blockages (of sin) we put in the way of God's work. Dying to 
immediacy is one way, but this is not to be taken as dying to temporality 
because it is precisely in the mode of the temporal that God meets us. The 
temporal is the context of God's movement towards us, and we 'become' as we 
participate in this conjoining of time and eternity, so becoming more our 
particular selves and more acutely aware of God's relationship to us. 
22 S. Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, tr. W. Lowrie (London: OUP, 1941), p. 137 
23 CUP, p. 346 
24 CUP, p. 232 
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Kierkegaard's thought raises the question of the way of this transcendence but 
his (finally) elusive and purposefully ambiguous hints concerning the manner of 
our becoming may with some justification be regarded as insufficient guides to 
understanding our participation in God. 25 
6.2 Barth: The Grace of Participation 
One of the interesting questions arising from all of this is how Kierkegaard is 
able to understand the difference between God and human beings because it 
might be argued that this would presume a perspective on both human beings 
and that which is absolutely other than human beings, God. Such a perspective 
is impossible for reason according to Kierkegaard and for him it can only be 
faith which gives some indication of the difference. Kierkegaard locates the 
principal difference as being in our sinfulness, because human beings derive 
sin from themselves and their own activity. Collins suggests that 
.. unfortunately he (Kierkegaard) locates this difference in something other than the very 
perfection which founds their likeness... This leaves two things unexplained; how the rest of the 
created order is distinguished from God, and how the divine mode of being is set off from that 
aspect of a human being which is perfect, in a natural or supernatural way. A metaphysical theory 
of participated being would begin by pointing out that, by deriving its being from God, the 
temporal existent is unlike God, even in the respect in which they are alike-26. 
Collins is right to flag up the human creature's dependence and derived nature 
as an important difference between creature and Creator, but there is a sense in 
which this goes hand in hand with an awareness of distance from God through 
sinfulness, sinfulness showing itself as the assertion and assumption of 
independence, from which selfishness, irresponsibility, pride etc. arise. 
Awareness of our sinfulness may be the beginning of our response to God, a 
response which simultaneously realises culpability, relationship, dependence 
and responsibility, as well as forgiveness and the offer of new life. 
Kierkegaard sees faith as the point at which contact is established but we have 
25 E. Farley seeks to go beyond Kierkegaard's thought by appealing to an experienced 
phenomenon over and against Kierkegaard's recognition of the impossibility of faith for an 
egocentric subjectivity whose only passion is itself. He claims "we experience a passion for life 
which is not merely on behalf of the self or on behalf of others. And with that we experience 
resistance to death, to dullness, to meaninglessness on behalf of something larger than the self". 
See his Good & Evil, pp. 181-182 
26 Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 151 
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seen that there is a certain ambivalence about the derivation of this faith in 
Kierkegaard's writings; is it a human work or a divine gift? Perhaps Kierkegaard 
is again being purposefully ambiguous, implicitly drawing attention to the 
paradoxical nature of faith which can be simultaneously experienced as having 
been received and yet as that which we nurture in ourselves. But for some 
theologians insurmountable problems arise if we maintain that faith is in any 
sense our work. Karl Barth for example, following Calvin, interpreted God's utter 
otherness as His inalienable subjectivity in His revelation. This being the case, 
faith is not about our building a way to God but about God condescending to 
come to us, and speaking of God really means letting God speak. Barth 
understands the infinite qualitative difference in terms of the finitum non capax 
infiniti primarily, that is humanity's incapacity for revelation. But while human 
beings are incapable of spanning the gulf between themselves and God, God 
mercifully bridges the divide by creating faith in human beings, revelation 
creating of itself the necessary point of contact with human beings. Such faith 
never becomes our possession as if we have the gift of faith to dispose of as we 
will (and with it the relation to the Other); rather, as S. Smith notes, 
it (faith) is loaned to him (man) exclusively for use. Epistemically as well as practically, man is 
allowed to enter only that "synergism" that advances God's will alone, based on a correct 
relationship of Creator and creature: as servants and witnesses, but precisely thus, as human, we 
have contact with God... The claim to Christian knowledge is justified by the event of God's self- 
giving, not by "even the most weighty stipulations" offered in advance of the event... The 
assurance proper to faith is not one of cognitive possession but of hope, hungering and 
thirsting. 27 
Consequently Christian 'experience' for Barth is a contingent, decisional event 
where the primary note is one of acknowledgement, of being led, of "letting 
oneself be continually led, always making a step, always being in movement 
from the experience felt at one time or the thought grasped at one time to the 
opposite experience and thought" (C. D. 1.1, p. 207). Such experience, or really 
"not experience but more than experience" (p. 208). 28 shows that the finit urn 
non capax infiniti is not the last word. It would seem from this that the Other 
achieves that which is impossible, and its very Otherness is appreciated in its 
27 S. Smith, The Argument to the Other(Chico CA: Scolars Press, 1983), pp. 156-157 
28 Smith rightly points out that for Barth it is inappropriate to set up any experience per se as the 
proprium of Christian theology: "For where within experience will be found the criterion by which 
to distinguish the valid from the invalid, divine from human? That is why Christian experience is 
more than experience"; like the church, it is not alone, not referred back to itself. The infinite 
Word of God eternally exceeds and masters this experience. It is axiomatic for Barth that our 
experiences and concepts in themselves express our resistance to God" Ibid., p. 158 
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not being imprisoned in the realm of the possible. And against the argument 
that relationship with such an Other can not be instituted without some 
antecedent frame of reference, without some prior epistemological 
assumptions, Barth argues that the gesture that exceeds the Same, instituting 
relationship with the Other as Other is the spoken Word, language heard; "the 
imperative chains and binds us because, invading us through the ears, it cannot 
be intercepted and filtered through our ideas of what can happen and what can 
be demanded". 29 One of the reasons why this aural model provides a promising 
approach is because it appears to retain both human and divine freedom, 
persons being present to one another but not coercing- one another. Barth 
himself claims that 
.. the grace of revelation 
is not conditioned by his (man's) humanity, but his humanity is 
conditioned by the grace of revelation. God's freedom does not compete with man's freedom. 
How could it be the freedom of the divine mercy bestowed on man, if it suppressed and dissolved 
human freedom? It is the grace of revelation that God exercises and maintains His freedom to free 
man (C. D. 1.2, p. 365). 
But Barth cautions against an understanding of relationship with the Other 
which somehow thematises the Other, or the assumption of a language which 
adequately captures the Other in a way which reduces the transcendence of the 
Other. If we are tempted to frame the Other in our language, in definitive, 
coherent, logical and non-contradictory ways conforming to the rules of 
language and the canons of reason, we have already lost that 
acknowledgement of the Other's transcendence and priority; it is the Other who 
provides the justification for the rules and canons of reason we set up, not vice 
versa. For Barth we can only evoke the reasonableness of faith by obediently 
committing ourselves, just as we can only learn to swim once we are in the 
water. 
Where the Other has spoken to us, where the gulf between Creator and 
creatures has been spanned, is in the highly concrete givenness of Christ for 
Barth, and to those who would question the Incarnation in terms of its 
particularity, conceptual coherence or rationality Barth would presumably 
respond by suggesting that their speaking of so-called appropriate forms of 
transcendence shows that they are still not listening to God but only to 
themselves. Reason, or theological reason, arises then as the comparison of 
the authoritative witness to Revelation in scripture with the church's 
29 S. Smith, ibid., p. 208. 
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proclamation. The mystery is of course that not many seem to hear God's Word 
as spoken in the Incarnation, not many appear to respond to the approach of 
the Other. Perhaps some have heard but pretend that they have not, perhaps 
some reject such an approach and seek to justify themselves, but whatever the 
reason, Barth is driven to say it is the scandal of sin. If however the approach of 
the Other is attended to, then one can attend properly to the others around one; 
the awareness that God has spoken and that God has acted has implications for 
Christian ethics because we discover the meaning of the other person in the 
light of such speaking and acting; 
What is the meaning of "conscience" in Christian ethics? Very simply it means that we may know 
what God has done for us. And we may therefore also know about ourselves, and know about 
ourselves as God knows about us, so choose and determine ourselves and our acts as God has 
chosen and determined us. Good or evil action is simply being obedient or disobedient to this 
knowledge of ours about God and ourselves. 30 
6.3 God's Sovereian Freedom and our Response-ability 
Well-rehearsed criticisms of Barth's approach include the accusations that the 
Other overrides our freedom in making contact with us31 (arbitrarily establishing 
faith in some and not in others) and the apparent passivity of human beings in 
responding to God, so that it seems that when God calls to us, it is God who 
answers from our human hearts (e. g. C. D. 1.2, pp. 271-272). (We should note 
here that Barth does not clearly distinguish between the formal freedom of 
choice and the freedom of proper fulfilment: when Christ is described by Barth 
as the only subject who is truly `free', the freedom described is that of proper 
fulfilment, not freedom of choice. ) It may well be that a larger problem here is 
Barth's conception of the relation of nature and grace32 and the way in which 
30 K. Barth, 'Christliche Ethik' in'Zwei Vortrage', Theologische Existenz Heute, n. F. No. 3 (1946), 
p. 6 (89f. ) 
31 See for example N. Biggar's The Hastening That Waits, p. 162 
32 The nature/grace debate in the West has often underemphasised God's relationship to 
creation in originating (creation), sustaining and bringing all things to completion in Himself. We 
are created and elected as beings related to God and in that relationship our existence and 
possibilities together reside. If the-focus of our being and becoming is God's relationship with us 
(in Christ) and our relationship with Him (in Christ) then the image of covering us with grace or 
providing us with 'substantial' gifts above and beyond our natural status and abilities fades away. 
(And we saw earlier how Calvin's focus on relatedness to the person of Christ helped here). 
Participation as a notion must not subvert the conjoining of our being and becoming in our 
relationship with God by being considered simply as the process of sanctification independent of 
justification, or by being considered as a metaphor for the implantation of grace into our natural 
state. Our participation must cover both justification and sanctification, both our createdness and 
teleological goal if problems associated with the nature/grace debate are to be circumvented. 
(And this is so because only a relationship to God in the person of Christ can prevent grace from 
becoming something external to our being, or tear it away from the person of Christ. ) 
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all reality derives from the Word of God. Even so, while at times "it does seem 
that Barth is trying to derive a complete description of reality from the Word of 
God, at other times he seems to be engaged in the more modest project of 
articulating a vision of the theological environment in which empirically 
perceived reality is set". 33 Interestingly Barth's understanding of 'participation' 
tends to develop the latter line of thought. In C. D. IV. 1 where Barth focuses on 
the Doctrine of Reconciliation he writes of the opportunity of salvation as "the 
expectation of being in perfection in participation (Teilnahme) in the divine 
being" (C. D. IV. 1, p. 8). Not that having a "part in the being of God" implies a 
creature assumes some form of divinised being but "a being which is hidden in 
God, and in that sense (distinct from God and secondary) eternal being" (C. D. 
IV. 1, p. 8). Further, 
Since salvation is not proper to created being as such, it can only come to it, and since it consists 
in participation in the being of God it can come only from God. The coming of this salvation is the 
grace of God - using the word in its narrower and most proper sense (C. D. IV. 1, p. 8). 
It is for this purpose that God creates, preserves and over-rules the human 
being, "that there may be a being distinct from Himself ordained for salvation, for 
perfect being, for participation in His own being, because as the One who loves 
in freedom He has determined to exercise redemptive grace - and that there 
may be an object of this His redemptive grace, a partner to receive it" (C. D. IV. 1, 
p. 9-10). Our refusal to be such partners, our opposition to salvation and our 
aiming at another salvation supposedly found in the sphere of our own 
creaturely being by our own effort jeopardises our creaturely being and reveals 
our sin and misery. Yet at this point God intervenes for us, becoming the human 
partner in our place in Christ. And this is not simply the restoration of the status 
quo ante, but is "His participation in our being, life and activity and therefore 
obviously our participation in His; and therefore it is nothing more nor less than 
the coming of salvation itself, the presence of the eschaton in all its fullness" 
(C. D. IV. 1, p. 13). This does not leave us without responsibility or as mere 
spectators according to Barth but "awakens" us, "sets us in motion" and 
"actualises" the "one true possibility of our own being"; we are to "affirm" the 
establishment of our true humanity; 
to be thankful for it, to accept the promise and the command which it contains, to exist as the 
community, and responsibly in the community, of those who know that this is all that remains to us, 
but that it does remain to us and that for all men everything depends upon its coming to pass. And 
it is this 'We with God' that is meant by the Christian message in its central "God with us", .. 
i. e. our 
participation in His being (C. D. IV. 1, p. 15). 
33 N. Biggar, Book Review in SJT Vol. 47, No. 4 (1994), p. 542. 
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We can see here a strong ontological realism about the new creations we 
actually are, a sense in which our response needs to be one of 
acknowledgement of what we have become through Christ. Participation in this 
sense is about conformation to what we really now are. 'Become what you are' 
means 'Grow into your character, accept the outline of your particular form of 
life... ' (C. D. 111.4, p. 388). We are to take up humanity's relationship to God in 
Christ which we realise exists as we look to Christ, and participation is about 
relating ourselves to God in Christ, becoming those human beings who are for 
God (and for one another) as we appreciate from Christ that our true humanity is 
a being for God (and for one another). 
This understanding is complemented by Barth's earlier comments on 
participation in C. D. 11.1 where our human knowledge of God is the focus of our 
participation; 
.. the veracity of our human knowledge of God, consists in the fact that our viewing and 
conceiving is adopted and determined to participation in the truth of God by God Himself in grace 
(C. D. 11.1, p. 179). 
Given that there is bestowed upon our viewing, conceiving and speaking a 
similarity with the object of our knowledge and that the divine veracity is 
adapted to us, our participation is primarily a relationship of thanks. Barth takes 
care here both to stress how we remain within our human capacities and yet in 
this very sphere of human capacity witness to what transcends our possibilities: 
in this exuberance "human knowledge of God is an act of gratitude and 
therefore partakes of the veracity of the revelation of God" (C. D. 11.1, p. 219). 
Further, the consciousness of our inadequacy to partake of the knowledge of 
God and our awareness of such participation makes for awe (cf. C. D. 11.1, 
p. 223). 
To argue that our words and concepts are entirely inappropriate to grasp God 
and that as such we cannot participate in the knowledge of God is, according to 
Barth, not to understand our thought and language as God's creation (cf. C. D. 
11.1, p. 229). But even if the separation between Creator and creatures is 
overcome by God, it is not the case that there is no longer any hiddenness 
about God; to assume so is immediately to assume that our knowledge of God 
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is not due to the grace of His revelation; "each step that we take as we come 
from the hiddenness of God must, and will, consist in a new reception of the 
grace of revelation" (C. D. 11.1, p. 235). Further, God is gracious "not only in His 
unveiling, but also in His veiling; not only in His pardoning and sanctifying Yes 
but also in His No of judgment upon our work" (C. D. 11.1, p. 236). 
6.4 The Christological Ground of Participation 
At this point the Christological centre of Barth's thought becomes evident. It is 
Christ alone who participates in our humanity and who for Barth enables us to 
participate in God. This requires some explanation. Barth readily grounds the 
relation of the human Jesus to the Father in the Trinitarian relation of the Son to 
the Father, and he draws analogies between our relation to Christ and the 
Son's relation to the Father; "He (Christ) then knows us, and we know Him, as 
the Father knows Him and He the Father" (C. D. 11.2, p. 780). This grounding of 
relations in the Trinitarian relations is perhaps at once the most promising and 
complex of paths by which to understand our participation in God. And this 
'acting out' is, in one movement, both the descending humility of the eternal 
Son and the ascending humanity of Jesus for Barth (e. g. C. D. IV. 2, p. 24). Our 
participation pivots on the incarnation because it is precisely here that we also 
begin, at least from a noetic standpoint, to participate, as human beings, in 
God's power and glory - epistemologically the divine act which is the presence 
of the incarnate Word is an open, participable event in which Christ can initiate 
human knowing into the very act of his incarnation; 
the essence of the knowledge of this One is that the divine act of majesty in and by and from 
which the man Jesus has His being should be reflected and repeated in the human seeing and 
interpreting which is awakened and controlled by Him and therefore corresponds to Him (C. D. 
IV. 2, p. 39). 
The thrust for Barth is on things actually taking place, our being drawn in to the 
life-transforming event of Jesus Christ, as Christ installs us in a new and deeper 
sharing of the acts of his own life. And this means no change in nature for 
human beings, but rather involves us in reflecting Christ's own human being, 
acting and knowing in the mode of the divine act, a being, acting and knowing 
illuminated by the divine act's 'own quality'. At times Barth suggests that our 
telos is a relationship in which the Father's relation to the Son is repeated in us; 
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"He (Jesus) gives us his Holy Spirit in order that his own relationship to his 
Father may be repeated in us" (C. D. 11.2, p. 780). However it should be stressed 
that our telos depends upon Christ in that the basis of our teleological becoming 
is that qualitatively different person Jesus Christ who both embodies what we 
are to become and mediates God to us; Christ is not jettisoned when we reach 
our telos through him because we are dependent for eternity on the sustaining 
grace of God which is mediated through Christ. It is of significance that Barth 
uses the term 'participation' in this context, the word stressing the dependent 
nature of our telos; 
We emphasise again that there can be no question of there being simply and directly that which 
Jesus is alone. They are not simply and directly covenant-partners of God as His creatures; they 
are destined to become this. And this means concretely that they are destined to participate in the 
benefits of the fellow-humanity of that One, to be delivered by Him" (C. D. 111.2, p. 225). 
Our participation in God appears to be two-tiered for Barth; there is an 
underlying passivity where our relationship with the totally Other and our 
humanity is established, and an overlying activity which is both 
acknowledgement and affirmation of this established relationship and humanity. 
It might be argued that our participation is constantly in need of re- 
establishment for Barth, that the event-like nature of revelation suggests an 
occasionalism which is implicit in his notion of participation and that 
participation needs to start over and over again. 34 Such an argument should 
not lead us to view God's commitment as at best-occasional however. Our 
participation is in one sense not occasional because of our being elected by 
God in Christ, an election which entails God's commitment to us and the basis 
on which God reveals Himself to us and the foundation of our participation. Our 
participation is not so much a sharing in terms of being or having as it is a 
participation in God's purposes for us in Christ, which begins with our election 
by God in the person of Jesus Christ. This election is not an election following 
on from our being created but is implicit in and the purpose of our being 
created. The sustaining of creation in being can be regarded as a manifestation 
34 A. J. Torrance suggests that Barth failed to draw out suff iciently the Son's revealing the Father 
to a person as a personal communion beyond mere epistemic communication. For example Barth 
largely neglects doxological participation - that "gift of free participation in the glory of God or, more 
fully, the gift of participating by the Spirit in the Son's communion with the Father". Torrance 
emphasises the vicarious subjectivity of the Son in relation to the Father, in particular the 
(continuing) priesthood of Christ, a notion we have already mentioned in the context of Calvin's 
thought. See his Persons in Communion, p. 225 
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of the ground God provides on which our (active) participation can be 
established, unfold or be realised. But there is a sense in which we are already 
participating in God as created, elected human beings. 35 This is perhaps not 
how Barth would want to put things because Barth might regard such an 
analysis as failing to give due emphasis to God's continual gracious act of 
upholding and nurturing human beings as covenant partners; 
we are not created the covenant-partners of God, but to be His covenant-partners, to be His 
partners in the history which is the goal of His creation and in which His work as Creator finds its 
continuation and fulfilment. That this is achieved... is a matter of the free grace with which God 
deals in sovereignty with His creature... We are created as mutual partners. And this leaves open 
the further possibility that we are created to be covenant-partners of God. And the content of the 
two statements makes it clear that the first is a reflection of the second, its truth being a likeness of 
that of the second (C. D. 111.2, p. 320). 
6.5 Alteration 
Some twentieth century philosophical approaches to the issue of 
intersubjectivity, personal identity and relationship with the Other can be 
instructive in fleshing out the process of 'becoming who we are' which plays 
such a role in Barth's theology and his understanding of participation. For 
example, Husserl's difficulties concerning establishing the reality of other minds 
result from starting with an autonomous, isolated subject. His understanding of 
intentionality (as the mind being directed towards objects) and his deduction 
that some kind of content in the mind accounted for this directedness led him to 
a starting-point as the intentional contents of his mind, self-evident content 
which could be the absolute and indubitable ground for everything else. The 
details of Husserl's theory need not detain us here36, but what is clear is that the 
(human) other is reached by analogy with one's self and by empathy37. Not only 
does such an approach elevate the act of representation to being the paradigm 
of conscious life, so neglecting the historical, existential nature of 
consciousness, but it also stands in danger of not so much encountering the 
35 "The purpose and therefore the meaning of creation is to make possible the history of God's 
covenant with man which has its beginning, its centre and its culmination in Jesus Christ. The 
history of this covenant is as much the goal of creation as creation itself is the beginning of this 
history" (C. D. 11.1, p. 42). 
36 See M. Theunissen, The Other, trans. C. Macann (London, MIT, 1984) p. 81 for a brief overview. 
37 Theunissen, ibid., p. 71 Interestingly, as Edward Farley points out, "both Husserl and Max 
Scheler, the two dominant figures of early phenomenonological movement, ceased to give 
primacy to the knowing consciousness when they identified empathy as the basic act of human 
being-together". See his Good and Evil, p. 38. 
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Other as other but assimilating otherness to the same. 38 A completely different 
approach is that of Martin Buber, who begins not by positing a transcendental 
ego but by suggesting that the "event" where others meet, where the I meets the 
Thou, is more original than those who are meeting each other. While it is true 
that at times Buber restricts himself to saying that the I becomes a "real self" in 
the meeting with the Thou, that an "individual" receives the mode of being of the 
person out of the between, nevertheless as Theunissen notes, "Buber's 
fundamental approach concedes to the between an absolutely creative power 
in that it precisely excludes this assumption"39 (the assumption that I, for 
example, as an individual, am already what I am without the between). The 
trouble with this approach is that it is difficult to describe convincingly "the 
genesis of perspectivity out of the non-perspectival reality of the between. Since 
perspectivity is the essential component of the subjectively constituted world.. "40 
validation of the thesis seems impossible. An approach which might take 
positive features from both Husserl's and Buber's thought would be one which 
stressed the nature of dialogical self-becoming (from Buber's I-Thou 
philosophy) together with the idea of alter-ation from Husserl's account. Alter- 
ation is about putting oneself in the position of the Other, in so far as one is able 
to 'make' oneself into the other. For Husserl, psychologically speaking this 
means "I not only feel myself into his (that is, the Other's) thinking, feeling, 
doing, but must follow him therein, his motives becoming my quasi motives. I 
have to 'go along with' them in thought"41. Such an alter-ation involves a certain 
decentering, a disempowering. Such a dynamic can be distinguished from an 
Hegelian dynamic by asserting that the given particularity of the one who is 
alter-ating is not a transitory phenomenon lost in the ebb and flow of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis, but the very essence which is teased out through the 
38 E. Levinas was one who saw this danger in Husserl's thought, see S. Smith's The Argument to 
the Other, pp. 83,91. One who did not was Max Scheler whose extreme formulation of emotional 
participation led him to claim that "so far as concerns the act and its nature and the range of facts 
appearing within it, everyone can apprehend the experience of his fellow-men just as directly (or 
indirectly) as he can his own". See his The Nature of Sympathy, trans: P. Heath (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 256. The positive aspect of this thought is that we are not so 
removed from the other that all we can immediately discern is a bodily veneer and external 
actions. 
39 M. Theunissen, The Other, p. 366 
40 Theunissen, ibid., p. 368 
41 E. Husserl, Phanomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Ed. W. Biemel 
(Hague: 1952) p. 275 
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process of alter-ating. This quest is not necessarily sinfully egotistical42 or 
narrowly individualistic however because particularity is discovered to depend 
upon others and otherness which gives definition, limit and form to particularity. 
In terms of Christian relationships it could be argued that the second great 
commandment implies such a process of alter-ation. ("Dialogical" self-becoming 
is perhaps not the happiest phrase to use within a Christian context because it 
neglects that wider communal context of self and other-becoming which the 
church provides. Becoming here may depend on a wide range of 'dioratic' 
relationships, relationships open both to God and our neighbours. ) 
6.6 The Mode of Human Participation 
Of interest here is Barth's understanding of the form of humanity as a "being in 
encounter" because Barth discusses ways of being intrinsic to human beings as 
human which in varying ways stress this process of alter-ation, deepening and 
broadening out the idea. Barth delineates four aspects to this being in 
encounter. First there is a seeing eye to eye, where we see others for who they 
are and allow others to see us, without deception, idealisation or derogation. 
Not to engage in such an eye to eye encounter is for Barth inhumanity. 43 The 
second aspect is that of 'mutual speech and hearing' (C. D. 111.2, p. 252). Just as 
we can look past people, so too we can talk past them and hear past them; an 
authentic human dialogue is one where "the spoken word becomes a means to 
seek and help the other in the difficulty which each entails for the other" and 
authentic human listening begins "only when the hearers are concerned about 
themselves, about the removal of their own difficulty in respect of the other, so 
that the words of the other are received and welcomed as a help in this 
embarrassment" (C. D. 111.2, p. 259). Thirdly "humanity consists in the fact that we 
need and are capable of mutual assistance" (p. 262), and this is rooted in an 
awareness of our own limitations (so that we need the help of others) and in our 
awareness of the limitations and needs of others. Fourthly, our being in 
42 Provided human beings' egocentricity is not exclusive but that which naturally arises from our 
space-time embodiedness and desire for well-being then it is not of itself necessarily sinful. 
Human beings may transcend their embodiment, their organic needs, immediate desires etc. 
without such embodiment, needs or desires being cancelled necessarily. Transcendence could 
be understood here as not so much the deformation as the transformation of human 
egocentricity. 
43 "The isolation in which we try to persist, the lack of participation which we show in relation to 
others and thus thrust upon others in relation to ourselves, is inhumanity" C. D. 111.2, p. 251. 
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encounter means that the three foregoing dimensions to being human are 
undertaken freely and with gladness. We must resist understanding human 
beings as able, from a point of neutrality, to choose "either for or against a 
willing participation in the Thou; either for or against an inner Yes as the motive 
of this participation" (p. 267). Rather for Barth, "in his essence, his innermost 
being, his heart, he is only what he is gladly". 44 Barth's point could be reinforced 
with an understanding of human desire for relation itself, a being drawn to 
vulnerable, mysterious others without which the human being is impoverished. 
In this case the gladness of our being in encounter is in part the satisfaction of 
the desire to be with others in compassion. 45 
In all of this Barth is outlining the content of what it is to be human, the natural 
exercise and actualisation of human nature. But for the divine mercy embodied 
in Christ, human sinfulness would have prevented the authentic exercise of 
human freedom in loving and glad 'being in encounter'. This is the potency of 
Christian love, its distinction and relation to humanity, that it can make true and 
actual that which human beings cannot make true and actual of themselves, 
even though our natures are determined for it, "namely, a co-existence of man 
and fellow-man "gladly" fulfilled in freedom" (C. D. 111.2, p. 282). This Christian 
love is grounded in a noetic participation in Christ for Barth, a participation 
which sets aside our perverted relations, "in the knowledge of the forgiveness of 
sins, and in the summons to gratitude by the gracious gift of the Holy Ghost" 
(C. D. 111.2, p. 281). Barth thus understands Christian love as "the awakening and 
fulfilling of humanity, of the distorted and perverted but not forfeited manner of 
the natural man, i. e. of man as God created him" (C. D. 111.2, p. 284). Or to use the 
language of participation: 
only as love is shed abroad in our hearts as the love of God can humanity as the nature of man 
receive new honour and acquire a new stability. As it participates in love, it can and will never fail 
(C. D. 111.2, p. 276). 
In terms of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' relations, it seems that our authentic 
freedom for one another and "being-in-encounter" gladly depend on a noetic 
44 C. D. 111.2, p. 267. 
45 M. Nedoncelle claims that "the primordial drive of the self is not only an impulse toward the other 
and toward the value of the other, as Scheler so admirably showed; it is also an efficient energy 
that wants to contribute to the existence and development of the other. " See his Love and the 
Person, trans. Sr. R. Adelaide (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), p. 10 
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vertical participation as awareness of what Christ has done for us and who 
Christ is. While Barth acknowledges human goodness outside of Christianity, it 
is not clear whether he is able to make sense of such goodness given this 
requirement of noetic awareness for authentic freedom. 
The "being in encounter" discussed by Barth goes beyond the concept of alter- 
ation mentioned earlier in that there is a greater stress on the mutuality and 
reciprocity implicit in being in encounter; as I become more me, you become 
more you, and it is together that we become more (or less) human. But even 
more significantly, the possibility of our becoming, our self-realisation, rests on 
God's movement towards humanity in Christ, in whom we see our possibilities 
as human beings. Barth notes that theological anthropology has a criterion - 
namely its knowledge of divine grace and the man Jesus - by which it can move 
towards a conception of the human being as being, at its deepest and highest 
level, a freedom of heart for the other. Such a conception is grounded in Christ's 
being from, to and with God the Father, a relation of a human being with God 
which shows humanity that it exists in a dependent relation to God, that it exists 
with God in that this relationship is maintained by God for the sake of 
humankind's salvation and deliverance, and that it exists for God in that we see 
our eternal destiny in Christ as being in communion with the Triune God. For 
Barth the clue to human being and relationships is found in the Triune 
relationships and the Christological relationship (of God with humankind and 
humankind with God in Christ), Barth pointing out that Jesus himself draws 
attention to the oneness of the Father and the Son and that unity of the disciples 
(Jn. 17: 11,22), the love the Father has for the Son and the love that the 
disciples might have (Jn. 17: 26) etc. (cf. C. D. 111.2, p. 221)46. 
The four essential characteristics of "Being in Encounter" mentioned above are 
humanity's appropriate response to the revelation of Christ at the inter-human 
level, because in this way human beings participate in the history of the 
encounter and interaction of God with humanity in Jesus Christ and humankind 
images the Image of God, Jesus Christ. 47 This process is a process of becoming 
46 Even Barth accepts that there is a restricted Biblical warrant for validating such an analogy 
however; ".. we may refer to a narrow but sharply defined and therefore distinct line in St. John's 
Gospel" C. D. 111.2, p. 220. 
47 "The humanity of Jesus is not merely the repetition and reflection of his divinity, or of God's 
controlling will; it is the repetition and reflection of God Himself, no more and no less. It is the 
image of God, the imago Der(C. D. 111.2, p. 219). 
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in which we become who we are called in Jesus Christ to be. Perhaps we can 
discern then what participation in the life of the Trinitarian God means for Barth. 
We do not become like God in any respect but rather always remain creatures 
totally dependent and in need of God. Even so there is a certain analogia 
relationis between the inner Trinitarian relations (e. g. of Father and Son) and 
the relation between God and human beings, an analogy we can infer from the 
relation of Jesus to the Father. The correspondence between the two 
relationships rests in the fact that the same divine freedom and love is exercised 
in both cases (cf. C. D. 111.2, p. 220). And in response, in the relation of Jesus to 
the Father we see a human being from, with and to God; in gratitude, 
exuberance and awe we respond in Christ to the God who is already for us, and 
in Jesus we see this embodied and this implies living for and serving the 
purposes of God by fulfilling his humanity and that of others. Jesus' being for 
others displays our human freedom to serve God willingly and actually fleshes 
out our freedom as our being for others rather than a being for ourselves apart 
from others. Thus our participation in the Triune life is a following of Christ which 
means concretely a participation in the knowledge of a God who is for us in 
Christ and a participation in Christ's being-for-others in the creaturely sphere. 
And this being-for-others extends to enabling others to come to acknowledge 
that God is for them, so sweeping them up into participation in the Triune life as 
they realise their election and respond by obeying and serving God in Christ. 
6.7 Human Correspondence to the Trinitarian God 
We might ask at this point whether Barth was sufficiently clear in his exposition 
of humanity as being in the image of God in terms of the analogia relationis. 
Does the analogy imply that our relationships with one another share a certain 
"similarity in dissimilarity' (C. D. 111.2, p. 324) with the Trinitarian relationships (in 
which case one might speak of a participation in the Triune life of God through 
'horizontal' relationships), or'does the analogy refer us rather to the covenantal 
relationship existing between God and ourselves? In his discussion of male- 
female relationships Barth appears to use both models; at times he argues 
against the idea of superiority and inferiority between men and women, yet 
Barth's reading of the N. T. (and in particular Paul) leads him to use terms such 
as superordination and subordination, all the while protesting that such terms 
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do not entail superior and inferior positions! Barth struggled to find terms 
expressive of 'equality' and distinction in relationship. This is pertinent to our 
discussion because if Barth is ambiguous about the nature of those horizontal 
relations which are expressive of our being for others (rooted in our being for 
God) and thus a participation in Christ, then there remains a deep ambiguity 
concerning the form of relationships indicative of participation. Issues such as 
this touch other deep concerns. For example should we treat the Trinitarian 
relationships as the theological grounds for defining human beings in terms of 
relationships of mutuality, community and ecstasis? One implication of this 
approach is that we move towards a Platonic view of participation in God; the 
Trinitarian God becomes merely a regulative ideal, the Form by which we live 
and in which we participate as our relations mirror those of the inner Trinitarian 
life; lost is all sense of the direct personal relation of God to ourselves and with it 
any hope for humanity. For all Barth's ambiguity he is rightly struggling to avoid 
such dangers by linking God's inner Trinitarian life with human life through 
God's external relationships, and for Barth this means God's covenantal 
relationships. Where Barth is to be followed is in his vision that it is God's love 
and freedom which provide the basis of the analogia relationis. In this case the 
image of God is in part our freedom to love and our being creatures who love 
freely, a love directed towards God and our neighbour, a love similar in respects 
but dissimilar in other respects to God's love, a love grounded in God's love. 
Barth's thought provides an interesting understanding of our correspondence to 
God's faithfulness and action, God's freedom and love, an understanding which 
can help to fill out what it is we mean when speaking of participation in God. 
Right responsiveness to God's downward movement in Jesus Christ includes a 
correspondent obedience of humility (cf. 2 Cor. 8: 9), which however "will always 
be a profoundly imperfect correspondence, (it) will always be similar only in the 
greatest dissimilarity" (C. D. IV. 1, p. 636) and will not give human beings any 
glory or merit. Even so, "If we have become obedient to Him, it is inevitable that 
the divine humility in which Jesus Christ is the righteous man should be the 
pattern which we who believe in Him should follow" (IV. 1, p. 636). Our 
correspondence involves an imitatio Christi then, but this is an "analogy to His 
attitude and action" (p. 634), a "corresponding and appropriate answer to the 
faithfulness of God as effective and revealed in His judgement and sentence" 
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(p. 634). Barth is concerned here that such an imitatio Christi be understood in 
the context of relationship to Jesus Christ as its object and origin; it is a 
response to, just as our faith is a recognition and apprehension of, Christ's 
being and activity for us. According to this line of thought we can regard our 
participation in God as one of correspondent humble obedience to Jesus Christ, 
an imitatio Christi which retains Christ's priority as the one originating, 
sustaining and completing our participation in Him. (Barth tends to speak of 
'faith' as the correspondent response rather than 'participation', but 
participation covers better both the noetic appreciation of who Christ is and 
what Christ has done together with our responsive, on-going, developing 
embodiment of such appreciation. 48) Undergirding this correspondence are 
three analogies which we have already implicitly alluded to. First Christ's 
relation to humankind images the intra-divine, loving I-Thou relationship. 
Second Christ's "being for man repeats and reflects the inner being or essence 
of God and this confirms His being for God" (C. D. 11.2, p. 219); there is an 
analogy, harmony and similarity between Christ's divinity and his humanity. 
Third as Jesus is for God or for humanity, so human beings are for other human 
beings - there is an analogy between Christ's humanity and humanity in 
general. (Sin of course distorts this 'being for' into 'being against' as mentioned 
earlier. )49 
For Barth our participation in God is not realised through some Neoplatonic 
ascent through intermediary beings, nor is our participation realised as we 
share in some ideal Platonic form of human being as exhibited in Christ. 
Participation is relational rather than substantive, and the concept depends for 
its force on the similarity-in-difference we find between ourselves and Christ. 
Alter-ation in Christian perspective is not simply my activity or the activity of the 
transcendental ego but is based itself on a relationship in which I have already 
been approached (in terms both of originary election and eventful revelation), 
by God who enables my alter-ation. Where doctrines of participation can often 
fail is in not appreciating that such alter-ation affirms creaturely particularity and 
48T hat Barth tends himself to stress the noetic dimension when writing of faith can be seen in his 
understanding In C. D. 11.1, p. 9 of faith as'mediated knowledge'; further "Faith Is the total positive 
relationship of man to the God who gives himself to be known in his word... It is the Yes which man 
pronounces in his "heart" when confronted by this God... in the light of the clarity that God is God 
and that he is his God... In this event of faith the knowledge of God is realised" (C. D. 11.1, p. 12). 
49 See A. J. Torrance for more on these three analogies, Persons in Communion, pp. 180ff . 153 
distinctiveness within the very process where it is tempting to assume creatures 
transcend their humanly understood limits. Perhaps the sort of transcendence 
with which human beings are involved in terms of participation in God can be 
understood analogously from Barth's understanding of God's transcendence. 
God's transcendence is not primarily a transcendence of utter difference and 
superiority for Barth (though this is true), but a freedom for that which is other 
than Himself which does not compromise Himself; "His freedom (is) not merely 
to be like the reality different from Himself, but to be as the Creator, Reconciler 
and Redeemer acting towards it and in it, and therefore as its sovereign Lord" 
(C. D. 11.1, p. 304). Only a God transcendent in this way makes it possible for 
creation and human creatures to become themselves, and our transcendence, 
our going beyond our own possibilities and becoming the human beings we are 
called in Christ to be, is actualised as we respond to God, such response 
having the character of a knowledge of God, an obedience to God, an 
invocation of God and, summarising all of these, a freedom imparted by God 
(C. D. 111.2, p. 192); "He (man) is free on his side to know God, to obey Him and to 
call upon Him freely' (ibid., p. 193). Fortunately Barth clarifies the distinction 
between God's transcendence and human transcendence5O and elsewhere 
explains that our freedom for God and our neighbours is also a freedom from 
our being for ourselves, with all its attendant fears, anxieties and hopelessness; 
Since God is for him (man), he is relieved from the post of being for himself by the One who alone 
can be actually and effectively for him. He is relieved of all the care and all the fear of being for 
himself" (C. D. 11.2, p. 597). 
If this approach to self-becoming is valid then we must begin with an 
appreciation that the self's beginning is not an isolated transcendental ego who 
relates to an Other and others but a situation in which relationships to others 
and to a creating Other is presupposed; in other words Barth's understanding of 
the human condition as one of "being in encounter" must be taken seriously. But 
then perhaps there is something in Buber's fundamental approach which 
highlights the initiality of the between. Theunissen argues that, in its favour 
50 "And if it is true that when man goes to God in his responsibility, knowledge and act, he too 
transcends the limits of the creature, yet this does not happen in the same unequivocal, 
irresistible and unchallengeable way as it does on God's side. If it takes place on man's side too, 
and perhaps even as his own act and not without a certain definiteness, certainty and joyfulness, it 
happens with all the difference between what he is enabled and obliged to do as a creature and 
what God is free and powerful to do as the Creator" (C. D. 111.2, p. 188). 
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.. the primordiality that, as completedness, one is entitled to attribute to the matter of dialogical thought, seems to imply originality. Dialogic looks at the completing end insofar as it thinks the 
self-becoming of the I out of the meeting with the Thou. Self-becoming has, as its return home 
out of alteration, the character of a turning back to the beginning. I become myself - this means 
that I become what at bottom I am: I become what initially I already was... being in and out of the 
between. 51 
Plato's Symposium (189c-193d) contains one example of a philosophical myth 
about a prior unity out of which an individual is realised and for which the 
individual yearns. But more pertinent is the Judeo-Christian tradition of Creation 
with the mythical harmony of relations between human beings and human 
beings and God in the Garden of Eden, a lost origin which human beings long 
to re-establish. In this context the "solitude" of the transcendental ego is "no 
original fact" but a result of the fall from grace as Schelling pointed out. 52 Some 
interpreters of Buber suggest that Buber sees God as the reality of the between, 
that reality which links all relations with one another. Such an approach would 
have some problems establishing the personal nature of God and God might 
reduce to relations between others. Positively however, the thought suggests 
that authentically being in touch with others in ways which treat others as 
personally other (i. e. not as objects, not as material to be assimilated, dismissed 
or denied, but as persons warranting response, respect, engagement), indicate 
God's involvement, our participation in Christian love and indeed give an 
indication of the splendour of God behind it all, as Barth might contend. 
While Buber's fundamental approach must be rejected for reasons highlighted 
earlier, the comments above suggest that there is a sense in which self- 
becoming through encounter with otherness is about a home-coming, a coming 
to oneself, a being what one was created to be. Barth's remarks often echo this 
theme, with his talk of Heimkehr and the idea of humanity's homecoming as a 
thematization of the Incarnation, together with his stress on becoming what we 
now are in Christ. One theologian who focuses carefully on these ideas, who 
we have already seen using the language of participation and who it might be 
instructive to contrast with Barth is Bonhoeff er. While Barth focuses primarily on 
the noetic dimension when discussing participation, Bonhoeffer focuses 
primarily on the ethical dimension. Of particular interest at this point are 
Bonhoeff er's 1932-1933 lectures Creation and Fall (hereafter CF), which reflect 
51 Theunissen, The Other, pp. 378-9 
52 Ibid., p. 382 
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on the way in which our fallenness is reflected in the cor curvum in se of human 
beings and how, in and through the person of Christ, this inwardness is broken 
open and we are liberated for relations with one another which respect the 
other's transcendence and which embrace our own creaturely limitations rather 
than struggle against them. (There are parallels here with Barth, who also refers 
to Luther's terminology in suggesting that humanity is no homo incurvatus in se 
(cf. C. D. 111.4, p. 473). Such selfishness bespeaks our sinful, lost state, and is 
marked by an (at least implicit) refusal to live by God's grace. ) 
6.8 Bonhoeffer: Christ as Boundary and Centre 
Bonhoeffer, in his commentary on Genesis 1-3 (CF) is partly concerned to 
understand Creation and Fall in terms of creaturely limitations, the creature's 
attempted trespass of such limitations, and their re-aff irmation in Christ. 
Bonhoeffer sees the tree of life at the centre of the Garden representing life that 
comes forth from God who is in the middle. "Adam's life comes from the middle 
which is not Adam himself but God" (CF 50). Adam receives life not as an 
animal but as man; 
he has it in his obedience... ; that is, he has it in his freedom". The prohibition not to eat of the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil means nothing to Adam but 'Adam, thou art a free creature, so 
be a creature' (CF 51). 
The forbidden tree that denotes the limit of man stands in the middle. Man's limit is in the middle of 
his existence, not on the edge. The limit which we look for on the edge is the limit of his condition, 
of his technology, of his possibilities. The limit in the middle is the limit of his reality, of his true 
existence"(CF 52). 
'Limit' seems to be used here as that frame, form or structure which shapes us 
into what we are, i. e. human beings, and the recognition of 'limit' is then part of 
the task of grasping and living out our humanity authentically. Thus Bonhoeff er 
argues implicitly against that-peculiar notion of freedom as freedom from 
determination, the freedom of emptiness53. "The limit is grace because it is the 
basis of creatureliness and freedom" (CF 52). (This understanding of freedom 
53 By writing in this way Bonhoeffer avoids the diff iculty with a purely voluntaristic understanding 
of the Fall - namely its obscuring of the conditions and discontent which cause humanity's prideful 
rebellion and to which the serpent can appeal. Bonhoeffer might have said more however about 
the Fall as an understandable response to the conditions of human existence, conditions such as 
finitude, non-necessity and vulnerability. 
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as freedom-in-relation is one of Bonhoeffer's strongest and most attractive 
themes. ) The decisive difference between Adam and ourselves is that our 
history begins where his ends. Indeed we can only know about the beginning 
"from the new middle, from Christ, as those who are freed in faith from the 
knowledge of good and evil and from death, and who can make Adam's picture 
their own only in faith" (CF 57). Thus the Creation story reveals God's intentions 
and purposes for Creation and human beings, intentions we see realised in our 
own history by Jesus Christ and in whom we can see Adam's beginning as our 
eschatological fulfilment. 
The Fall describes the transgression of our limits and our attempts to become 
our own creators, to be like God. 
Now he (man) lives out of his own resources and no longer from the middle. Now he lives out of 
himself, now he creates his own life, he is his own creator (CF 74). 
Man's being sicut deus in fact includes his not wanting to be a creature. Only God can address 
man in a different way. He can address man in his never-abolished creatureliness° (CF 74). 
In his fallen state man hates his limit and thus acknowledges it in the form of 
shame (CF 80). 
He is not without the Word of God, even though it is the wrathful, repelling cursing Word of God. 
This is the promise. Thus Adam lives between curse and promise (CF 86). 
It is precisely in respect of death, that most terrible curse, that we also see 
humanity living in God's merciful preservation. The serpent was right; Adam 
would be like God and not die the death of non-being; but the Creator was right 
too, in that Adam would die the death of being like God (CF 88). The death of 
death is the promise of the curse, a promise whose content we are able to see 
in the light of Christ's resurrection, but not one Adam was able to see (CF 89). 
Christ is both boundary and centre for Bonhoeffer. In Christ our boundary is re- 
established because through faith in him our state of being turned in on 
ourselves is broken open. In revelation "alone human thought, which again and 
again seeks an I-enclosed system, is set free from such an enclosure and, at the 
same time, from the deadly isolation out of which there is no escape for those 
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without faith" 54. We have already examined Bonhoeffer's understanding of the 
cor curvum in se in the last chapter so this need not detain us here. 
Bonhoeffer's understanding is particularly interesting here as complementary to 
Barth's thought in the context of interpersonal relations. While Barth focuses on 
acts in, by and through which the other is present as an other person, 
Bonhoeffer focuses not so much on the acts whereby the other person is 
realised as such but with the mystery of that realising itself. More recently 
E. Levinas has focused on this 'realising', in terms of the 'face' of an other, that 
face which resists manipulation, assimilation and control, which calls forth 
compassion and responsibility55, and which calls from a great `height'. 56 But 
while for Levinas this realising is simply existentially apparent in the world, a 
realising of ethical responsibility which can be distorted by human beings as 
violence, murder, assimilation etc., for Bonhoeffer it seems to be a realising 
dependent on Christ's mediating influence, a realising whose fulfilment as 
compassionate obligation depends (whether we appreciate and acknowledge it 
or not), on Christ. 
Christ is not only boundary but also our re-established centre for Bonhoeffer. In 
particular he is the centre in being-there for human beings. As Bonhoeffer puts 
is, the present Christ 
.. stands pro me. He stands there 
in my place, where I should stand, but cannot. He stands on the 
boundary of my existence, beyond my existence, yet for me... Here Christ stands, in the centre, 
between me and myself, between the old existence and the new. So Christ is at the same time my 
own boundary and my rediscovered centre, the centre lying both between 'I' and 'I' and between 
'I' and God. The boundary can only be known as a boundary from beyond the boundary. In Christ 
man knows it and thus at the same time finds his new centre57. 
Where this approach goes beyond the dialogical self-becoming which is both a 
coming to oneself and a going out to others is in its stress on Christ as the 
person establishing this becoming and sustaining its proper mode (by for 
54 E. Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 12 
55 Levinas speaks of the nakedness and destitution discerned in the face, a vulnerability and 
fragility which demands compassion and struggle on behalf of the other against potential threats 
and violations. Farley speaks of this as'emotional participation' and empathy. See his Good & Evil, 
p. 42. 
56 See for example E. Levinas, Totalityand infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 187-220 
57 D. Bonhoeffer, Christology, pp. 61-62 
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example rejecting assimilation of others to ourselves). For Bonhoeffer the only 
immediacy the believer has now is faith directed to Christ as centre, who 
mediates "not only between God and human beings, but between one human 
being and another, between people and reality"58. To live from this centre is not 
to reflect theologically on Christ; it is in its inner meaning ex-centrically oriented 
action as explained in the last chapter. 
6.9 The Inadequacy of Participation as Ethical Transcendence 
In the context of our discussion of participation and Otherness what is promising 
is Bonhoeffer's understanding of Christ as the person enabling our engagement 
with others without assimilation or dismissal but it remains to consider how 
exactly the cor curvum in se is broken open. An orientation towards our 
neighbours which embraces our responsibility and the claim our neighbours 
have on us is the way to grasping the 'reality'59 of the other; 
on the epistemological and metaphysical path one never reaches the reality of the other. Reality 
cannot be derived, it is simply given, to be acknowledged, to be rejected, but never to be 
established by proofs, and it is given only to the moral person as a whole60. 
But in Bonhoeff er's thought this ethical transcendence can be separated from 
any sense of relationship to Christ if we accept that "the knowledge of Jesus is 
entirely transformed into action, without any reflection upon the human self"61 
(my italics). We have remarked on this weakness in Bonhoeffer's thought 
previously but why in particular is it problematic in connection with relating to 
otherness? It is problematic because it does not take human sinfulness 
seriously enough nor does it appreciate fully our dependence on God in Christ; 
we are constantly tempted in our actions and relationships not so much to 
attend as to assimilate, not so much to distinguish as to divide, not so much to 
serve others as others but serve others as reduced to the same or disserve 
58 D. Bonhoeffer, Cost of Discipleship, p. 88 
59 Bonhoeffer takes 'reality' to mean primarily God, God in Jesus Christ and "it is from the real one, 
whose name is Jesus Christ, that all factual reality derives its ultimate foundation and its ultimate 
annulment, its justification and its ultimate contradiction, its ultimate affirmation and its ultimate 
negation. To attempt to understand reality without the real one is to live in an abstraction to which 
the responsible person must never fall victim; it is to fail to make contact with reality in [if e.. ". See 
Ethics, p. 228 
60 Sanctorum Communio, p. 88 
61 Ethics, p. 34 
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others as alien. Action in itself towards others may or may not be corrupted by 
such temptations. Christianity has resources to address such temptations 
however, especially through an awareness that Christ mediates otherness to 
us, the otherness of our fellow human beings and the otherness of God and that 
only as such are we authentically in touch with one another and with God. Our 
constant reductions and dismissals of otherness, our attempts to live from 'the 
same' can be addressed best not merely by our own ethical actions but by the 
narrative of Christ's life, death and resurrection which at one level can be read 
as humanity's rejection of Otherness and an addressing of this rejection by the 
wholly Other. The refusal of the Other to be finally dismissed (as in the 
resurrection where God refuses to be dismissed despite the murderous 
rejection of men), and the reestablishment of human beings (the 
reestablishment of their limit and centre in Bonhoefferian terms), is the ground 
of a way of being in relation to otherness which consciously resists the 
temptations to fall back on sinful patterns of relating to others. And what makes 
this way of being possible despite the discouraging failures and backsliding is a 
receptiveness to the offer of forgiveness rooted in the cross of Christ, a 
forgiveness which enables repentance and enables an actus directus which is 
constantly alert (because rooted in the story of Christ), to the temptations to 
corrupt relations with others. (This alerts us also, as Kierkegaard alerted us, to 
the temptations of theology and religious language, the temptations to claim a 
total perspective or control over otherness. A healthy suspicion about our 
accustomed ways of mastering others together with an awareness that God has 
spoken is required and perhaps proper theology is possible only as our 
discourse about God declines the attempt to take God's point of view (i. e. 'a total 
perspective')). 
Precisely here we can begin to realise that participation simply understood as 
participation in Christ's (ethical) way of being is inadequate. Not only does it fail 
to take sufficiently seriously the need of the sinful human creature and the 
dependence of the human creature on that relation to otherness which alone 
can help in his/her waywardness and helplessness and which dependence 
defines the human creature, but it also stands in danger of losing Christ's 
distinctiveness and that of the human creature. Neither should we imagine that 
when human beings no longer sin they no longer stand in need or want of 
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relationship with God, because it is precisely in realising a dependent way of 
being which grounds our freedom in obedience to God that we come by the 
Christian perfection of sinlessness. Participation must be grounded in an 
ongoing dependence, a sense of human wickedness and human dissolution 
apart from God, a constant awareness of the temptations to 'independence' and 
the formlessness of 'independence' and therefore a continuously humble, 
penitent attitude in relation to God, even and especially in the midst of 'ethical' 
service. To say all of this is to say, in part, that participation must be grounded in 
the cross of Christ, a point P. T. Forsyth was quick to notice and a point we have 
made previously in our discussion of Calvin's thought. Forsyth writes of Christ's 
death that 
.. the penalty was his, the repentance remains ours. His expiation does not dispense with ours, but evokes and enables it. Our saving repentance is not due to our terror of the judgement to fall 
upon us, but to our horror of the judgement we brought on him. The due recognition of the 
wounded law was his, but the sense of having inflicted the wound is ours alone. Yet not possibly 
ours till we have acted on what was his. The truth of penalty is penitence. 62 
For Forsyth penitence is the Spirit-worked consequence of Christ's confession, 
acknowledgement of the righteousness of God and also "a sharing in the 
communion of the cross and a hallowing of his Name"63. There is here a 
participation in Christ. But our sharing is not a sharing in Christ's atoning victory 
so much as a repentance rooted in Christ's atonement, an acknowledgement of 
our part in Christ's crucifixion and a reception of the gracious forgiveness and 
reconciliation that God has provided; 
.. our repentance was latent in that 
holiness of his which alone could and must create it... In 
presenting himself he offers implicitly and proleptically the new humanity his holy work creates... 
He represents before God not a natural humanity that produces him as its spiritual classic, but the 
new penitent humanity that his influence creates. 64 
Our participation in Christ is then a thankful and joyful repentance, an 
involvement in Christ's 'confession' of God's holiness (a reverent recognition of 
the rightness and goodness of God's claim on creation), a "direct personal 
communion with Christ, based on forgiveness of sins direct from him to the 
62 P. T. Forsyth, The Atonementin Modern Religious Thought(London: James Clarke & Co., 
1902), p. 76 
63J. H. Rodgers, The Theology of P. T. Forsyth (London: Independent Press, 1965), p. 183 
64 Forsyth, The Atonement, p. 188 
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conscience"65; "so understood as man's personal participation in communion 
with Christ, faith is salvation". 66 Our participation is faith that implies and 
realises faithful actions although 
.. faith is salvation; it is not rewarded with salvation. To be forgiven much is to love much, which is to live much and live anew. The new life is the faith which constantly takes home forgiveness, 
regeneration, reconciliation, and all they imply for the heart. 67 
But the cross of Christ is also definitive for the new humanity. Undergirding 
Forsyth's analysis here is an anthropology focused on conscience and free will; 
for Forsyth the human being 
is more than a consciousness, he is a conscience. He is not only aware of himself, he is critical of 
himself. There is in the soul a bar, a tribunal; our thoughts and actions are ranged before it; 
judgement is passed there upon what we have been and done. Everyone who believes in 
morality believes in the conscience as the power we have in passing moral judgement about 
ourselves 68. 
Our sense of responsibility is rooted firmly in the conscience and in our 
sinfulness we have chosen to abide by the authority of human law 
rather than holy law. God's action in Christ is the recreation of conscience, a 
recreation installing holy law as the Lord of conscience; finally 'the saved 
conscience is integrated into the justice of the universe'. Conscience is the 
"engrained gift of the Creator and we have no power by which to cancel or still 
its voice even if it pronounces us guilty" as Hall points out. 69 But by 
reestablishing our conscience as our sense of responsibility enabling us to 
exercise our freedom in accepting God's authoritative claim on us, we are 
reestablished as God's children. And while this authority is not alien, it is other7o 
in that it is an external authority enabling us to be the human beings we have all 
along been created to be. The emphasis for Forsyth is clearly the moral life, and 
65 P. T. Forsyth, Rome, Reform and Reaction. Four Lectures on the Religious Situation (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1899), pp. 92-93 
66 J. H. Rodgers, ibid., p. 184 
67 P. T. Forsyth, The Church and the Sacraments (London: Independent Press, 5th Impression, 
1955), p. 199. This relates to Forsyth's understanding of sanctification's permanent condition 
being justification. See for example his God the Holy Father (London: Independent Press, re- 
issued 1957), pp. 126-129 
68 G. HaII, 'Tragedy in the Theology of P. T. Forsyth' in Justice the True and Only Mercy, Essays on 
the Life and Theology of P. T. Forsyth, ed. Trevor Hart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), p. 86 
69 Ibid., p. 87 
70 See C. Gunton's article The Real as Redemptive' in Justice the true and only Mercy, ibid., p. 43 
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for him it is the moral which is the real, and 'the spiritual world is not the world of 
noetic process or cosmic force, but of holy, i. e. moral order, act and power'. 
What is useful here is that Forsyth retains a sense of the ethical implications of 
our participation while rooting such participation in the cross of Christ, that place 
which is also the source of humble penitence, gratitude and awe. Our 
consciences, in grasping a new sense of responsibility in the face of the cross, 
simultaneously are aware of our responsibility for the cross so that all our 
conscientious actions are imbued with a certain penitent and self-critical 
attitude, and (going beyond what Forsyth explicitly says) all of our actions must 
be regarded suspiciously if they lack this penitential, self-critical dimension. 
Perhaps more than Barth Forsyth brings out the moral consequences of Christ's 
action for us humans, Barth concentrating primarily (certainly in his treatment of 
participation), on the noetic dimension. In the end of course our participation 
cannot be construed as primarily noetic with ethical implications nor as primarily 
moral with epistemological implications because both invite the dangerous 
possibility of a wedge that can be driven between faith and action, between the 
events of our lives and the events of Christ's life. A surer way forward is to root 
our participation in the narrative of the Incarnate one's life, death and 
resurrection, in such a way that participation in Christ becomes a participation in 
that story, not as we become the Christ of that story but as we become those 
human beings who realise in and through Christ who we have been and who 
we are now in him and who we are called to be. 71 Forsyth is especially strong 
when rooting us in the cross of Christ and stressing our participation in this 
aspect of Christ's life. But where Forsyth is weaker is in his neglect of the 
incarnational unity of Christ with all people, a unity reflecting our being elected 
by God in our creation as those beings who God is for. That stress in turn ties 
the doctrines of creation and redemption more closely, in providing continuities 
which Forsyth stretches to breaking point by focusing so narrowly on the 
cross. 72 Participation in the story of Christ is about being brought into relation 
71 As Trevor Hart notes concerning our use of scripture, "we are called not simply to enter the 
world of the text in some sort of imaginative retreat from reality, but, having entered this world, to 
recognize it as none other than our own, and to begin the complex task of refiguring our own 
world in the light of this narrative presentation of it". See his Faith Thinking, p. 152. Imagination 
may be of particular importance where this kind of participation is concerned, because as S. T. 
Coleridge noted, this faculty is at once both active and passive (as can be seen by philosophical 
reflection on the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking). See Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 
The Oxford Authors Series (Oxford: OUP, 1985), p. 222 
72 C. Gunton, 'The Real as Redemptive', ibid., p. 51 
163 
with Christ through the Spirit (and it is of course vital that an account of divine 
initiatives and human responses are explained pneumatologically if due space 
is accorded for the relationships there established to be other than coercive. ) 
Participation in God is not to be understood according to some a priori ordering 
of knowing and doing; our participation is one involving personal relations and 
as such proceeds from the noetic to the ethical and vice versa. As we attend to 
one another we may come to know that our spirit witnesses with the Spirit to the 
fact that our service is one of obedience which can only be rendered because 
we have been freed for such service. But we may also come to realise, through 
our service, that our knowledge of God is truly authentic only as it is forged in 
the furnace of active obedience. 
6.10 Conclusion 
We began this chapter by considering Kierkegaard's views on the Otherness of 
God and relationship with God. Faith was the bridge for Kierkegaard, a faith 
realised at times as a divine gift and at other times as a human work it would 
seem. Occasionally Kierkegaard suggests that the most we can do to establish 
relationship with the wholly Other is to acknowledge our sinfulness. This 
consciousness of sin can lead the individual to acknowledge his total 
impotence before God, which is as much as the Kierkegaardian individual can 
do. It is at this point that faith becomes an imperative. Perhaps the most we can 
do in order to participate in God is to acknowledge our sinfulness and wait for 
God, trustfully and hopefully. But Kierkegaard leaves us with ambiguity and 
paradox; ambiguity concerning the part we finally play in relating to the Other, 
paradox in that the 'infinite qualitative difference' between God and ourselves 
makes it paradoxical that human beings can relate to God at all. 
We then saw how Barth unambiguously suggested that the establishing and 
sustaining of relationship is entirely God's work, and Barth emphasised God's 
transcendence as one of being free for His creatures, able to relate as Creator, 
Redeemer and Reconciler without compromising His divine integrity. This loving 
freedom of God for His human creatures is the basis of our participation in God 
for Barth, a participation dependent on God's participation in humanity in Christ. 
Because of God's self-revelation in Christ we are able to participate in that in 
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which we would otherwise be unable to participate, the knowledge of God. The 
presence of the Incarnate Word realised through the Spirit is an open, 
participable event in which Christ can initiate human knowing into the very act 
of his incarnation. As such our relationship is one to be marked by gratitude, 
exuberance and awe. It is however only in relationship with God that our 
knowledge is prevented from sliding into idolatry, resistance to God and sinful 
assertions of human independence. Only in a living relationship with God in 
which we are responsively grateful, humble and obedient is there hope that 
noetic participation will not be corrupted by us. The revelation of God is also a 
revelation of humanity as it is meant to be in Christ, and if we truly acknowledge 
the revelation of Christ we will be set in motion to be the human beings God 
establishes us as being in Christ. Thus there is an ethical dimension to our 
participation. And Barth describes some concrete aspects of this ethical 
dimension 'horizontally' in his description of human being as a 'being in 
encounter'. However, in terms of our 'horizontal' and 'vertical' relations, it seems 
that authentic loving freedom for one another and true 'being in encounter' 
gladly depend on a prior noetic vertical participation as awareness of what God 
has done for us in Christ and who Christ is. (Such an analysis might suggest 
that the Gandhis of this world neither participate in God nor embody authentic 
being for others). Our participation can be viewed as a dynamic process of self- 
becoming through being for others rooted in a being for God, a process whose 
origin, sustenance and telos is Jesus Christ. Two modes of divine relationship 
provide analogy for human modes of relating in this participation; the inner 
Trinitarian life provides an analogy for inter-human relating (we have noted the 
relatively narrow Biblical grounding for such an assumption), and the 
covenantal relating of God and human beings in Christ provides an analogy for 
the divine-human relationship. Our reading of Barth suggested that our 
correspondence to God's faithfulness and action, God's freedom and love, can 
help to fill out what it is we mean when speaking of participation in God. 
Bonhoeff er's approach in his lectures Creation and Fall shares many 
similarities with Barth except that for the early Bonhoeffer there is a certain 
dialectic73 of obedience and knowledge in discipleship rather than an ordering 
73 By'dialectic' we mean statements which may appear to be contradictory but which are only true 
when stated together; so Bonhoeffer sums up "only he who believes is obedient, and only he 
who is obedient believes", Cost of Discipleship, p. 69 
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of knowledge and obedience as with Barth. However the later Bonhoeffer 
appears to elevate obedience and loose such obedience from its Christological 
moorings, participation in Christ becoming a sharing in Christ's way of being for 
others. This ethical understanding of our participation in Christ lacks an 
awareness of human helplessness and sinfulness in our bondage to ourselves, 
both of which imply the inevitable hopelessness and impossibility of our being 
for others without that Other's liberating commitment to us in word and deed. 
Only in the light of that commitment in Christ can we truly grasp the appalling 
weakness and corruption of human beings apart from God, and simultaneously 
realise the beauty, truth and fulfilment of ourselves in being with and for God 
(and the implications thereof for our being with and for one another). But our 
appreciation of this commitment is at once a participation in God, a participation 
which is an integrated response of faith and action, without prejudice to some 
schematic a priori ordering of knowledge and ethics. Our appreciation is evoked 
by the Spirit, who alone provides the timely and appropriate opportunities for 
our free response to God's commitment in Christ to us. On the one hand such 
response may begin with love of our neighbours. Not all reach faith in God via 
this route however, and even the sheep of the Matthean parable on the sheep 
and the goats show surprise when they are told that in ministering to others they 
have served God. And if our participation remains at this level we are forever in 
danger of slipping back into the cor curvum in se. Rather, as Bonhoeffer 
recognised in his earlier work, we must discern that it is God within us who 
enables our movement towards one another, and from there appreciate this 
God who is already for us, already forgiving us, already renewing us. Only with 
this appreciation and an awareness of Christ's mediating influence can we 
embrace our human being for one another without appropriating destructive 
notions of independence, isolation and freedom that lead only to a sense of 
futility, despair and failure. On the other hand our response may begin with an 
awareness of God being for us, rooted for example in a true hearing of the 
Gospel, leading us to worship, praise and thanks. 
We mentioned how an understanding of participation as participation in the 
history of God's encounter with humanity in Jesus Christ provided a model for 
our participation which gives neither the noetic nor the ethical dimension a 
necessary priority. Forsyth's remarks on our sharing in the cross of Christ 
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provides a good example of what such participation entails; not a sharing in 
Christ's activity but the human response correspondent to that event and implicit 
within it, namely for Forsyth the confession of God's holiness, our gratitude and 
penitence, and a moral regeneration of conscience. (There is a trend in certain 
theologies which stress the suffering of God to see Christ as suffering with us in 
our suffering rather than we who are enabled through the Spirit to align our 
sufferings with those of Christ. The Biblical background suggests that we should 
stress the latter understanding (cf. Rom. 6: 3f, Gal. 2: 20, Rom. 8: 17,2 Cor. 1: 5-7 
etc. ) and this is in accord with a view of participation in God that seeks to root 
our lives in the history of Jesus Christ). If however this is the way of participation, 
then we must note that the history of Jesus Christ is a history which has 
included the establishment of that body which bears explicit witness to Jesus 
Christ, the church, that body of believers who trust faithfully in Christ's 
commitment to them through the Spirit as they seek to live by God's grace. 
Given God's promises in Christ to be with his people as they seek to live in this 
way, it would seem at least recalcitrant to seek to participate in God apart from 
the ecciesial community. Our participation in the history of Jesus Christ is about 
allowing our own history to be caught up in his so that, as we are enabled to 
relate to Him through the Spirit, our freedom becomes the freedom of 
obedience to Him, our knowledge becomes a knowledge of the Incarnate one 
and thereby a knowledge of the Triune God, our responsibility becomes a 
responsibility to one another and to God originating in the Father's being for the 
Son and God's being for others in Christ, our service of one another becomes 
our service of Christ and on behalf of Christ, our forgiveness becomes Christ's 
forgiveness of one another etc. 
Finally it should be noted that to participate in Christ in this way is not to forego 
a participation in the life of the triune God. Barth wrote of how the history of 
Jesus Christ was the external manifestation and repetition of the intra-divine 
history (see e. g. C. D. 111.2, p. 66), and while the notion of repetition might raise 
some problems, the linking in some way of the inner divine history with the 
history of Jesus Christ allows for an understanding of our participation in that 
history of Christ as being also a participation in the divine life of the Triune God. 
How this can be best understood remains to be answered. But before we turn to 
this question we must consider more closely, as promised at the end of our last 
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chapter, concrete ways in which participation in Christ is enabled and realised, 
and this will entail a more detailed discussion of sacraments and ecciesiology 
than we have undertaken so far. 
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7. PARTICIPATION AND SACRAMENTS 
Truly, truly, I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have 
no life in you... He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him (Jn. 6: 52,56). 
The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a participation in the blood of Christ? The bread which 
we break, is it not a participation in the body of Christ? (1 Cor. 10: 16). 
Scriptural texts such as these have long been used by scholars and 
Churchmen to give provenance to the centrality of sacramental activity in the 
church's life and such activity is described often, from St. Paul onwards, in terms 
of our participation. lrenaeus for example in arguing against certain Gnostic 
sects writes that 
Given that the cup which has been mixed and the bread that has been manufactured receive the 
Word of God and become the Eucharist - the body and blood of Christ - and that the substance of 
our flesh has grown and been strengthened out of these, how can they deny that the flesh which 
has been nourished by the body and blood of Christ, and is part of him, is capable of receiving 
God's gift of eternal life? 1 
While some scholars have rightly questioned the readiness with which it is 
sometimes assumed that it is the sacraments which are being referred to in key 
scriptural texts2, the fact is that the mainstream of churches have long regarded 
the sacraments as being a central part of their modus operandi, although the 
interpretation of quite what is going on in such activity has varied greatly. So far 
our study has tended to discuss in rather broad terms the nature of our 
participation in worship and service, in 'humble obedience' and 'correspondent 
love and freedom' and our interest here is in exploring the use of the notion of 
participation in understanding sacramental practice with a view to seeing how 
sacramental participation (and ecclesial life) gives us a concrete focus to our 
participation in God, and how this dimension fits with other dimensions of the 
notion (such as the ethical and the epistemological). Our discussion will 
concentrate on the sacraments of Baptism and Eucharist. 
1 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, V. 2.3, my italics. 
2 With John's Gospel for example the range of scholarship could be summarised in terms of four 
broad positions; 1) The FE was indeed a sacramentalist (e. g. O. Cullmann); 2) he was concerned 
to revise an understanding of the sacraments held in his day (e. g. C. K. Barrett); 3) not the 
evangelist but a later redactor is responsible for the sacramental passages in the gospel (e. g. 
R. Bultmann); and 4) there is no sacramental teaching in the gospel at all (e. g. C. H. Dodd). 
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7.1 Calvin and the Eucharist 
Our discussion of Calvin's understanding of the Eucharist provides a useful 
starting-point because, it will be recalled, Calvin wishes to retain a sense of 
deepening unity with God through Christ by sacramental acts but not in such a 
way as to undermine the efficacy of the person and work of Christ in realising 
our salvation, nor in such a way as to suggest that participation in Christ is an 
automatic benefit of sacramental practices. Calvin argues that "we maintain no 
other presence than that of a relationship". 3 For Calvin the Body of Christ 
remains at the right hand of the Father in heaven, interceding for us, underlining 
humanity's forgiveness and acceptability in Christ to God. Yet we do participate 
in this very Body in the Eucharist because the Spirit lifts us to heaven to 
participate in Christo. Calvin suggests a number of different purposes which the 
Eucharist serves, as we saw in Chapter 4, and in particular Calvin contrasts the 
embodied, material participation in the sacrament with the reception of 'mere 
knowledge'5. While we have seen that assurance of salvation and justification 
do not rest upon participation in the sacrament for Calvin, such participation 
brings with it benefits to our faith and a distinctive sense of our unity with Christ 
such that "by true partaking of him, his life passes into us and is made ours - just 
as bread when taken as food imparts vigour to the Body". 6 Further the fact that 
the way of this participation is contrasted with the way of "mere knowledge" 
indicates that Eucharistic participation, involving as it does, material, physical 
response, is profoundly more than intellectual assent. Calvin's remarks are not 
inconsistent with the view that authentic participation is wholistic, involving the 
whole person, mind, body and soul. 
7.2 Participation in Christ's Sacrifice 
Calvin points out at Institutes IV. xvii. 8 that the faithful are to open the bosom of 
their hearts to embrace the Eucharistic Lord, suggesting believers have an 
3 Institutes IV. xvii. 13 
4 "I hold that Christ is not present in the Supper in any other way than this - because the minds of 
believers (this being a heavenly act) are raised by faith above the world, and Christ, by the agency 
of his Spirit, removing the obstacle which distance of space might occasion, conjoins us with his 
members", see Calvin's A short Treatise on the Lord's Supper (1541), in Calvin's Tracts and 
Treatises(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), vol. 2, p. 280. 
5 Institutes IV. xvii. 5 
6 Institutes IV. xvii. 5 
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active part to play in participation in Christ. However this active role is not so 
much a participation in that which Christ does but in the benefits which Christ 
has achieved for us, so far as the Eucharist goes. This is a point of some 
moment because other Eucharistic theologians consider our part in the 
Eucharist to be much more than simply the reception of benefits long since 
achieved for us by Christ. For example Dom Gregory Dix in his historical 
analysis of the meaning of the Eucharist claimed that one can trace 
.. the gradual elaboration of a synthesis of all the main ideas about the Eucharist into a single 
conception, whose key-thought is that the 'action' of the earthly Church in the Eucharist only 
manifests within time the eternal act of Christ as the heavenly High-priest at the altar before the 
throne of God, perpetually pleading His accomplished and effectual sacrifice.? 
No new sacrifice is being offered but the same sacrifice as Christ offered in 
Himself is being offered in the Eucharist; "because the Eucharist is essentially 
an action and the church in doing that action is simply Christ's body performing 
His will, (so that) the Eucharistic action is necessarily His action of sacrifice, and 
what is offered must be what He off ered. "8 This argument depends partly for its 
force on a quite literal application of the `Body of Christ' phrase to the church, 
and Dix argues for the "physical truth" of the identification of church and the 
Body of Christ from the New Testament. 9 Passing over for now the propriety of 
such an identification, a major difficulty with this understanding of our 
participation in Christ's sacrifice is that it rests on little New Testament evidence, 
being bolstered only by some similar patristic interpretation. While we find clear 
evidence of the ascended Lord as the high priest continually interceding for us 
from the throne of grace in Hebrews, we find no such emphasis on Christ's on- 
going pleading of his sacrifice. Richardson notes that in the letter to the 
Hebrews 
Christ is seated in the seat of the Vizier, not standing in the posture and place of the suppliant. He 
intercedes for us, but with the effective power of the co-ruler seated on the right hand of the 
sovereign God. Because of what he has done in history there is no more offering for sin 
(10: 18). 10 
Besides this, the force of the contrast between Christ's 'once-for-all' sacrifice 
7 G. Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (Westminster: Dacre, 1945), p. 251 
8 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, p. 246 
9 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, p. 246 
10 A. Richardson, An Introduction to the theology of the New Testament (London: SCM, 1958), 
p. 202 
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and the daily sacrifices of the Aaronic priests at Heb. 7: 27 and Heb. 9-10 would 
be somewhat lost if the Christians' high priest was repeatedly offering His 
sacrifice. Again Christ's kingly rule and priestly intercession can be better 
interpreted as resting on the accepted, completed nature of his sacrifice; 
precisely because of the reconciliation with the Father effected through Christ's 
sacrifice, confirmed and accepted in the resurrection and ascension, the church 
is able to draw near in faith to the throne of grace, assured of the extraordinary 
privilege of access to God because of her high priest who has passed into the 
heavens. 11 In view of all this, the idea that we participate in Christ's ongoing 
pleading or indeed that Christ's pleading is ongoing all seems quite dubious. 
Perhaps the root difficulty here is one involving temporality. Is it simply the case 
that if the sacrificial death of Christ is now present in the Eucharist then this 
somehow devalues or disempowers the understanding of that sacrifice on the 
cross? Only if our Trinitarian God is constrained by the creaturely limitations of 
linear time. Instead of arguing for a sacrifice "presently operative by its effects'' 
in the Eucharist, Dix would have done better to assert that the Eucharist 
involves the Spirit relating us to that event in a manner granting a certain 
synchrony-in-diachrony, a kind of contemporaneity-across-time. The primary 
thrust here is not of the church contributing to the narrative of Christ's crucifixion 
and sacrifice but our entering into his narrative through the Spirit, a movement 
reconstituting ecclesial identity as (for example) no longer a despairing, 
purposeless, fearful group but (in the light of the 'completed' narrative of Jesus 
Christ), a hopeful, directed, loving body trusting in the (proleptically anticipated) 
promises of God. On this understanding the redemptive act of Christ on the 
cross is not reiterated but eternally active through the Spirit. This understanding 
assumes that the Triune God is not subject to creaturely time in the sense of 
past events being irredeemably past, and that in some sense in God past, 
present and future are at one. 12 
A second problematic area concerns the potential identification of the church's 
11 This argument is primarily scriptural, while the Anglo-Catholic argument ascribes more weight to 
a synthesis of scripture and patristic doctrine. It is however only with some considerable ingenuity 
that the Anglo-Catholic method can consistently coordinate patristic doctrine and scripture 
without allowing the latter to undermine the former. 
12 K. Barth writes of God's eternity as "pure duration", here "beginning, succession and end... do 
not fall apart", but 'between source, movement and goal there is no conflict but only peace". See 
his C. D. 11.1, pp. 608-640. 
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self-offering or sacrifice and that of Christ. It is one thing to respond to Christ's 
sacrifice in a self-sacrificial way, but quite another to regard our sacrifice as part 
of Christ's self-offering. Indeed the latter can only hold with the supposition that 
we completely identify church and Christ. However, as Aulen points out, 
.. 
it is true that nothing more important can be said of the Church than that it is the body of Christ, 
which implies that Christ identifies himself with his Church. But the profound truth of this 
statement does not permit us to turn around and say that the Church is Christ. If this last statement 
were valid, and if we thus identified the action of the Church with Christ's own action, we could 
without difficulty say that the Church offers Christ. The offering of the Church would then be 
identical with Christ's own sacrifice. But if the sacrifice made by Christ once for all is primary in 
relation to the Church, this identification becomes impossible. The sacrifice of Christ is and 
remains his own sacrifice, eternally valid, present in the Eucharist, but entirely his own, not the 
Church's sacrifice. 13 
It can still be argued that the church participates in Christ's sacrifice, if by this we 
mean that Christ's completed sacrifice is offered up to the Father by the church 
through the ministry of the priest, the church 'offering' that perfect sacrifice to the 
Father of which she is the beneficiary. The concept of sacrifice needs some 
unpacking here. We might note that the Israel of the O. T. used a variety of 
sacrificial practices and notions in a somewhat eclectic fashion; similarly "in the 
N. T. we find sacrificial concepts and language appropriated when they fit what 
Christ did and calls us to do, rejected when they do not, and if convenient 
transformed to make them fit". 14 Sacrifice came to be used by Christians in a 
way which involved 
... the giving over of oneself out of 
love... Over against the usual cultic separation of priest and 
offering there occurs here a decisive new interpretation: Jesus Christ worked redemption, in that 
he poured out his own blood; he is priest and offering at once. 15 
This entails a "... personalising of the notion of sacrifice: it is no longer a matter of 
13 G. Aulen, Eucharist and Sacrifice (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1958), p. 911. This need not entail a 
separation of God's agency from the church nor a pretence of ecclesial passivity. Rather, "when 
the church is understood with ontological seriousness as the risen Christ's body, an appropriate 
dialectic of identity and difference between God and the church must result. I an my body; yet I 
have my body. What my body does, I do; and yet I as subject must determine what my body shall 
do, and "in the flesh" have to struggle to make my body obey. Thus what the church does is done 
by Christ the Logos; and yet he is free over against his church and, indeed, so long as the church 
is in the flesh, must often reform his church". R. W. Jenson, Unbaptized God: The Basic Flaw in 
Ecumenical Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), p. 128. 
14 R. W. Jenson, Unbaptized God, p. 39 
15 Okumenisches Arbeitskreis evangelischer und katholischer Theologen, "Das Opfer Jesu 
Christi und der Kirche: Abschliessender Bericht, " Das Opfer Jesu Christi und seine Gegenwart in 
der Kirche, ed. K. Lehmann and E. Schlink (Freiburg: Herder, 1983), 4.1. 
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giving something, but of giving oneself. "16 The church's self-offering within the 
Eucharist is analogously and responsively sacrificial to that founding sacrifice of 
Christ and participates in that sacrifice by such self-offering, an offering which 
responds not only to the gift of Jesus' offering of himself to the Father but also 
the offering of communion with him. The Lutheran R. W. Jenson puts it well; 
Jesus' sacrificial act on the Cross is his giving of himself to the Father torus and inseparably his 
giving of himself to us in obedience to the Father. What he gives is therefore communion: our 
communion with him, and just so our communion with the Father and with one another. Just so 
again, the content of this encompassing communion is our sharing in Jesus' "own life and fate", 
which is to say, in his self-giving, his sacrifice. Precisely in that Jesus sacramentally gives himself to 
us in the bread and cup of the Eucharist, all these dialectics belong also to the event of the 
Eucharistic meal, of his giving the bread and cup and our receiving them. The sacrament of his 
self-giving to us incorporates us as a communion, as the church, precisely into the communion of 
his sacrifice of himself and of us to the Father. 17 
Again care is needed here that the church's salvation is not wrought by our 
good works performed with God's help (semi-Pelagianism); nothing is achieved 
by the church in terms of contributing to Christ's atoning work by this offering. 
Rather the emphasis needs to be on the church's receptivity and on the fact that 
the church's offering reminds the church not of her own contribution to her 
salvation but of her total focus on God's free gift of salvation, which free gift the 
church shows herself to be embracing by (for one thing) her Eucharistic 
thanksgivings and her self-offering to the Father through and because of 
Christ's self-offering. On this understanding our participation in Christ in the 
Eucharist is based on Christ's sacrifice rather than being a contribution to that 
sacrifice. Further, it is a correspondent and continuously dependent 
responsiveness to what Christ has done and who Christ continues to be for us. 
7.3 The Dynamic of Giving and Receiving 
Christ's sacrifice enables the church's sacrifice, a sacrifice which is a self- 
offering and an offering of symbolic gifts and praises which the church knows 
will be received by God in Christ. As Rowan Williams puts it 
.. we 
bring ourselves near to the altar of the cross as we come and offer our gifts - and we are 
encouraged to do so because the way is open through the flesh of Christ - and we are brought to 
the Father as we claim the fruition of the covenant proclaimed in the paschal event. Through the 
Spirit's work, the covenant is'renewed' in us, in our re-entry into the 'sanctuary' of Calvary. 18 
16 Ibid., 4.2.1. 
17 R. W. Jenson, Unbaptized God, p. 40. 
18R. Williams, Eucharistic Sacrifice - The Roots Of A Metaphor (Grove Liturgical Study No. 31, 
1982), p. 27 
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This interpretation of the church's sacrifice is significant because while it does 
not suggest that we contribute to the salvation wrought in Christ, it yet indicates 
one aspect of what it is to be the church growing into the salvation given in 
Christ, it is one dimension of that process of sanctification whereby the church 
becomes what she finally will be. In her self-offering the church in no way 
bargains with God but enters into that structure of giving and receiving, that 
system of communication, of eternal praise and activity of gratuitous love which 
the church sees in the offering of the Son to the Father. This self-offering, this 
giving, is already a receiving in terms of justification, access to God, the 
possibility of giving and the very gifts to give, so that the church participates in a 
dynamic of giving and receiving. The church shares the relationship of giving 
and receiving to and from the Father with Christ, although only sharing this 
relationship insofar as the church is in Christ. 
In relation to the notion of participation as involvement in the dynamic of giving 
and receiving the anthropologist J. Van Baal suggests that 
.. true giving is participating, participating 
in the life and work of the donee, participating in one's 
universe as a sympathizing member. No one can participate without giving first. Giving is essential 
for a meaningful existence. The simple food-offering set aside for the gods, the clumsy prayer 
before meals, and the give-and-take characteristic of mutual care in the small group, are the most 
real and effective means of communication, cementing togetherness and confirming security. All 
communication begins with giving, offering. 19 
Without giving, offering and sacrifice communication is not established (or else 
it remains a one-way street) and human beings remain enclosed within 
themselves. God's gift of Himself in his Son breaks in to that situation of 
enclosedness, demonstrating our value in His eyes and giving us a share, a 
participation in that eschatological life and world which is in communion with 
Him in Christ through the Holy Spirit. The church's giving is a giving back, a 
response to God's giftedness and an embracing of that share in the Kingdom of 
God. 20 T. F. Torrance captures the importance of our dependence on Christ in 
this Eucharistic dynamic, stressing that the Eucharist is "the sacrament of our 
19 J. Van Baal, "Offering, sacrifice and gift", in Numen vol. xxiii (1976), pp. 177-178 
20 J. Milbank demonstrates skillfully how the notions of receptivity and reciprocity are conditions 
for gift being gift, to the extent that "we participate in the trinitarian exchange such that the divine 
gift only begins to be as gift to us at all... after it has been received - which is to say returned with 
the return of gratitude and charitable giving-in-turn - by us". See his'Can a Gift be Given? 
Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic', Modern Theologyvol. 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1995), 
p. 136 
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continuous participation in Christ and all he has done and continues to do for us 
by. his grace, whereby we live unceasingly not from a centre in ourselves or our 
own doing but from a centre in Christ and his doing". 21 
It is however not just the human beings who belong to the church which the 
church offers up in the Eucharist for participation in Christ, nor is it the whole of 
humanity but rather the whole of creation is offered back to the Father through 
Christ. John Zizioulas makes much of this point, arguing that the human being is 
the representative of creation who in his priestly action refers creation back to 
God the Creator at the anaphora. 22 Here the human being links God and the 
world in a way which can redeem creation's being-unto-death which is there 
because "the world having come out of nothing and being penetrated by it does 
not possess any means in its nature whereby to overcome nothingness". In 
priestly action the human being links creation with the only eternal and immortal 
being through whom it can survive, God. The place of Christ in this priestly 
action becomes clear once we understand that Christ did what Adam failed to 
do, that Christ as the embodiment and anakephalaiosis of all creation, the 
human being par excellence and Saviour of the world, provided the model of 
our proper relation to the world, the priest of creation, by referring himself and 
creation in himself to the Father, liberating creation from its subjection to death 
and enabling it to be as it was meant to be. (On our understanding then our 
participation in Christ's priesthood mentioned earlier is partly about this 'lifting- 
up' of creation and therefore one aspect of our participation in God). Zizioulas 
goes on: 
On the basis of this belief, we forma community which takes from this creation certain elements 
(the bread and the wine) which we offer to God with the solemn declaration "Thine own of thine 
own we offer unto Thee', thus recognizing that creation does not belong to us but to God, who is 
its only'owner'. By so doing we believe that creation is brought into relation with God and not only 
is it treated with the reverence that befits what belongs to God, but it is also liberated from its 
natural limitations and is transformed into a bearer of life. We believe that in doing this'in Christ', 
we, like Christ, act as priests of creation. When we receive these elements back, after having 
referred them to God, we believe that because of this reference to God we can take them back 
and consume them no longer as death but as life. 23 
21 T. F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Exeter: Paternoster, 1983), p. 101- 
22 J. Zizioulas, 'Preserving God's Creation. Three Lectures on Theology and Ecology', King's 
Theological Review 12 (1989), pp. 4-5 
23 Zizioulas, 'Preserving God's Creation', Iectr III (1990), p. 5 One quibble we have with this 
statement is that in saying "we like Christ" Zizioulas fails to stress sufficiently the fact that it is 
Christ's priesthood alone on which we depend, and to speak of human priesthood is to speak of 
participation in the vicariously given and perfect priesthood of Christ. 
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Zizioulas' thought is of considerable interest because in terms of the language 
of participation, it becomes clear that the redemption of creation depends on 
participation in the life of God through the mediating influence of the human 
being in Christ, a participation looked forward to and yet at the same time most 
clearly actualised in the Eucharistic anaphora. It should be noted however that 
Zizioulas does not speak of participation but of communion (for reasons we will 
explore later), and he suggests if 
.. communion is the only way for truth to exist as life, then nature which possesses neither 
personhood nor communion "groans and is in travail" in awaiting the salvation of man, who can set 
it within the communion-event offered in Christ. Man's responsibility is to make a Eucharistic reality 
out of nature, i. e. to make nature, too, capable of communion. 24 
7.4 Baptism 
If in the Eucharist we must take care to distinguish Christ's atoning sacrifice from 
our sacrifice and understand our participation as based upon and responsive to 
Christ's person and work, then we must exercise similar care in understanding 
our baptism in relation to Christ. If the life, death, resurrection and ascension of 
Christ become the ground for our participation in Christ, how are we to 
understand Paul's remarks that all of us who have been baptised into Christ 
Jesus were baptised into his death? "We were buried therefore with him by 
baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the 
Father, we too might walk in newness of life. " (Rom. 6: 3-4). What Paul does not 
imply by this is that Christ's baptism and the dynamic of events concerning his 
life are merely exemplary for us. It seems rather that baptism is the seal of our 
being incorporated into that dynamic whereby our salvation was wrought for us. 
Baptism is not even primarily a decision or response by a believer here so 
much as a symbol of God's initiative and proactive work of redemption and faith 
is a fruit of this redemptive work. The corporate dimension should be 
highlighted here for "by one spirit we were all baptised into one body" (1 Cor. 
12: 12); baptism places us in the community of the Spirit and it is the faithful 
community who in the power of the Spirit brings new members in to the 
community through baptism. There is a sense in which the community believes 
'on behalf of' the baptismal candidate, a notion which retains the primacy of 
God's saving initiative towards the baptismal candidate prior to the candidate's 
24 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 119 
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faithful response and which also points to the community's responsibility to 
nurture and support the newly baptised person into appropriate responsiveness 
to the salvific grace of God in Christ. This does not mean that the baptised 
person can gradually come 'to stand on his own two feet' apart from the church, 
because baptismal identity and appropriate responsiveness include being a 
part of that interdependent body which serves and is served by other members. 
Neither does the community operate in place of the Holy Spirit; the community 
is defined by its relation to the Spirit and is truly itself as it mediates God's Spirit 
through appropriate relationships within itself and 'between' itself and the 
'world'. 
Baptism is the point of entry into the church and incorporation into the Body of 
Christ. It can be understood further as the beginning of our participation in 
Christ where participation is understood as activity based on a prior receptivity 
to God's salvific action25 and which involves ethical, ecclesial and sacramental 
dimensions26 Baptism is the church's response to God's promise in Christ to 
bind himself to his faithful people because in baptism the church acknowledges 
that being embedded in a community which Christ indwells enables 
relationship with God in Christ to be realised, epistemologically combining 
knowledge about and knowledge by acquaintance, ontologically affirming a 
network and pattern of relationships centred on Christ, worshipfully and 
ethically oriented by and on the person of Christ. Further, by baptism we not 
only enter into membership of the church, but also begin to participate in the 
church's reality as a visible, historical sign of God's grace in Christ. Rahner 
explains that the church enables 
.. the grace of 
God (to) be present in the world as an event, as an ongoing event with historical 
tangibility and with incarnational corporeality. Anyone who receives grace in baptism by being 
25 As T. F. Torrance puts it, "Baptism is the sacrament of our once and for all participation in Christ, 
and may be spoken of as the Sacrament of Justification, which is not to be repeated". Space, 
Time and Resurrection (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1976), p. 150. Further, ".. the Reality of our baptism 
is to be found in the objective reality of what has already been accomplished for us in Jesus Christ 
and is savingly operative in us through the union and communion with Christ effected by the 
Spirit". Theology in Reconstruction, p. 94 
26 A question arises here concerning the place of those unbaptised but impressive individuals 
such as Gandhi; do those such as he participate in God in any sense? One might argue "possibly, 
but only partially, in an ethical but not ecclesial or sacramental sense". But all participation is 
"partial" in one sense or another and the concept of participation is designed in part to bring 
together the various dimensions of our relational existence with one another and God. Given this, 
the primary practical application of 'participation' is not as a means of reaching conclusions 
concerning the eschatological status of the likes of Gandhi but as a tool for self-criticism in 
assessing where discipleship of Christ is partial. 
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incorporated into the Church... necessarily receives along with the grace of the Church a share in, 
and the mandate and capacity for participating in, this function of the Church to be the historical 
tangibility of God's grace in the world. 27 
Participation in Christ is not to be understood here as an automatic benefit of 
baptism but an ongoing process, which process is acknowledged as depending 
entirely on God's prevenient graciousness in Christ at baptism and which 
develops as the new member of the church embraces this graciousness and 
responds to the call to be that which s/he is called to be in Christ. 
7.5 Sacramental Causality 
It is worthwhile reflecting for a moment on the ways in which Baptism (and the 
Eucharist) are effective of our participation in Christ. It is important that baptism 
(and indeed the Eucharist) are not understood in terms suggesting that they 
'cause' a particular relationship between God and the recipient in some sort of 
impersonal or automatic way, as if by executing certain acts with certain words 
we would thereby realise God's grace. Against such a view we would stress 
(with Calvin) the sovereign freedom of God and also the understanding of the 
sacraments as not so much an isolated means of grace but a concrete way of 
presenting the grace of God in Christ which 'brings home' the truth, reality and 
actuality of the gospel of salvation. (And this' bringing home to us' is not 
narrowly intellectual, but material, palpable and tactile, as Calvin noted). The 
reality of Christ's atoning work is presented and received in the sacramental 
acts but this giving and receiving of which the sacramental acts are loci is based 
on the completed act of God in Christ, incarnation, death, resurrection and 
ascension. God's promises of grace are made present in the sacrament 
because God binds Himself freely and faithfully to these promises in the 
sacraments in such a way as for the sacraments to be signs, seals and 
guarantees of those promises. While this gives an 'objective' pole to 
sacramental actions, an existential or subjective pole is still present because 
God's gift requires acceptance, the faithful receptivity of the believer. 
One problem potentially created by such an understanding of the sacraments 
as signs, seals and guarantees of God's promises is that it would seem in 
danger of depersonalising sacramental activity, as if sacramental life involved 
27 K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith (London: DLT 1978), p. 416 
179 
the cashing of I. O. U's, promises written by God to us and realised as legal 
tender through the processes of sacramental celebration. To offset this danger 
we might juxtapose a second way of understanding the sacraments, 
complementary to the first, which more precisely stresses the personal 
becoming present of God in Christ through the Spirit and our personal 
response. God's presence is assured, a presence we are enabled to realise by 
the Spirit who relates us to the risen ascended Lord, but it remains for us to be 
truly with God. The sacramental act focuses us on God, just as our prayer life 
and other ecclesial activities seek to focus us more intently on God, and the 
appropriate response then of the recipient is attentiveness, to be truly with God 
rather than merely being alongside God, or beside God like a chair is next to a 
table. As G. Marcel puts it, albeit in a different context, we can 
.. have a very strong feeling that somebody who is sitting in the same room as ourselves, sitting 
quite near us, someone whom we can look at and listen to and whom we could touch if we wanted 
to make a final test of his reality, is nevertheless more distant from us than some loved one who is 
perhaps thousands of miles away or perhaps, even, no longer among the living. We could say that 
the man sitting beside us was in the same room as ourselves, but that he was not really present 
there, that his presence did not make itself felt. 28 
Sacraments do not specify a presence of God which is any the less real outside 
of sacramental activity but they do provide concrete ways of focusing on and 
relating to that presence, ways which trust faithfully in God's promises to be so 
present to His people. 
It might seem as if `receptionism' is lurking in the background here with the 
attendant danger, highlighted by some scholars, of a divorcing of spiritual reality 
and outward sign. 29 While it is true that the gift of God's grace can be set at 
nought (temporarily at least) by the faithless recipient, this is not because we 
play a semi-Pelagian part in enabling the sacraments to work but because God 
in his freedom has given us the space to receive his promises as presented to 
us. If the model is one of promise/ratification, gospel/sacrament, then it is not so 
much a question of an objective divorcing of spiritual reality and outward sign 
as the faithless participant being able to divorce the two. Neither does a stress 
on the existential reception of the believer necessarily drive a wedge between 
faith as some 'inward phenomenon' and its 'external manifestation' in good 
28 G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1, 'Reflection and Mystery' (London: Harvill, 1950), p. 177 
29 See for example O. C. Quick, The Christian Sacraments (London: Nisbet, 1932), p. 213 
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works. What we believe is understood not simply from what we intuitively 
comprehend or feel but also from what we say, from what we do, from our 
obedience. The sacramental acts themselves are not to be devalued in favour 
of some interior measure of faithfulness because the sacramental acts are part 
of the mode of our faithfulness, expressing our obedience. If more attention was 
paid to the faithfulness involved in obediently receiving the sacraments perhaps 
there would be less anxiety in certain quarters about whether there has been a 
'worthy' reception or not. 
This of course raises the whole debate concerning the relationship between 
external rites and their performance and intentionality and interior orientation. 
Paul is in no doubt of a distinction it seems when he writes to the church at 
Corinth that whoever 
.. eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of profaning the body and blood of the Lord... For any one who eats and drinks without discerning the body eats 
and drinks judgment on himself (1 Cor. 12: 27-29). 
Earlier in the same letter Paul makes it clear that to take part in ceremonies 
where food is offered to idols and pagan sacrifices is to forego authentic 
participation in the Eucharist; "You cannot partake of the table of the Lord and 
the table of demons" (1 Cor. 11: 21). It is not enough simply to go through the 
motions of the Eucharist without consideration of one's interior disposition and 
without reflection on activities which may sit uncomfortably with this action. (In 
connection with this we should recall how in the synoptic tradition Jesus flags 
up the importance of inward disposition in terms of ethical action, as when he is 
recorded as identifying the heart as the source of human defilement (Mk. 7: 21- 
3) and when he sees a prior adultery in the heart which is forbidden no less 
than the act of adultery (Mt. 5: 28)). However, it is a big step from these remarks 
to concluding that 
.. the outward represents the inward, and the 
inward which is represented is far higher than the 
outward which represents it; therefore while the inward is essentially necessary for the reality of 
the outward, the outward is only conventionally necessary for the reality of the inward. 30 
Indeed we would question those who ascribe such importance to the distinction 
between inward and outward. Paul is not drawing attention primarily to the 
30 R. C. Moberly, Ministerial Priesthood (London: John Murray, 1897), p. vi 
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distinction between inward disposition and outward activities in criticising the 
Corinthians but rather attacking the inconsistencies of their practices; to partake 
of the body and the blood is to be part of the Body of Christ and this has 
ecclesial and ethical as well as sacramental implications for Paul. These 
implications are flouted by those who persist in pagan practices and thus they 
cut themselves off from the Body of Christ. Again in the synoptic accounts Jesus' 
target is often those who do not practice what they preach, those whose 
outward displays are not part of a person's living relation to God but which are 
self-delusory, hypocritical and self-serving. The plea is not to adjust inward 
disposition so that outward acts automatically bear good fruit, but that attention 
be paid to the inconsistency of espousing relationship to the Father while yet 
speaking, thinking and acting in the manner in which they do. Besides all this, 
how is one to know what another is thinking except on the basis of their acts? 
And is not speaking an 'outward' act? The myth of some Cartesian inner me 
which reveals itself to the outside world at certain points in time may often be 
lurking behind much of the 'inward/outward' debate. The sacramental acts of 
participation in the body and blood of Christ are part and parcel of what it is to 
be the Body of Christ, acts whereby the promises of Christ are to be received 
but acts which must in no way be separated from the ecclesial and ethical 
components of being 'in Christ' and belonging to the Body of Christ. 
7.6 Communion and Participation 
Coming back to the issue of sacramental participation, one of the difficulties 
some scholars have with the idea of sacramental participation in Christ is that it 
is assumed that "participation always presupposes a given, fixed and 
permanent reality in which we participate, whereas the Body of Christ is 
constantly constituted anew in the Spirit". 31 This is one reason why scholars 
such as Zizioulas prefer to speak of "communion" rather than participation. 
However it should be clear that we have not been suggesting a participation in 
Christ in such a Platonic fashion but rather a dynamic involvement and sharing 
in the life of Christ's body, the church. The manner of Christ's taking form among 
us needs to be given some attention if we are to unpack what we mean by 
speaking of the church as the Body of Christ here. Rather than saying that the 
31 J. Zizioulas, The Church as the Mystical Body of Christ. (Unpublished paper given at a Research 
Seminar at King's College, London, Spring 1993). 
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Body of Christ is constantly constituted anew in the Spirit by the Eucharistic 
event, a line of thinking which does not seem to escape the charge of 
occasionalism, we must reflect upon the Spirit's ongoing relationship to Christ 
which is the source of Christ's being who he is and which is a sustained and 
sustaining relationship throughout Christ's life, not a series of events which 
constitutes Christ again and again. Similarly the church as the Body of Christ is 
sustained by a constant relationship to the Spirit, a relationship which enables 
the church's participation in the constitution of Christ among us, insofar as the 
service of the church, its sacramental devotions, worship, actions, relationships, 
obedience and witness allow Christ to take form in the church. Occasionalism is 
avoided in that the Spirit is always (though freely) bound to the church (and the 
church ever remains that place where God promises to be present in Christ 
through the Spirit), and the church is the Body of Christ in so far as she 
participates in the constitution of Christ in the world. None of this is to suggest 
that God cannot act in other ways in which the presence and activity of Christ 
through the Spirit is realised in the world, but the church is that public, concrete 
grouping where God has promised to be present in Christ through the Spirit. 
The church has the awesome responsibility to ensure that it does not hinder this 
presence. Neither does this line of thought necessarily suggest that the church 
is only sometimes the Body of Christ; the Spirit is always bound to the church 
but the way of God presenting himself can vary. The church here is actually 
participating in the Spirit's work of constituting Christ, as well as participating in 
Christ as it allows itself to be constituted by the Spirit in a manner which 
enables it to be the Body of Christ in the world. Thus, on our understanding, 
participation is not in some given fixed and permanent reality, but it is 
participation in the dynamic of permanent relationships, and in particular our 
stress here is on the dynamics of the Spirit's relationship to Christ, in which we 
participate as Christ is constituted as the church. 
7.7 Eschatoloqy and History 
This way of understanding participation in God allows us to grasp better the 
eschatological dimension of the Eucharistic act. John Zizioulas argues that the 
Eucharist is that moment in the Church's life where the anticipation of the eschata takes place. 
The anamnesis of Christ is realised not as a mere reenactment of a past event but as an anamnesis 
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of the future, as an eschatological event. In the Eucharist the Church becomes a reflection of the 
eschatological community of Christ, the Messiah, the image of the Trinitarian life of God. In terms 
of human existence... the transcendence of all divisions, natural and social... 32 
For Zizioulas the church draws its identity from the future, she " is what she is by 
becoming again and again what she will be". 33 The trouble with this approach is 
that it so focuses the eschaton on the Eucharist that the temptation is simply to 
see one's faith in terms of Eucharistic celebration without and apart from any 
sense of the social, moral or missiological aspects of obedient faithfulness. Paul 
McPartlan, in his comparison of the Eucharistic thought of De Lubac and 
Zizioulas, observes that 
.. the evidence suggests, paradoxically, that when 
history brought to its completion is so 
resolutely seen as the reality dominating history, something essential to the very drive of history 
towards its completion is lost. He (Zizioulas) must, therefore, explain in more detail than he has so 
far that this is not necessarily so and that, far from rendering history redundant, the Eucharistic 
inbreaking of the eschaton provides the vital means whereby, as the flow of history continues, 
Christians can discern what is truly of God and build upon it. 34 
If we see the Eucharist as being one way in which the church participates in the 
Spirit's relationship to Christ by realising itself as the Body of Christ (a 
realisation based on Christ's self-offering which enables the church to present 
itself as the Body of Christ to the Father), then we retain the eschatological 
dimension of the Eucharist where all things are gathered up into one in Christ. 
However there are implications of this Eucharistic self- real i sation35, namely that 
the church is the Body of Christ in the world, in service, witness, proclamation 
and mission. In this way the historical church does not determine the nature of 
the eschaton but becomes an instrument of its permeation of history, as others 
are brought to Christ and the Father's will is done. The Eucharist is a focus of 
the church's eschatological identity which empowers her to be even now what 
she will be. But if the church will finally be the Body of Christ which it celebrates 
and realises itself as being in the Eucharist, where is the motivation to take 
32 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 254 
33 Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in Orthodox Tradition' in One in Christ 24 (1988), p. 301 
34 P. McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church, Henri De Lubac and John Zizioulas in Dialogue 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), p. 299 
35 The term "Self-realisation" is meant to echo Macquarrie's point that the Eucharistic unifying of 
past, present and future parallells the constitution of the self; "it is the realization in a particularly 
intense way of the dimensions of temporality; and since it is this unity which constitutes self hood, 
then we can make the further claim that worship is creative of selfhood". See his Principles of 
Christian Theology (London: SCM, 1966), p. 435 
184 
history seriously? The motivation rests in love, in being the loving Body of 
Christ, in being that Body which is concerned for its members and those beyond 
itself, in seeking to bring the lost back to God, in seeking to serve the humanity 
for which Christ died, in seeking to participate in the Spirit's ongoing work of 
sanctification. (And the sacraments are a vital component of the church's life 
here, because as the Spirit acts through the church's sacramental activities new 
members of the church are incorporated, fellow members of the Body of Christ). 
The urgency and motivation is one of love, but it is one of love for sinners. The 
potency of sin is such that the possibility remains that sin can place us outside 
of the Body of Christ in the course of history, and history remains the arena for 
the conflict between the fallen world and the eschatological church, the Body of 
Christ. While in a sense the eschaton entered history in the incarnation and 
determined our standing before the Father through the salvation wrought in 
Christ, nevertheless our reception of this salvation in time is the space afforded 
by nature of the personal relationship each human being has with God. History 
is the opportunity for participation in the Body of Christ and the space given to 
us to respond to God's free gift and if we truly have this space then, 
hypothetically at least, we may refuse God's grace. On this understanding it 
becomes clear that the church must engage seriously with history, as the Body 
of Christ which loves and seeks the well-being of sinners within and without 
herself. Even in the Eucharist this must happen, as we refuse the temptation to 
live from ourselves, as we live from God's grace in Christ, as we recognise 
men's hostility to God, the ways in which we corrupt ourselves and God's 
message, as we acknowledge and embrace God's forgiveness and promises, 
reassured that even though we have pushed God away from us we have not 
forfeited the possibility of new life, as we consume the elements of new life 
resolutely and thankfully. 
Perhaps Zizioulas is unable to take history sufficiently seriously because he 
does not dwell on human sinfulness. In any case he reveals his anxieties about 
the significance of history when he writes that 
I agree with the view that the incarnation introduces eschatology into history but this does not 
mean that the eschatological God has been enclosed by history. The eschaton must be allowed 
to reaffirm itself anew, and this is the essence of the Eucharist as I understand it. Otherwise the 
eschaton does not determine history but history captures the eschaton. 36 
36 J. Zizioulas, 'Eschatology and History' in Whither Ecumenism?, T. Wieser (ed. ) (Geneva: World 
Council of Churches, 1986), p. 73 
185 
However we would resist talk of the 'determination' of history by the eschaton or 
of history 'capturing' the eschaton, as if one must control the other. The 
eschaton became history in Jesus Christ, this historical person showing in his 
person that destiny to which human beings (and all creation through human 
beings) are called in him. This person has bound himself through the Holy Spirit 
to the church so that, in the concrete, public fact and act of the church the 
eschaton appears as the church properly responds to this binding by being the 
Body of Christ. This is not to say that the eschaton determines history, in that the 
church can and has shown often enough that she has acted in ways at odds 
with the vision of humanity and the Kingdom which Christ sets before her. But 
neither is it to say that history captures the eschaton because as the church 
allows herself to be the Body of Christ she realises her eschatological reality, 
participation in Christ here being primarily a historical receptivity to the 
eschaton rather than an active moulding of its content or shape. 37 (This 
historical receptivity is only to be logically distinguished from the concrete 
obedience which overlays it, the danger being that a temporal disjunction can 
create the possibility of ethical quietism once more or Bonhoeffer's 'cheap 
grace'. ) This receptivity together with the inextricable obedience which is 
implied by it make up the church's participation in Christ, a participation which is 
also a participation in the Spirit as we have seen. This historical receptivity is 
not to be thought of as standing over or against the eschaton but rather, as in 
the Eucharist, is to be considered part of the space afforded to relate to the 
eschaton. 
7.8 Further Reflections on the Ontology of Participation 
We have suggested an understanding of our participation in God which 
involves our participation in the relationship between the Spirit and Christ, 
participating in the constitution of Christ in so far as the church becomes the 
Body of Christ in the world and participating in Christ in so far as the church is 
the Body of Christ in the world, led by the Spirit and oriented towards our Father 
37 At an individual level this can be related to the way in which, as they conform to the will of God in 
Christ, Christians become aware that "this is how it was meant to be", and that here it is God who is 
making us rather than us building our way to perfectedness. Even so, at a secondary level it would 
seem that individuals may be able to mould the content of the eschaton actively in so far as there 
is the possibility that individuals can exclude themselves from the Kingdom. 
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and Creator. This idea of 'participating in the constitution of Christ in the world' 
needs some teasing out however because it is not as yet clear what we mean 
when we suggest that the church is the Body of Christ. In particular is this 
participation functional, ontological or both? In other words are we participating 
in Christ in that we do as he would do, or do we participate in Christ because 
we are in some sense Christ? Our answer to this question depends upon an 
assumption of ontology (mentioned previously) as involving three interrelated 
dimensions, what we are, the way we are and that we are. The church is that 
place where the 'what' of our being in Christ is recognised (hopefully) and 
where human beings seek to live in accordance with that being in Christ. To 
speak of the church being the Body of Christ ontologically is accurate in that 
relationship to Christ bears ontological weight and has immediate implications 
for our way of being (as the church seeks through the Spirit to conform to that 
which she is in Christ and will be eschatologically). However there is still room 
here for the church either to realise or not to realise herself as the Body of Christ 
in terms of the way of her being in the world, so that functionally the church may 
or may not realise temporally that which she is in relation to Christ through the 
Spirit. The functioning of the church is one aspect of the ontology of the church, 
her way of being, so that we can argue for a participation of the church which is 
both ontological and functional. Even if the church is not functioning in a 
manner appropriate to her being the Body of Christ, one dimension of her 
ontological participation is retained as God remains freely bound to her. 
(Individualism is avoided here. The conforming of the way of our being to the 
what of our being is essentially the task not of an individual but of the whole 
community in which the individual is set, because that conformation involves the 
entire spectrum of the individual's relations within the community. ) 
Notice that this approach guards against a purely ontological participation, or a 
purely functional participation, or a participation which simply identifies the 
functional and the ontological. The danger with seeing our participation in 
Christ as purely ontological is that it suggests that the church is Christ in a way 
which confuses the church's contemporary and eschatological states and which 
flies in the face of much of the historical church's un-Christlikeness. Further, it 
hands over to men the grace of God and the sovereign Lord of the church 
stands in danger of being perceived as under the church's control. God is not 
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bound to the church in a way which ontologically identifies Christ and His body 
but is bound to the Church in Christ through the Spirit, a binding which has 
ontological implications for the church which fall short of ontological 
identification with her Lord. 38 On the other hand, the danger with understanding 
the church's participation in Christ in purely functional terms (so that the church 
participates in Christ in so far as she does that which Christ would do in her 
place) is the danger of Pelagianism; without an undergirding relationship to 
Christ of ontologically transforming significance here the church is left being that 
institution which, through her imitation of Christ participates in Christ and is 
subsequently sanctified. In opposition to this view, sanctification must be more 
closely tied to justification (as argued in earlier chapters), and both more closely 
tied to the person and work of Christ, so that the church's participation in Christ 
is understood as a responsive activity dependent on relationship to the 
incarnate, crucified, risen and ascended Lord. 
Why then is an identification of the functional and the ontological not an 
appropriate way forward? If the ontological reduces to the functional, then we 
are what we do and the dangers just highlighted above loom large. If the 
functional reduces to the ontological then what we do is simply a result of who 
we are, which stands in danger of stifling the space required for there to be 
authentically personal relations of giving and receiving between human beings 
and God. Different theologians may err to one of these two poles in their work. 
Zizioulas for example manages, for example to place "the entire matter of 
Ordination outside the dilemma of choosing between ontological and 
functional", because for Zizioulas, as McPartlan notes "to have an (ontological) 
ecclesial identity is to have a (functional) relationship and role, here and now, 
... 
". What McPartlan fails to notice and what a close analysis of Zizioulas' 
thought reveals is that Zizioulas so stresses the functional as to stand in danger 
of the way of being becoming determinative of the what of being. In other words 
the ontological is reduced to the functional, the functional being given so much 
ontological weight as to suggest that if our way of being is identified with God's 
38 Some Orthodox conceptions of the church as the Body of Christ seem to reverse the fact that 
the church is the Body of Christ and see the Body of Christ as being the church. So Zizioulas for 
example argues both that the church "has no hypostasis of her own but draws her identity from 
Christ and the Kingdom to come"( p. 302) and that Christ's identity is "dependent on the 
existence of the Church"(p. 303). We would want to distance ourselves from statements akin to 
the latter while agreeing with the radical dependence of the ecclesial community on the person of 
Christ for ecclesial fruitfulness. See J. Zizioulas, 'The Mystery of the Church in Orthodox Tradition'. 
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ecstatic way of being by our way of being we can transcend all creaturely 
limitations. Rather, we should see our way of being as in some sense catching 
up with what we have become in relation to Christ, a catching up which we can 
understand in terms of a progressive participation in Christ through the Holy 
Spirit, a catching up which is initiated, enabled and completed 
(eschatologically) by the Spirit. Such a view has ontological implications for 
participation in God which suggests neither a devaluing of the person and work 
of Christ, nor a Pelagianising theology. 
How then are we to understand the church as the Body of Christ? We are to 
understand by this that the church stands in intimate relation to Christ through 
the Holy Spirit, a relationship which has ontological implications for the church 
(because of the transformed relations to the persons of the Trinity which the 
church now has) and which enables the church's (functional) Christlikeness in 
the world. Participation in Christ involves sharing in this being the Body of 
Christ, a sharing which develops by 'degrees' in terms of our way of being as 
we more closely conform to Christ, or, better, as Christ takes form in us. Paul 
does not separate the ecclesial, ethical and sacramental components of the 
Body of Christ and we should keep all three closely tied in our understanding of 
participation. To participate in Christ while neglecting any one of these stands in 
danger of imbalancing the notion of participation entirely. For example without 
the Christological foundation our participation might reduce to winning salvation 
for ourselves, offering our own sacrifice at the Eucharist for example. Without 
the ecclesial dimension our participation can become simply my participation, 
an individualistically conceived relationship to God lacking the horizontal 
dimension (which is of ontological significance as Christ is mediated to one 
another through these relations and because who we are is forged, in part, by 
our relationships) and leading to ethical indifference. Besides, if we accept that 
the church has been promised God's abiding, faithful support and guidance 
(and that its continued existence indicates this) then it would seem somewhat 
recalcitrant to seek relatedness to God by other means. Without the sacramental 
dimension a concrete focus to our participation which is grounded in God's 
initiative in Christ and ecciesially embedded is lacking. The sacraments of 
baptism and the Eucharist draw out the nature of participation as response to 
God's prior initiative, obedient faithful response, joyful self-giving and thankful 
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worship rooted in our justification before God and they are part of the process of 
our sanctification as we continue to realise God's grace in Christ and right 
responsiveness to that grace. Further, the material, bodily nature of this kind of 
participation reminds us usefully of the wholistic nature of participation in 
involving the human being in his/her totality. 
Sacramental participation is also in a sense participation in the Trinity because 
in her self-offering the church enters into that structure of giving and receiving, 
that system of communication, of eternal praise and activity of gratuitous love 
which the church sees in the offering of the Son to the Father. An interpretation 
of the church's sacrifice as respondent self-offering in service, praise and 
thanksgiving does not suggest that we contribute to the salvation wrought in 
Christ, but it indicates one aspect of what it is to be the Church growing into the 
salvation given in Christ, it is one dimension of that process of sanctification 
whereby the Church becomes what she finally will be. To argue that one could 
find other foci such as meditation or social activism is acceptable in that being 
the Body of Christ involves both prayer and moral action. It is unacceptable as 
an argument however if such activities were suggested as a replacement for 
sacramental participation because it would seem to involve a wilful neglect of 
particular concrete means instituted by God in Christ by which our faith is 
quickened and our participation deepened. 
This argument brings us back to sacramental participation and in particular the 
provenance of such participation. The argument may seem to depend for its 
force on the assumption that our Lord did indeed institute the Eucharist and 
baptism as sacramental acts incorporating human beings more deeply into 
himself through the Spirit. While this assumption is one which the mainstream of 
Biblical scholars accept, some theologians prefer not to leave themselves 
hostages to the fortunes of Biblical exegesis. Our position does not stand or fall 
by the authenticity of the words of institution, however, because one can 
understand the church's interpretation and response to the scriptural testimony 
as one including sacramental activities, activities which are faithful to the wider 
implications of the Biblical record than merely the words of institution in living by 
God's grace, embracing salvation in Christ, celebrating the forgiveness of sins, 
appreciating our new-found status before God and participating in that dynamic 
190 
of giving and receiving which is found at the heart of Jesus' relation to his 
Father. 
But which ecclesial communities are authentic? Where is God binding Himself 
to the gathered faithful and where is genuine participation in God happening? 
These questions find their place in the wider context of ecumenical debate in 
the late twentieth century. This debate has embraced concepts such as 
koinonia and participation, terms which appear able to admit of degrees and 
allow such as the Second Vatican Council generously to admit that between the 
Roman Catholic Church and other communions 'a certain but imperfect 
communion exists'. 39 Without entering into a detailed discussion of the 
contemporary state of this debate we might note that our understanding of 
participation allows for a legitimate diversity in ecclesial communities without 
defining explicit, rigid boundaries to legitimate diversity. 40 Certain parameters 
are implicit however. Non-Trinitarian conceptions of God would make 
conceiving of participation in God in the way in which we have understood it 
well-nigh impossible; participation which is not a synthesis involving for 
example communal, liturgical and ethical dimensions falls well short of the kind 
of communion we are proposing; communities denying the radical (and on- 
going) dependence of the church on its transcendental and foundational Lord 
empty participation of one of its key components; patterns of life and service 
which contrast sharply with the stable frame of reference for discipleship 
discerned against the historical background of scripture, tradition, interpretation 
and experience are at least questionable as genuine participation in the tasks 
and purposes of God. 
Our analysis of sacramental participation carries with it certain implications for 
sacramental ontology. We are not viewing the Eucharist or baptism simply as 
"events of communion"; to do so lends itself to a number of difficulties. To speak 
39 Unitas Redintegratio, 3 
40 S. Wood writes that "the spiritual reality of koinonia consists in the invisible spiritual presence 
and action of the Spirit dwelling within the faithful. Since the mediatory vehicles of koinonia effect 
participation in the Trinitarian life, they effect a communion that is deeper than common belief or 
common activity. Various ecclesial traditions tend to place different emphasis on the importance of 
these visible structures. For example one could trace a continuum from those traditions 
emphasising visible elements of koinonia to those emphasising an invisible action of the Spirit.. 
All would affirm the presence of koinonia within their tradition, even though the forms it takes 
varies. " See her "Ecclesial Koinonia in Ecumenical Dialogues", One in Christ, vol. 30, no. 2,1994, 
p. 143. 
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of such an event is at once to downplay the seriousness with which God has 
entered into relationship with his church; God does not simply relate to the 
church now and then through disruptive events which presumably need further 
revelatory events. To view revelation in this light is to underestimate the 
commitment of God to His church in terms of binding Himself to the church and it 
is also to depersonalise God's relationship to His church somewhat. A figure 
who occasionally and unpredictably bursts in to another's life with guidance or 
support etc. compares unfavourably with the friend who is "always there for us", 
and the former lacks that ongoing relatedness which bespeaks personal 
commitment. It may also bind God to having to repeat Himself constantly. One 
reason for preferring event-type language is that it appears to protect God's 
freedom and prevents the church from thinking that she somehow 'possesses' 
God. But our analysis in no way infringes on the sovereign Lord who relates 
Himself to the church freely, faithfully and continuously, and whose mode of 
relating Himself varies (as challenging, comforting, clarifying etc. ) God's 
freedom is the freedom of love, a freedom which transcends that impoverished 
notion of the freedom not to be committed. Our position should be distinguished 
from a theology of God's presence which goes no further than stressing that we 
are not alone but that God is 'with' us in being present to us. Maurice Wiles 
adopts such a position and quotes G. Marcel approvingly: 
when somebody's presence does really make itself felt, it can refresh my inner being; it reveals me 
to myself, it makes me more fully myself than I should be if I were not exposed to its impact. 41 
However Wiles leaves no room in his thought for this presence to present itself, 
and without that dimension, a dimension Marcel is aware of, our relationship 
with God loses its personal, particular quality and dissolves into an intangible 
immanence. In contrast, our position assumes a faithful commitment on God's 
part to His church which involves God presenting Himself continuously, in 
variable ways. 
The fact that sacramental participation involves focussing on God's presence to 
His church suggests that such participation may be eventful for participants 
without meaning that God abandons His church between Eucharists or even 
during parts of the Eucharist. A revelatory dimension to the notion of 
41 M. Wiles, Faith and the Mysteryof God (London: SCM, 1982), pp. 122-123 
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participation involves (within the Eucharist for example) both personal and 
propositional aspects, set firmly in the context of a worshipping community. As 
we attend in such worship to the movement of God in Christ towards us in the 
Spirit, a movement given content by our propositional 'knowing about' God 
through the scriptures and tradition handed on to us, we personally engage with 
this movement as God the Father becomes our Father for example. 
Propositions help to fill out the relationships which we gradually realise we are 
placed in and, while being interpretations of relationships and secondary to 
actions involved in such relationships, are a vital (communally grounded) part of 
the process of participation. The personal and propositional dimensions of 
revelation must be held together here; to lose the personal is to ignore that we 
'know more than we can tell' and that there is knowledge by acquaintance as 
well as propositional knowledge; to ignore the propositional is to forget the 
communal, linguistic framework in which our experience is self-reflectively set 
and the fact that relations with others involve knowing about them. Indeed the 
propositional can mediate the immediacy of personal relation (maintaining 
separation, otherness and yet unity), and the personal can provide the 
immediacy of communally mediated propositional revelation (maintaining 
actual relation). (Immediacy here is not meant in the sense of instantaneous but 
as presence presenting itself). 
7.9 Conclusion 
Our reflections on the notion of sacramental participation have concentrated on 
the Eucharist and Baptism and have stressed the nature of such participation as 
dependent upon Christ's person and work, not identifying Christ's atoning 
sacrifice with ours or Christ's baptism with ours but basing our sacramental 
activities on them and relating our sacramental activities to Christ through the 
Spirit. The triune God alone creates the possibility of participation in Himself 
and we progressively realise this participation as we respond faithfully by 
offering ourselves (and all creation) to the Father in Christ in the Eucharist. 
Baptism marks the individual's acknowledgement and response to God's 
initiative in Christ, beginning the process of participation which has 
Christological, ecclesial and sacramental dimensions. This process is 
(ontologically) about the way of our being conforming to the what of our being in 
193 
Christ, it is about our (the church's) constituting and being the Body of Christ in 
the world, it is about sharing in the relation of the Spirit and Christ, it is about 
realising our eschatological destiny in Christ. The church as the Body of Christ 
is sustained here by a constant relationship to the Spirit, a relationship which 
enables the church's participation in the constitution of Christ among us, insofar 
as the service of the church, its sacramental devotions, worship, actions, 
relationships, obedience and witness allow Christ to take form in the church. 
(Put this way, not only worship but our whole life of faith is more 'gift' than 'task') 
Sacramental activity (particularly in the Eucharist) draws out concretely the 
nature of participation as response based on the prior initiative of God in Christ, 
acknowledges the dependence of participants on God's initiative, trusts in the 
promises of God to be present to his church in such acts and focuses on that 
which the church will be and is in Christ. As we have already stated, sacraments 
do not specify a presence of God which is any the less real outside of 
sacramental activity but they do provide concrete ways of focusing on and 
relating to that presence, ways which trust faithfully in God's promises to be 
present to His people. Sacramental activity provides one concrete way in which 
we participate in Christ, relating us to the Father in Christ through the Spirit in 
such a way that our materiality, our creaturely being, is not so much 
transcended as set in life-giving relationship with God, retaining the distinction 
of Creator and creature while enabling the liberation of the latter from sin and 
death. Sacraments, together with the ministry of the Word, worship in general, 
prayer and the ongoing mundane struggles to transform our actions and world 
in the light particularly of Christ's life, death and resurrection constitute that (not 
necessarily exclusive) context in which God promises to make Himself known, 
to enable our conformation to Christ, to nurture our participation in God. 
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B. PARTICIPATIO DEI 
It is possible to build an understanding of participation consistent with the 
pointers we find in scripture and which draws on the insights of the theologians 
we have considered in our study. To see this we shall analyse the notion from 
various (interrelated) perspectives including the ontological, epistemological 
and ecciesial, in the hope that these perspectives will cohere in our suggested 
way of approaching participation. 
8.1 Ontological considerations 
With the life, death and resurrection of Christ humanity is ontologically changed 
in that it now stands differently related to its potential destiny, meaning and 
hope, in Christ. Our ontology (of the human) assumes three interrelated 
dimensions, what we are, the way we are and that we are. Because of the 
reconciliation effected in Christ between God and human beings, the 'what' of 
our being, which was previously introverted through sin and which was the 
subject of gravely distorted relations with God and fellow human beings, this 
'what' of our being has been redeemed and transformed. A new mode of 
relatedness with God has been realised, born as the fruits of Christ's life, death 
and resurrection. And it is vital to appreciate that this ontological transformation 
is a result of a change in the nature and quality of relationships that human 
beings now have with God through Christ. It is not a case of some 'substance' of 
humanity commonly shared by all that is cleansed or transmuted, but a case of 
a difference in personal relationships, relationships being at the very core of 
who we are. By becoming incarnate and living a life of obedience to the will of 
the Father, the Son perfects humanity, particularly in terms of right relatedness 
to the Father, other creatures and the creation. This is not simply to see human- 
ness as some Platonic universal which is put right by Christ and which 
thereafter we participate in for salvation. The universal significance of Christ lies 
in the way in which our humanity is now able to relate to God in and through 
Christ. Such a relation is of ontological significance in making humanity a new 
creation, a new creation 'hidden in Christ'. As God's creatures we have always 
been related to the Creator but the manner of that relationship is transformed by 
Christ's incarnation among us. Atonement is significant here in realising God's 
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justice, our forgiveness and evoking right human responsiveness. But while 
atonement focuses primarily on God's initiative towards humanity in Christ, 
participation for us is a broader term incorporating atonement but also focusing 
on our response to God through Christ. With the life, death and resurrection of 
Christ humanity is ontologically changed in that it now stands related to its 
potential destiny, meaning and hope, in Christ. 
However it remains for human beings to appreciate the quiddity of their being in 
relation to God in Christ (cf. Rom. 6: 13). Following Barth in seeing all humanity 
as elected in Christ we can understand all humanity to have been made a new 
creation in so far as we are related to God in Christ through the Holy Spirit as 
creatures forgiven and reconciled to God. Participation is about conformation to 
what we really now are, beginning with the realisation that we are already 
participating in Christ by dint of Christ's person and work. 'Become what you 
are' means 'Grow into your character, accept the outline of your particular form 
of life... ' (C. D. 111.4, p. 388). We are to take up humanity's relationship to God in 
Christ which we realise exists as we look to Christ, and participation is partly 
about relating ourselves appropriately to God in Christ, becoming those human 
beings who are for God (and one another) as we appreciate from Christ that our 
true humanity is a being for God (and for one another). The new creation is 
revealed to us as we live it out in worship and in the life of communities of 
mutual respect, love and service, when what we are in Christ is truly affirmed by 
the way we are in the world. 
A second ontological issue concerns the nature of the inner Trinitarian relations 
and how their relationships are distinguished from our participation in the 
Godhead. We have seen (e. g. Chapter 3) how we can understand the divine 
persons as related in an eternal perichoretic union, a relationship ontologically 
distinct from our relationship of participation in God. The distinctiveness lies in 
the fact that perichoresis involves a unity understood as ontological 
interpenetration mutually constituting the divine persons (a substantial union) 
whereas participation involves a one-way dependence which stresses God's 
role in realising and sustaining human beings where there is no substantial 
identity. Both perichoresis and participation can be understood dynamically 
(and aspects of the thought of the Cappadocians prompt this approach). The 
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issue of deification (which we will explore further below) is affected by the 
perichoresis/participation contrast of Trinitarian/Creator-creature relations, and 
the contrast provides ontological grounds for seeing our eschatological status 
as distinct from that of the persons of the Godhead. 
8.2 Freedom 
This analysis suggests an understanding of our freedom as the option to allow 
ourselves to be conformed to Christ or not. This view of human freedom 
assumes that God leaves us the (at least provisional) freedom to reject Him, 
that God effects a salvation for us which depends on our free acceptance of it, a 
position which provides for the possibility of (eventually) universal salvation and 
which entails moral responsibility. As argued in Chapter 4, the Holy Spirit 
creates the conditions for a genuine decision before Christ so that it is only as 
God relates to us that we are enabled to embrace God's call. Thus our notion of 
freedom perfected is not simply a naked freedom of choice but a freedom of 
obedience moulded in concert with the Holy Spirit which leads to the freedom to 
choose rightly. 1 This kind of freedom involves a libertarian account of choice 
without necessarily lapsing into a kind of synergism. We can retain a relational 
account of God's activity which is not primarily synergistic but dependent on 
God's initiative here. Accounts of this relationship such as "0 God, from whom 
all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed" can be seen 
from this perspective not as debasing our humanity but as acknowledging the 
glory of the human being to rest in the dependent relation of creature to Creator. 
There is here a blend of compulsion and freedom. An analogy might be the 
decision to marry, which at one and the same time may be experienced as a 
decision utterly freely taken and also as a decision one may feel compelled (in 
a positive sense! ) to take. Paradoxically one is aware of being most free and 
most compelled simultaneously. 2 Or again the blend of freedom and 
compulsion one experiences occasionally in bearing true witness or in self- 
1 It is unwise to see freedom of choice in the sense of freedom from limitation as the human 
being's distinguishing feature and the seat of the imago Dei (pace Zizioulas). Unwise because this 
leads to an individualistic conception of the (fulfilled) human being, a conception corrosive of the 
'freedom-in-relation' which gives direction and meaning to human freedom of choice. 
2 T. F. Torrance, writing of the shaping of Calvin's mind, notes that for Calvin "freedom, 
compulsion, personal relation are all involved in knowledge of God. This is the legitimate 
knowledge of the pious mind in which he knows God in accordance with the way he reveals 
himself and keeps to the line of the Word and Truth of God". See his Calvin's Hermeneutics, p. 86. 
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sacrifice. Further, it seems to be the case among many who most single- 
mindedly pursue what they see to be God's will that the element of choice 
recedes and the element of compulsion comes to the fore and the sense of 
God's grace in enabling and guiding becomes ever clearer, and ever more 
sought after. On this account we find our true freedom not to reside so much in 
an ever-expanding degree of freedom from limitation but in a deepening 
realisation and embracing of our creaturely limitations as dependent, derived 
beings together with a deepening realisation of the transcendence of fallen and 
false limitations such as death and the drive to live from ourselves (based on 
the liberating realisation that God is for us). 
This kind of freedom inevitably realises love as its content, love for the God who 
creates, redeems and sanctifies, love for the neighbour before whom we are 
response-able in Christ. This kind of freedom corresponds to the freedom of 
God which primarily is not to be construed as a freedom from creation but as a 
loving freedom for creation, albeit a non-dependent, underived freedom. The 
distinction between God's and human freedom also suggests a 
correspondence and distinction within human and divine loving. While the 
divine love towards creation is primarily agapeistic (spontaneous, uncaused, 
creative of value and relationships) and deriving from that erotic (seeking our 
proper fulfilment, desiring union), human love is primarily erotic (desiring 
completeness, discovering value, born from want) and subsequently agapeistic 
(freely giving as we have freely received for example). To participate in God 
here is to share the loving freedom of our God in a manner appropriate to our 
creatureliness. Participation in God's love is quite different from the Platonic 
understanding of love where interpersonal relations are focussed entirely on a 
common, sought-after ideal. Otherness and haecceity are not valued in Plato's 
thought and the ideas of for example seeking the other for the other's sake and 
self-enrichment through relation to the Other rather than by assimilation of the 
peculiarity and distinctiveness of the Other, such notions are absent from the 
Platonic corpus. 
8.3 The Way of Participation - Ecclesiology, Sacraments and Ethics 
When does our participation begin? We would argue that it is simultaneous with 
our election. If so, we should remember with Barth that this election is not an 
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election following on from our being created but is implicit in and the purpose of 
our being created. The sustaining of creation in being can be regarded as a 
manifestation of the ground God provides on which our (active) participation 
can be established, unfold or be realised. There is a sense then in which we are 
already participating in God as created, elected human beings. Creation is the 
beginning of the history of our participation in God. But there are two tiers to this 
participation, an underlying, grounding tier which is of God's initiative and 
where creation is entirely passive. Creation itself, election and (symbolically) 
baptism belong to this tier. But a second overlying tier involves God's initiative 
and our respondent obedience. This tier is the history of grasping that we are 
chosen in Christ for life in Him. There is a qualified sense in which our 
participation begins with baptism in that the second tier of our participation 
begins to be actualised thenceforward. But more strictly, our participation 
begins with our creation (as Augustine suggested), which is also our election. 
However, our election requires as its confirmation, concrete manifestation and 
implication, participation in the Body of Christ, election being an election to 
become or to become in being, the goal being in Trinitarian terms our perfected 
relationship to the Father in Christ through the Holy Spirit. 
One might wonder where we would place the genesis of faith on this 
understanding. Is faith solely due to God's gracious initiative or do we play a 
part in its realisation? Or in the terms above, does faith find itself in the first or 
second tier of participation? The answer is that faith is not to be 
compartmentalised in this way. A better understanding can be found in Angel's 
notion of faith as 'creative passivity'. If we understand this aright, it suggests that 
human faithfulness is service which allows God to perform His work. It is true 
that Angel stands in danger at times of allowing his Lutheran leanings to lead 
him to an over-emphasis on human passivity such that human beings become 
mere functions of God's action. But faith is a relationship here, a relationship 
initiated by God which requires the correspondent activity of the human person 
for its actualisation. Undergirding the act of faith of the human agent is a prior 
passivity of faith; 
Our being is not our work. Humanity does not make itself. But we can and should make something 
of ourselves. Our creatureliness in no way excludes but includes human creativity. Our passivity 
liberates activities. 3 
3 E. Jüngel, 'Lob der Grenze' in Entsprechungen. Gott-Wahrheit-Mensch. Theologische 
Erorterungen (Munich: Kaiser, 1980), p. 375 
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This approach gives room for God's prevenience and superordination without 
devaluing human action; indeed God's prevenient action elevates the status of 
the human activity of faithful response. The difference between faith and 
participation is one of emphasis, the former stressing the prevenience and 
superordination of God's action, the latter stressing our correspondent 
response. However both terms must find room for the stress implicit in the other 
if errors akin to Lutheran passivity, synergism or Pelagianism are to be avoided. 
Further, faith and participation overlap in terms of characteristics such as 
repentance, decision, trust and loyalty. 4 
Participation is not to be thought of in narrowly intellectual, individualistic or 
anti-materialistic terms, all possibilities within a Platonic or Neoplatonic view of 
the way of participation. At its best Platonic thought intertwined the elements of 
reason, love and freedom but even then the communal emphasis which we 
found in Paul was lacking; where our participation reduces to an individualistic 
quest we can be sure that it is not the corresponding obedience analogous to 
Christ's attitude and action indicative of authentic participation. The individual is 
set within a community which gives orientation, form and direction to 
understanding, language and action. The Christian community is that body 
which provides the context for the individual's participation, a participation 
which is inextricably related to the church's participation in Christ. We have 
suggested earlier an understanding of our participation in God which involves 
our participation in the relationship between the Spirit and Christ, participating 
in the constitution of Christ in so far as the church becomes the Body of Christ in 
the world and participating in Christ in so far as the church is the Body of Christ 
in the world, led by the Spirit and oriented towards our Father and Creator. The 
church is that place where the 'what' of our being in Christ is recognised and 
where human beings seek to live in accordance with that being in Christ, 
sacramentally, ethically, and worshipfully. 
Our reading of Barth suggested that our correspondence to God's faithfulness 
and action, God's freedom and love, can help to fill out what it is we mean when 
speaking of the way of our participation in God. Our responsive freedom and 
4 M. Buber's analysis of Hebraic faith as Emunah is of note here, despite his misguided contrast of 
Emunah with a narrow and misleading understanding of Christian concept of pistisas belief-in. 
See his Two Types of Faith, trans. N. P. Goldhawk (New York, Harper & Bros., 1961) 
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love, based on God's freedom and love for us, provide the way of our 
transcendence by which we participate in God, a transcendence not of 
creaturely limits as such (limits which give definition to our love and freedom), 
but a transcendence5 of the cor curvum in se. Bonhoeffer's comments on 
Christ as boundary and centre are pertinent here. As boundary Christ is that 
person through whom we can relate to others without assimilation, dismissal or 
trespass of their transcendence. Relationship with others through Christ entails 
sharing an awareness of who such others are to God (and thus puts us in touch 
with who others ultimately are), realising how Christ identifies with such others 
(e. g. Mt. 25: 31-46), understanding their value and participating in Christ's loving 
service of them. And this is a liberation as well as an ethical imperative, to be 
able truly to recognise, relate to and serve our neighbours in their otherness 
without the destructive drives to assimilation or dismissal. 6 But we are liberated 
by Christ as boundary and also as centre, in that we now also understand 
ourselves in relation to Christ, an understanding which realises that God is for 
us in Christ, as our re-established centre, our new creation. (The person of 
Christ as source, model and goal of our new creation all figure here). We enter 
into this new creation by faith, faith which is also obedience to following Christ 
at the boundary, where we face our neighbour. 
(We might note further that our participation in Christ here is a participation in 
his human faithful response to the Father through the Spirit. The same Spirit 
who anointed and empowered Jesus Christ in a manner enabling perfect 
human responsiveness moves towards us now enabling our responsiveness. 
Our assurance of overcoming sin rests in Christ who has provided a means to 
5 Farley defines human transcendence as an irreducibility to our concreteness (or givenness), our 
capacity to surpass it in modes it in awareness, criticism etc.; beyond this transcendence is the 
capacity "to exist self-consciously in the face of discerned possibilities and to respond to 
situations in the light of what is discerned". See his Good & Evil, p. 69-70, p. 159-60. The 
corruption of transcendence occurs when, for example, our relation to the other before us is 
dominated by the securing and protection of what we take to be essential aspects of our 
concreteness, rather than being drawn by the other in the modes of compassionate obligation, 
social longing and aesthetic attraction. This notion of transcendence blends well with Zizioulas' 
understanding of the transcendence of every natural or social exclusiveness associated for him 
with the realisation of an 'ecclesial hypostasis' beyond our given 'biological hypostasis'. For 
Zizioulas this experience is offered par excellence by the Eucharist. See his Being as 
Communion, pp. 59ff. 
6 There are echoes here of the Levinasian theme of the face which calls forth compassionate 
obligation from a height. But while for Levinas this call appears to be brute phenomenonlogical 
reality, here the revelation of the true reality, meaning and (hopeful) destiny of our neighbour is 
given content in and through the narrative of Jesus Christ, presented to us pneumatologically. 
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attain holiness and because this can be regarded (following Irving) as being 
through the upholding of the humanity of the Son in the power of the Spirit, this 
is for human beings a realistic assurance and means of Iiberation. )7 
Finally in this section we should recall (from Chapter 4) that the way of our 
participation will not be properly delineated until the places of justification and 
sanctification within the notion are properly understood. Participation is about 
the realisation of what we are to become in Christ, rooted in the primary 
realisation of what we are already in Christ. On this understanding our 
participation is initiated and sustained by our reconciliation with God in Christ, 
but this is a participation which we grasp intermittently and whose reality is 
properly responded to and glimpsed better as we conform to Christ; even so the 
reality will be manifest fully only eschatologically. As we conform progressively 
in obedience to Christ we realise, as we have stressed repeatedly, that our 
conforming to Christ is in fact primarily Christ conforming us to Himself and so 
we are referred back constantly to God's initiative (and paradigmatically to our 
justification), in the process of sanctification. (Barth's remark that our 
participation is primarily a relationship of thanks can be seen in this context as a 
point well-made). Only with these qualifications can we speak of degrees of 
participation, which is not to do with grades of achievement but with a 
progressive realisation and embracing of God's beneficent mercy and intention 
for us, despite ourselves. 8 
8.4 Causality 
The issue of the way of our participation immediately raises the question of the 
respective influences of God and human beings in the process of participation 
or put another way it raises the question of causality. We have seen how Plato's 
thought failed to address this issue adequately (in the context of Forms and 
phenomena) and how Plato's thought was marked with ambiguity concerning 
the manner and kind of causality involved in participation. Later thinkers such 
7 See G. McFarlane's Christ and the Spirit. The Doctrine of the Incarnation according to Edward 
Irving (Exeter: Paternoster, 1996), pp. 145f, 165f and passim. 
8 This suggestion fits well with an understanding of moral and immoral acts being executed not 
out of sheer freedom in a vacuum but out of a background of shaping experiences and actions, 
out of enduring continuities and developed dispositions, inclinations and habits of behaviour. 
See for example the exploration of virtue in A. Maclntyre's After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology 
(London: Duckworth, 1981) 
202 
as Plotinus, Augustine and Calvin share some of the same sense of ambiguity 
concerning (divine) causality, and all of those err towards the kind of (arbitrary) 
divine omni-causality which appears to crush human autonomy. Aquinas, on the 
other hand, following the Aristotelian assumption that effects resemble their 
causes, gives the impression that God cannot help but create His own likeness 
in His creation, a point suggesting the divine sovereignty is subject to 
(Aristotelian) laws of cause and effect rather than vice versa. 
What is required is an understanding of causality which, in contrast, 
emphasises the personal nature of divine causality, causality which is truly 
causal (which we can understand by analogy with how other people cause us 
to do certain things and be in certain ways), but which owes more to the 
personal impact of receiving (and giving) love than being on the receiving end 
of an impersonal potentia absoluta. This kind of causality is consistent with a 
Creator who provides creation with space to develop in relation to Himself. A 
key difficulty with the language of causality is understanding how human beings 
can retain a contingent autonomy white yet being caused to respond, develop 
and so on. The Hegelian scheme whereby human beings were caused to 
contribute to the developing self-consciousness of Geist both wittingly and 
unwittingly smacks of manipulation for Geist's purposes which works almost 
despite human autonomy rather than a sustained personal nurturing of others 
into their fulfilled and enduring particularity. However the Spirit may well be that 
agent who can help provide the sort of causality we are looking for. It is the 
Spirit who mediates the Father to the Son while maintaining the Son's authentic 
humanity; the Spirit who is associated with the Word in the act of creation 
(allowing and enabling otherness) and (traditionally) the agent of resurrection 
(recreating, restoring otherness); it is the Spirit who leads us and creation to the 
teleological goal of being in God (fulfilling others). Given all of this, a developed 
pneumatology would seem to be the best way forward in understanding how 
divine personal causality can retain and transform creation's and creaturely 
otherness without slipping into misconceptions of divine agency as automatic, 
autocratic or mechanical. 
Perhaps causality is not dissimilar to that causality we outlined in relation to 
sacramental participation. There, sacraments were understood not so much as 
an isolated means of grace but as a concrete way of presenting the grace of 
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God in Christ which 'brings home' the truth, reality and actuality of the gospel of 
salvation. The Spirit could be understood as orienting and relating us to this 
reality. While this gives an 'objective' pole to sacramental actions, an existential 
or subjective pole is still present because God's gift requires acceptance, the 
faithful receptivity of the believer, which is a question of our spirits bearing 
witness with the Spirit. (it is not impossible in this situation that the causal 
influence of the Spirit is experienced at the point of greatest felt autonomy, and 
this touches on the blending of freedom and 'compulsion' in Christian 
discipleship which we have discussed above). There are parallels here with 
our understanding of 'becoming what we are, affirming and entering into the 
new creation we are in Christ. (There is a kind of asymmetry about this kind of 
causality, we cannot cause it to happen but we maybe able to undo that which 
has been caused and is being caused for us. ) 
8.5 Epistemology 
Polanyi's epistemology can help us to see how knowledge of God arises within 
us as faithful commitment and acknowledgement of God which is a response to 
God's movement towards us in the Spirit as He enables us to participate in 
Christ, a participation involving knowledge. We have argued against 
understanding this knowledge as narrowly intellectual, individualistic or purely 
propositional. A Polanyian understanding suggests that our knowing is a 
personal act occurring within a given framework of beliefs, relations and idioms. 
There can be 'universal intent' here as explained earlier but not 'pure objective 
knowledge'. Participation in Christ, knowledge and ecclesial belonging require 
commitment and trusting faith; either we enter the 'hermeneutical circle' 
mentioned in Chapter 5 (commitment to Jesus Christ as Lord <-> church <-> 
Personal participation in Christ <-> commitment to Jesus Christ as Lord) or we 
do not. Only as we enter this circle does it become possible for us to realise that 
we are participating in Christ. Knowledge by acquaintance is primary here, 
although 'knowledge about' is a vital component of such knowledge. We cannot 
come by this 'knowledge by acquaintance' except by way of allowing Christ to 
take form in us, so overcoming the experience of being alienated from our 'true 
selves', an experience common to the Christian tradition from Paul (cf. Rom. 
7: 19 ), to Augustine, to present thought (e. g. Tillich's notion of self- 
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estrangement). We are in a sense committing ourselves to catching up with 
what we have become in Christ, with what we will be (eschatologically). The 
epistemology outlined here is an ontological epistemology involving as it does 
personal relationships, and it has ontological implications for our way of being. 
And this ontological epistemology, unlike that of say Aquinas, does not threaten 
our creaturely integrity as we come to know God better, nor does it imply that we 
must become other than human if we are to progress in our participation in the 
divine. 
Discussion of participating in the knowledge of God is closely related to the 
issue of religious language and its authenticity. Linguistic issues concerning 
participation have been touched on at numerous points in our study. From Plato 
onwards the question arose that if a particular participates in a Form F then how 
are we to understand their community of character? Univocity undermined the 
Form's transcendence, equivocity emptied participation of intelligible content. 
Allen argued that the community of character might be explained by 
.. treating exemplifications not as substances in which qualities inhere but as relational entities, 
entities in which resemblance and dependence so combine as to destroy the possibility of 
substantiality. Plato's use of the metaphors of imitation and reflection, and his characterisation of 
particulars and Forms, indirectly indicate that he accepted this solution. 9 
But Plato (like Proclus after him and others) did not have the relational 
conception of substance to enable him to move from these (presumed) 
intuitions to a more rigorous understanding. With such a conceptualisation, 
resemblance and dependence might so combine not "to destroy the possibility 
of substantiality" but "to establish substantiality which is not con-substantiality" 
by nature of the qualitatively different relations involved (participatory rather 
than perichoretic). The issue recurred in early Christian debate, the ontological 
limitations of Arius suggesting finally to Athanasius that access to who and what 
God is in Himself are sealed from us. If however the nature of our dependent 
relationship with God is both the source of our (categorically different) being 
and of our access to God, we are able to understand our participation neither 
equivocally or univocally in terms of community of character but as a community 
in distinct character, a community where our character corresponds to our 
creaturely status as creatures related to our Creator. Only within the context of 
9 Allen, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, p. 60. 
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this relationship, where God is Subject, initiating, sustaining and fulfilling, is our 
language appropriate to grasp God because it is in this context that we 
appreciate that our words are not our property but His. 
And disposing of them as His property, He places them at our disposal - at the disposal of our 
grateful obedience - when He allows and commands us to make use of them in this relationship 
too... When we apply them to God they are not alienated from their original object and therefore 
from their truth, but, on the contrary, restored to it" (C. D. 11.1, p. 229). 10 
But even if the (partly semantic) separation between Creator and creatures is 
overcome by God, it is not the case that there is no longer any hiddenness 
about God; to assume so is immediately to assume that our knowledge of God 
is not due to the grace of His ongoing relationship with us. This knowledge also 
shares in that 'eschatological tension' which understands that we are both new 
creations in Christ and yet still sinners, so that provisionality and 
incompleteness mark both personal and propositional knowledge, life and 
language. 
8.6 Eschatology 
In distinguishing our participation in God from the intra-trinitarian relations 
Origen is in danger of leaving us with the possibility of further falls from our state 
of perfected participating being, thus undermining a sense of eschatological 
finality, fulfilment or completion. Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of eternal 
progress in our participation in God is free of the possibility of further falls but it 
stands in danger of undermining the eschatological vein of thought in scripture 
which stresses God's initiative in the completion of all things in Himself. If 
however we understand our progress as a continual rolling back of our own 
initiative apart from God, understanding ourselves to be led more and more by 
God and allowing this to happen, then this 'progression' (which is itself a 
response to God continuously dependent on God) fits more easily with an 
awareness of a final consummation which is entirely of God's doing. In one 
sense our uplifting is complete in our justification in Christ, but it remains for us 
to embrace this uplifting in the personal, spatio-temporal space provided by 
10 For an exploration of the theological possibility of our language containing words that in their 
full sense may only be used to describe God see Roger White's article'Notes on Analogical 
Predication and Speaking about God', in The Philosophical Frontiers of Theology, eds. 
B. Hebblethwaite and S. R. Sutherland (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp197-226. 
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God. Participation is about this embracing, participation which does not 
undermine eschatology but which provides for a deeper yearning for the 
eschaton, when He will be all in all and finally deal with those stumbling-blocks 
and stubborn barriers we persistently erect to keep ourselves apart from God 
and one another. Why there is this spatio-temporal opportunity provided for our 
response prior to the eschaton is to some extent an audacious question but the 
beginnings of an answer may perhaps lie (as Barth suggested)11 in the 
importance God gives to our human response-ability of thanks, praise and 
service. In the interim the church is the Body of Christ in the world, in service, 
witness, proclamation and mission. The historical church does not determine 
the nature of the eschaton here but becomes an instrument of its permeation of 
history, as others are brought to Christ and the Father's will is done. We saw 
earlier how the Eucharist is a key focus of the church's eschatological identity 
which empowers her to be even now what she will be. Further we have seen (in 
Chapter 7) how the church must engage seriously and urgently with history, as 
the Body of Christ which loves and seeks the well-being of sinners within and 
without of herself. 
8.7 The Participation of Creation 
The individualistic emphasis of the Platonic (and Gnostic) understandings of 
participation often included the dimension of escape from the realm of matter 
and flight from the transient temporal context in which human beings found 
themselves. This prejudice colours some of the early Christian understandings 
(e. g. elements of Augustine and Dionysius) and we might note that, while it may 
be that human beings have precedence over the rest of creation from God's 
perspective (cf. Rom. 8: 31-39) there is an emphasis in Scripture on the 
transformation and uplifting of creation along with humanity (e. g. Rom. 7: 21) 
and theologically one can plausibly argue that God will not allow His creation to 
be flawed finally but brought to fulfilment when He is "all in all". In our 
discussion of the Eucharist in Chapter 7 the thought of J. Zizioulas helped us to 
understand the Eucharist as including an anaphoric referring-back of the 
created realm to God, a referring-back which enables human beings to receive 
created gifts afresh as life-giving, a dynamic which is a part of human 
participation in God. 
11 C. D. IV. 1, pp. 737-738 
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The church's giving is a giving back, and an entering into the Son's gift of the 
new creation in Himself to the Father. If human reverence for creation loses hold 
of this referring-back to God, the possibility of pantheism looms and with it an 
understanding of participation in creation which includes a certain solidarity, 
unity, holism, immediacy and spatio-temporal continuity with the world but 
which has nevertheless removed our Creator from the scene. A holistic 
grasping of one's part in the created totality is not to be reduced to a shared 
affinity with other creatures and objects but also with an understanding, 
appreciation and realisation of our common source and sustenance in God. 
Zizioulas regards our referring back of creation (including ourselves) as the 
right exercise of our imago Dei, in that we were given an absolute freedom (in 
the sense of not being confronted with anything given) which is the imago Dei 
and which can only achieve the goal implicit within it (of survival) by bringing 
itself into relation with its eternal and imperishable Creator. Important for our 
purposes here are the points that Zizioulas seeks to retain a sense of the 
material realm's coming right with this approach (rather than being abandoned) 
and the fact that it is the image of God which is the seat of such possibilities. A 
further theological resource in arguing for this retention and consummation of 
creation is the Incarnation. For Augustine for example the centrality of the 
Incarnation does not rest in the fact that by it we are somehow released from the 
chains of corporeity and the material world but rather in the fact that in and 
through faith in the Incarnation we can be liberated from our sinful self-referring 
absorption in the material realm and be re-ordered towards God without our 
being in the material realm necessarily abrogating such a re-ordering. But the 
incarnation was not simply about God assuming material form but God 
assuming human form and this provides some weight to the view that human 
beings be accorded a certain priority and responsibility for creation. In Gregory 
of Nyssa we found the idea that through human beings authentically executing 
their delegated authority over creation, creation is 'lifted up' to partake of the 
divine glory, being transfigured in the process. Undergirding such an idea 
would appear to be the hierarchy of levels we see first in Platonic thought, but 
whereas in Platonic thought the aim is to ascend through the distinct levels, 
here creation, creature and Creator retain their distinctiveness while the former 
are fulfilled in realising relations to the Creator (in Christ through the Spirit) 
appropriate to their createdness. Thus we can begin to see how creation might 
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participate in God insofar as right relatedness to God is restored and insofar as 
creation retains its (dependent, derived) distinctiveness from God. Pantheism is 
avoided because the fulfilment of creation is rooted in relations respective of 
difference - the triune relations, the relation of God and human being in Christ, 
of the Spirit and human spirits - and therefore its fulfilment need not necessarily 
be seen as a question of assimilation but more of consummation of its 
particularity in relatedness to the Otherness of the Triune God. The mediation of 
God's loving will for creation through the Son and Spirit and the manner of this 
mediation (enabling space for other (human) persons) at least provides 
grounds for positing the transformation of the cosmos without its deification or 
destruction. 
8.8 The Image of God and Deification 
While theologians such as Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine use the 
language of deification in writing of human participation in God, it is clear from 
the foregoing discussions of their thought that a key strand in the patristic 
tradition understands this not to mean abandoning parameters appropriate to 
our dependent, derived existence as creatures but as implying the glorification 
of our humanity as embodied in the humanity of Jesus Christ. Our sympathies 
lie with an understanding of theosis akin to that which D. F. Winslow finds in the 
thought of Gregory of Nazianzus and also found in other Fathers; "theosis 
describes our progressive growth towards an adopted dignity of fulfilled 
creatureliness"12. (How far the various Patristic theologians succeed in 
presenting this kind of theosis coherently and consistently is, as we have seen, 
a moot point, but it is this strand of the tradition that we seek to support and build 
on). One reason why the doctrine of the Image of God has been important in 
Christian theological thought is that the understanding of human creatures as 
being in the image of God enables Origen, Gregory and Augustine (for 
example) to explain how it is that the possibility of participation in God is open to 
human beings. For Origen participation proceeds from image through likeness 
to unity while for Gregory the image of God which is our capacity for 
participation in God is likened to a mirror13 which increasingly reflects God as 
12 See his The Dynamics of Salvation: A Study in Gregoryof Nazianzus (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 
p. 179. 
13 The idea of "image" as in a reflection in a mirror has the positive advantages of communicating 
God's initiative and human beings' ongoing dependence for the imago Dei. Negatively (rather like 
the use of "transparency" to explain the image of God), this picture is impersonal and perhaps 
overstresses human passivity. 
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the human being participates progressively in God. (For Gregory, what enables 
our participation is our rational nature together with our freedom - qualities akin 
to God's qualities, and qualities such as these go to make the image of God 
within us and enable us to partake of the divine goodness. ) Again for Augustine 
the image of God provides our capacity for participating in God and in De 
Trinitate this participation proceeds through a discovery of the image of God 
within us which points on to the Trinity itself. Behind some of these 
conceptualisations we can see aspects of the Platonic understanding of 
participation as resembling or imaging. As previously pointed out, Plato's 
thought provides space for understanding the original and image as belonging 
to different ontological categories, regarding the properties of the participant as 
grounded in the relation to that which is imaged. Again the (Neoplatonic) theme 
of progressive (ontological, intellectual and ethical) ascent can be seen in the 
way in which progress proceeds through image to likeness, and this theme is 
only adequately transposed into a Christian key by those Fathers (such as 
Irenaeus) who do not finally dissolve "image" into the. "likeness" Christ has but 
who retain the dependent, derived, distinct status of the human image on the 
Incarnate prototype which is related to the image without absorbing it. 
But what is the image of God? It has to be said that there is no consensum 
patrum on this issue, although freedom, reason, human nature as spirit and 
person, have often been used to describe the image. All we can do here is 
provide some pointers to what an understanding of the image of God should 
involve and note some dangers to be avoided. One danger is that of losing the 
ongoing nature of dependent relationship with our Creator, a relationship in 
which alone for example knowledge of God is imparted by the Subject of such 
knowledge Himself (and having a communal referent). For example Augustine's 
approach might suggest that by sober self-knowledge we recognize that we are 
an "image" and that we therefore proceed from this God-given similarity to God. 
This in turn might be argued to be an example of the analogia entis, understood 
as an assumption of correspondence between creaturely being and divine 
being by which creatures participate directly (epistemologically at least) in that 
divine being. We would react against this analogia entis if it suggested a route 
to God apart from God because insofar as our image involves a particular 
relationship to God, discovery of who we are is inextricably connected both with 
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who God is and with God's gracious initiative in revealing the relation in which 
we stand to Him. However, insofar as the analogia entis implies that God has 
really given human creatures a reality separate though related to Himself we 
would not gainsay it. Any analogia entis must be situated within an 
understanding of our relationship to God as mediated by God and thus it must 
be situated within an analogia fidei. 14 
Barth's thought provides very concrete ways of understanding and exercising 
the imago Dei in our inter-human relating and his thought resists a second 
danger related to the first, that of assuming the image of God to be some sort of 
innate, realisable capacity of human beings potentially (perhaps 
eschatologically) independent of our Creator. The four essential characteristics 
of "Being in Encounter" listed by Barth and discussed earlier are humanity's 
appropriate response to the revelation of Christ at the inter-human level, 
because in this way human beings participate in the history of the encounter 
and interaction of God with humanity in Jesus Christ and humankind images the 
Image of God, Jesus Christ. In seeing, hearing and speaking, assisting and 
relating with gladness we are involved in a process of mirroring and imaging in 
which others come to know themselves both through us and in the process of 
mirroring/imaging us to ourselves, and vice versa. Barth avoids the idea of the 
imago Del being some sort of innate capacity of human beings, it is rather an 
analogy of (abiding) relationship. There is progression though, as our 
relationships more adequately conform to the relationships we image. This 
process is a process of becoming in which we become who we are called in 
Jesus Christ to be. The reformation of the Imago Dei includes both a 
participation in the knowledge of a God who is for us in Christ and a 
participation in Christ's being-for-others in the creaturely sphere. And this 
being-for-others extends to enabling others to come to acknowledge that God is 
for them, so sweeping them up into participation in the Triune life as they realise 
their election and respond by obeying and serving God in Christ. While our 
freedom, love and being for God and others correspond and are similar to the 
Trinitarian dynamics, they are reflections not suggestive of any ontological 
parity between human creatures and God. 
14 This approach circumvents two major difficulties for those who advocate the analogia antis; 1. 
that it might separate the knowledge of God from God as the Subject of that knowledge and 2. 
relatedly, that it might suggest a less than radical dependence of the human being on God for 
his/her being and becoming. 
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Barth's approach also avoids individualising our understanding of human 
beings, seeing the imago Dei as completely defined by reference to the 
individual (and God alone). Forms of Christianity heavily indebted to the 
Neoplatonic school face this possibility. Against this inclination, according to 
Calvin we 'exercise' the image of God within us in the sense that we follow 
God's pattern of extending His grace to the world as we reach out to our 
neighbours. And through this action we come more to realise that which has 
been wrought in us as we become what we are in Christ. Following Calvin's 
insight means also that we are prohibited from focusing attention on our "God- 
given" similarity to God in the imago Dei in any way which might miss the fact of 
its being grounded on God's downward motion of grace. Calvin links the 
'horizontal' and 'vertical' dimensions of participation in God in a way which 
steers a course between ethical indifference and Pelagianism. But while 
participation is conceived here as activity which mirrors the divine activity Calvin 
is careful to assert that there is a 'natural' (i. e. created) character to the image of 
God so that this image is not crystallised purely as or out of a dynamic ecstasis 
towards others, see Institutes I. xv. 3 for example. We would add that this created 
character is to be relationally conceived, in that human beings are born into 
specific patterns of relatedness which go part of the way to defining who they 
are. We are reminded at this point of the Cappadocian grasp of relation as 
qualifying persons ontologically and if our human relationships have 
ontological implications (constitutive implications building on God's originary 
creative act and involving God in that constitution), then the vital nature of such 
relations becomes apparent. Hence the importance of the church is also 
apparent, in providing a network of relatedness based on, sustained by and 
oriented towards God. It is the weakness of some formulations of the imago Dei 
that they fail to take account of the essential importance of relationship with 
fellow human beings and often underlying this is a questionable ontology a little 
too indebted to the (Neo)platonists, - we saw that Augustine was a case in 
point. 15 
One consideration in understanding the reformation of the image of God 
15 The fact that Genesis 1-2 incorporates both the individual and relational aspects of the doctrine 
of the image of God might be a starting-point for ensuring that any such doctrine includes both 
emphases, rather than allowing one to assimilate or predominate over the other. The individual 
particularity and contingent autonomy of our humanity must be asserted along with the 
constitutive nature of our relations if we are to be true to Genesis 1-2 and avoid either 
individualism or the dissolution of our particularity in all its personal spaciousness. 
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concerns how far we effectively become like Christ as the reformation is 
realised and how far Christ becomes irrelevant as our participation proceeds. 
The role of Christ is often associated with the reformation of the image of God 
and/or its capacity for participation in God, as for example Gregory and 
Augustine make clear. The uniqueness of Christ is retained better by those 
theologians who more explicitly distinguish the Son of God's relation to the 
Father from our relation to the Godhead16 and better still by those who do not 
show tendencies to see Christ's work as an impersonal reformation of the 
universal form of humanity in which all automatically participate. Participation in 
God is understood as being enabled by Christ but if Christ is not understood 
both in terms of his work and his person then Christ might easily be left behind 
as participation progresses (a danger Origen's thought faces). Without a 
sustaining, enabling relationship to the person of Christ as participation 
develops the scriptural stress on the ongoing relationship with Christ is lost as is 
the experience of generations of Christians of a living, nourishing relationship 
with Christ which draws them more deeply into knowledge and love of God. 
One way in which this ongoing relationship can be understood is in terms of our 
continuing dependence on Christ as we move towards God, and this suggests 
that the reformation of the image of God is not a once-for-all operation but is 
itself a dynamic, developing reformation rooted in a relationship to God through 
Jesus Christ, an understanding close to that of Gregory's. 
Finally, it is important to retain a sense of human particularity in the process 
(pace Hegel) of the reformation of the image of God and in participation and 
here we must stress the pneumatological dimension of the process. Just as the 
Spirit mediates the action of God the Father to God the Son in such a way as to 
maintain Jesus' particular humanity, so too the Spirit can be regarded as that 
person of the Trinity concerned with establishing communion between beings 
that are opposed or separate in a manner which keeps the space for individuals 
to be human in all their particularity. Hegel's pneumatology failed to preserve 
human particularity finally and serves as a warning to understand the Spirit's 
function as derived from God's self-revelation in Christ, a self-revelation in 
which Christ's authentic humanity is retained. (One might argue that by 
16 John Damascene for example distinguishes between the Son's imaging of the Father kata 
physin and that of human beings kata thesin (artefact-artist), a distinction having Platonic and 
Aristotelian roots. See John Damascene, De imaginibus, or 3,18 (PG 94,1337D-40B) A further 
example is Origen in D. P. 1.2.6 
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sublating humanity in higher syntheses Hegel failed to grasp the importance of 
the Ascension of Christ, which in part indicates the eternal nature of Christ's 
human-ness in all its particularity). Further, the Spirit does not merely underline 
human uniqueness but also evokes ecstasis toward God and neighbour. (One 
cannot separate the Spirit from Jesus Christ here in discussing the motivation 
towards ecstasis; the Spirit bears witness with our spirits to the person of Christ 
outside us, beckoning us and yet also that one who is so close to us and in 
whom we recognise our true selves that he is in a sense within us. But while we 
cannot then separate Christ and the Spirit in enabling ecstasis, perhaps we 
might stress their different (if mutually supportive) functions of evoking (cf. the 
Spirit) and provoking (cf. Christ) our ecstasis. ) Bonhoeffer comments that the 
Spirit acts by making us aware of the personal Other, in particular Christ; the 
Spirit elicits a decision from us concerning that which is Other, and with the 
Spirit there is a "continuous substitution of the principle of self-sacrifice on 
behalf of another for the natural drive of self-interest and dominance". 17 This 
dynamic of ecstasis corresponds to God's 'overflowing' for the sake of that 
which is other (i. e. creation), a dynamic in which we are caught up into the 
Trinitarian relations, participating in God and imaging God. We mentioned 
earlier the enabling role of the Spirit in bringing about our participation in Christ, 
that Spirit who enables us to commit ourselves to Christ and whose presence 
may be such that we are only tacitly aware of Him. Our awareness of the Spirit 
develops as we are focused on Christ, as we understand the Spirit in His 
relation to Christ and as we are oriented towards Christ by the Spirit. 
In summary then we would argue that "image" not be taken as implying an 
external imprint received by human beings in the beginning and preserved by 
human nature as its own property independently of its relationships with God. 
Rather "image" implies relationship with God, so that it is never merely a 
created gift but a letting-be in relation to God. "Image" is not to be 
individualistically conceived, but involves corporate horizontal relations as well 
as ongoing 'vertical' dependence; it retains human creaturely particularity and 
integrity, distinguishes and relates Christ and human beings and is not to be 
narrowly conceived as involving a number of human faculties but as involving 
the human being in his/her totality of faculties, being and relationships. 
17 John V. Taylor, The Go-Between God(London: SCM, 1972), p. 109 
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8.9 Participation in the Life of the Trinity 
To see our participation as a participation in the Godhead rather than somehow 
external to the inner divine life bears witness to scriptural indications of the 
former (e. g. Jn. 14: 23) and also emphasises the longed-for intimacy of God 
towards his human creatures. Further if the history of Jesus Christ relates in a 
meaningful way to the life of the triune God then it is presumably true that our 
sharing in that history in some sense implies a participation in the life of the 
Trinity. Quite in what sense remains to be fleshed out. 
Barth's understanding of the history of Jesus Christ as the external 
manifestation and repetition of the intra-divine history (see e. g. C. D. 111.2, p. 66) is 
provocative and has three difficulties immediately pertinent to our discussion. 
First it gives the impression of a God less than personally engaged with His 
creation, a God who has already worked out in His inner divine history all that 
comes to pass in the world ad extra. On the other hand Barth's thought avoids 
the danger that the Lord of all things is history, not God -a possibility which 
arises if God is in any way beholden to history. Second and relatedly, a notion 
of a personal, loving relationship of Creator to creature is difficult to imagine on 
Barth's understanding because the possibility of genuine, variable 
responsiveness on God's part seems to be ruled out by an almost 
predestinarian view of God's activity ad extra. 18 On the other hand if we 
assume that the history of Jesus Christ is in some sense the actual history of the 
triune God we may stand in danger of the Hegelian error of seeing creation as 
necessary to God's being and/or self-becoming. Thirdly the notion of repetition 
may undermine the (scripturally attested) communion of Father, Son and Holy 
18 Perhaps due care in understanding the term 'repetition' can help Barth's case. Repetition 
need not entail identical events/activities/relations and indeed in a sense cannot "because what is 
repeated, has been, otherwise it could not be repeated, but the fact that it has been, makes 
repetition into the new". ( A. Melberg, Theories of Mimesis, p. 136. ) Further, God's relationship to 
creation must be somehow different from the immanent relationships within the Trinity given the 
distinctiveness of God from creation. Repetition could be used to stress that the self-constituting 
intra-trinitarian relationality is strikingly reflected in the relationship of God to creation. Further, 
Kierkegaard's view of repetition is useful in demonstrating the complex and paradoxical nature of 
the relation between past and present; "the temporal device of "repetition" is a paradoxical 
movement between past and present; between time as instantaneous point or break or 
interruption; and time as process of past into present. Kierkegaardian "repetition" tries to keep 
these divergent dimensions of time together in one movement - making "repetition" into a non- 
concept or a paradoxical concept negating the presence it suggests; or a non-concept related to 
Plato's to exaiphnesin Parmenides - "this strange instantaneous nature, this something patched 
between movement and standstill and that does not exist in any time" (156DE).. ". Ibid., p. 141. 
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Spirit, that pattern of relationships which we have already seen can be 
understood as the very context of human participation in God. 19 Avoiding such 
difficulties is crucial if we are to retain the personal, relational God of 
Christianity, the sovereign freedom and transcendence of our Creator and 
human freedom, and the scene of participation itself. 
One way forward might be to follow Von Balthasar in understanding our 
relationship with God to be analogous to that of the Father and the Son, 
patterned on that relationship and all the modalities contained within it. This 
allows for genuine human freedom and retains a certain divine immutability, in 
that the modalities of relationship taken up with God are part of the eternal 
modalities of the Father-Son relationship. We can even speak of affecting God 
in terms of 'introducing' modalities into the divine life which would not otherwise 
be there but these are modalities which reflect richer, deeper corresponding 
modalities already present in the Father-Son relationship. The modalities within 
the immanent Trinity which are reflected in the economic Trinity's relations with 
the world are rooted by Balthasar (following Bulgakov) in the originary self- 
generation of the Godhead: 
the Father's self-utterance in the generation of the Son is an initial "kenosis" which underpins all 
subsequent kenosis... The Father must not be thought to exist "prior" to this self-surrender (in an 
Arian sense): he is this movement of self-giving that holds nothing back. This divine act that brings 
forth the Son, that is, the second way of participating in (and of being) the identical Godhead, 
involves the positing of an absolute, infinite "distance" that can contain and embrace all the other 
distances that are possible within the world of finitude, including the distance of sin. 20 
The Father refuses to be God for Himself alone and 
.. 
lets go of his divinity and, in this sense, manifests a (divine) God-lessness (of love, of course). 
The latter must not be confused with the godlessness that is found within the world, although it 
19 A. J. Torrance makes a forceful criticism of Barth in noting how his model of revelation, with its 
stress on the confrontational divine Ich who directly addresses the human subject and his 
preference for terms such as Seinsweisen over persons leads him to underplay the foundational 
importance of interpreting the divine unity and identity in terms of perichoretic communion. Barth 
prefers to stress the singular identity of the free divine subject, an emphasis which neglects the 
personal relatedness and mutuality found at the heart of the Trinitarian God. See his Persons in 
Communion, esp. pp. 104-105,218-221. 
20 H. Von Balthasar, Theodrama, vol. IV, p. 323. The space which Balthasar posits in God does not 
imply ontological separation because of the love within the Godhead which allows infinite 
otherness without detriment to unity. Divine love "has the power freely to unfold its richness in 
such different modalities that the Son's experience of opposition in a hostile sense remains 
always a function and an aspect of his loving relationship to the Father in the Holy Spirit". 
O'Hanlon, ibid., p. 119 Whether this experience of hostile opposition could rightly be said to 
include sin is questionable however. 
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undergirds it, renders it possible and goes beyond it. 21 
The Son's response is an eternal thanksgiving as selfless as the Father's 
original self-surrender, a self-giving so complete "that the Son's mission to the 
point of the cross is already contained within his procession from the Father and 
what it involves, and is a modality of that procession". 22 The Spirit here is the 
Father and Son's subsistent "We"; "as the essence of love, he maintains the 
infinite difference between them, seals it and, since he is the one Spirit of them 
both, bridges it". 23 
For Balthasar then the modalities of relatedness between God and the world 
are already provided for and in a sense contained in the inner-divine distance. 
From this we can see the centrality of the Father-Son relation as analogy for our 
relationship with the Trinitarian God for Balthasar, a relationship which can be 
understood as participation in the life of the Trinity in that we enter into 
modalities of the relating of Father and Son. Behind this Balthasar is rejecting 
the notion, common to much Process theology, that God can 'grow' in 
experience, knowledge etc., through his relation to the world. For Balthasar, as 
O'Donnell points out, 
.. creatures cannot add anything to God's Being since God is already infinite fullness. This 
is the 
element of truth in the classical conception of divine immutability24. 
However this approach needs further thought because our participation stands 
in danger of vanishing into the modalities of the Father-Son's relating, our 
particularity and value might dissipate if we become merely a faint echo of the 
amplified relating of the divine persons to one another. We need at this point to 
recall God's assertion of the distinctiveness of the human being in the 
Incarnation and throughout His dealings with His people, an assertion affirming 
the integrity of human beings, their history and development, while yet seeking 
their fulfilment in relation to Himself. Our relatedness to the Trinity does not rest 
on a weak mimicking of the relations of the persons of the Trinity but in a 
21 Ibid., p. 324 
22 G. F. O'Hanlon, The Immutabilityof God in the Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar(Cambridge: 
CUP, 1990), pp. 37-38 
23 Theodrama, ibid., p. 324 
24 J. O'Donnell, Hans Urs Von Balthasar in "Outstanding Christian Thinkers"series (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), p. 70. 
217 
corresponding dynamic appropriate to the quidditas of our humanity, reflecting 
such modalities in ways appropriate to our creatureliness. 
In fleshing out our participation in the Trinity here reflection on the humanity of 
Jesus Christ becomes important because if Christ's humanity participates in the 
divine life then we can perhaps understand our participation in the Trinity (in 
part) as proceeding analogously to that of Christ's involvement in the divine life. 
We noted earlier Calvin's implicit suggestion that our participation in the 
humanity of Christ is our participation in the life of the Triune God, an 
identification which depends for its force on the fact that our participation in 
Christ implies that we share in the same love of the Father for the Son and, 
empowered by the Spirit, reciprocate this love in our filial obedience to the 
Father. 25 The participation of the human Jesus in the Trinity is one which is 
inseparable from the Son's involvement in the inner divine life, including 
obedient humility and humble obedience, joyful self-giving and thankful service. 
Our participation in the divine life is a correspondent obedience, humility and 
thankfulness, a corresponding service which participates in Christ's service. At 
this point Balthasar's understanding of participation as participation in mission 
(cf. Jn. 20: 21) is relevant: 
Participation in Christ's mission and form of existence, a participation that bridges the permanent 
difference between him and us, is possible when a believer is ready through the assent of faith to 
receive and live his existence as mission. 26 
Faith here is not centred on the Lutheran conception of faith as security but 
rather involves a complete existential surrender to Christ, and Balthasar's 
understanding is inspired by Philippians 3; "One thing I do: forgetting what lies 
behind and straining forward to what lies ahead, I press on toward the goal for 
the prize of the upward goal of God in Christ Jesus". But if faith is an act of 
expropriation centred on Christ, trustful, risky and existing only in flight towards 
Christ, it is also obedience for Balthasar. As O'Donnell comments, 
Just as Christ's form was his abiding openness to the will of the Father, so the Christian's being, 
informed by Christ, consists in his radical availability to do the will of the Father. Here we see again 
25 However some precision is required in assessing just how far we "share" the "same" love and 
obedience and it is arguable that there is a greater dissimilarity in the similarity where our love and 
obedience is concerned vis a vis the inner Trinitarian love and (filial) obedience. (See the earlier 
section on'Freedom'). 
26 Hans Urs Von Baithasar, Spiritus Creator (Einsiedeln, 1967), p. 309 
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that the form of faith will always be Marian, the receptivity to let God do in me what he will. 27 
Our obedience finds concrete expression for Balthasar in our particular 
missions, those existential tasks received from and in Christ. Reception of this 
mission enables the human being as image of God (Abbild) to conform more 
and more to his likeness (Urbild), philosophically it enables the Geistessubjekt 
(spiritual subject) to become a person28 (as one hears oneself called an "I" by a 
"Thou") and it enables one to realise who one is and why one has been 
created. The particularity of each individual's mission emphasises the eternal 
election of each individual, who is known by God with a particular love and has 
a particular mission which s/he alone can fulfill. (For Balthasar this mission is 
tied to the ecclesial community in that Christ lets the church be by creating 
members, inserting them into his reality and giving each member a particular 
missio29. ) Our missio participates in Christ's missio and Christ's mission is not in 
any sense to be separated from the inner divine life; indeed Balthasar states 
that "the mystery of the Son's mission in the world is a purely Trinitarian 
mystery'30. The Son's missio is in a sense contained within His processio, or as 
Balthasar describes it in considering Christ's atonement, 
the Son's missio is his processio extended in "economic" mode; but whereas in his processio he 
moves toward the Father in receptivity and gratitude, in his misslo (thanks to the "Trinitarian 
inversion") he moves away from him and toward the world, into the latter's ultimate darkness. In 
fact, since all is obedience, he is moving toward the Father through this utter estrangement, but 
for the present he must not be allowed to know this. 31 
Our participation in the life of the Trinity can be seen to proceed through our 
faithful, obedient appropriation of our mission, our vocation. In this way we 
share in Christ's missio which is itself the "economic" aspect of the Son's 
27 John O"Donnell, 'Hans Urs Von Balthasar: The Form of his Theology', in Communio, vol. XVI, 
no. 3 (Fall 1989), p. 472 
28 Behind this understanding of human personhood lies Balthasar's understanding of Christ as 
person par excellence in being wholly receptive and thankfully self-giving in his obedient 
openness to the Father's mission. Certain Johannine texts carry particular weight for Baithasar, 
texts stressing Jesus' obedience to his heavenly Father, cf. Jn. 4: 34,6: 38,8: 28. 
29 ".. every grace also implies a mission (illustrated by the way baptism and confirmation belong 
together); and this mission has both a qualitative, personalising and socialising effect". Balthasar, 
Theodrama, Vol. 111,349. 
30 Balthasar, Christlicher Stand (Einsiedeln, 1977), p. 149 
31 Balthasar, Theodrama Vol. IV, p. 356. Elsewhere Balthasar clarifies the term "Trinitarian 
inversion"; "What we have termed "inversion" is ultimately only the projection of the immanent 
Trinity onto the "economic" plane, whereby the Son's "correspondence" to the Father is 
articulated as "obedience". " Theodrama, Vol. III, p. 191 
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processio from the Father, a processio involving filial thanksgiving, receptivity 
and obedient self-giving. Our human missio is our concrete participation in 
Jesus Christ and our participation within the Trinitarian life for Balthasar. 32 To 
see the full Trinitarian force of this understanding we should clarify the Spirit's 
place in our participation. What opens the Godhead to us according to 
Balthasar is the Holy Spirit, who processes from the love of the Father and the 
Son, being both the bond of their union and the opening of their love to the 
world (rather like a child within marriage). The Spirit manifests to the earthly 
Jesus the Father's will and only in the power of the Spirit is Jesus so radically 
open to the Father's will, ready to face even the human failure of his mission on 
the Cross and entrust his mission's completion to the Spirit after the 
Resurrection. Similarly our sense of mission is mediated by the Spirit 
(beginning with baptism), the Spirit of freedom and obedience, mediating the 
Christian's particular way of letting himself/herself be moulded by the archetypal 
figure of Christ, a letting-be ordered on obedience to the Father. At the same 
time the Spirit respects the distinction of believers and Christ, for this is the 
same Spirit who allows the Father and the Son to remain distinct and yet be 
joined in an unbreakable bond of love. 
There is one particularly pressing issue raised by this explication of human 
participation in God. To speak of our participation in the life of the Trinity brings 
us up against the problem of two traditions of thought concerning God and how 
they interact; that of the 'philosophical tradition', God the 'necessary, immutable, 
uncaused, omnipotent, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient and in every sense 
perfect' One33; and that of God as personal agent, the loving, merciful, 
righteous, faithful God of much of the Bible, tradition and human experience. In 
relation to participation, it is not immediately apparent how for example an 
eternal, immutable God is able to enable the sharing of temporal, mutable 
beings in His Godhead in ways involving personal loving relations. The issue is 
one which we encounter throughout our historical discussion of participation, 
right back to Plato whose two notions of participation (as 'sharing in a part of' 
and resemblance) reflect an analogous issue between the immanence and 
32 Missio for Balthasar appears to encompass all those divinely inspired actions in which we move 
out of ourselves towards God and others in freedom and love. Thus our missio is an ecstasis 
which includes sacramental, ecclesial and ethical components and which is as much (for example) 
a participation in Christ's priesthood as it is a participation in Christ's prophetic ministry. 
33 C. Schwoebel, God: Action and Revelation (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992), p. 50 
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transcendence of the Forms, an issue he finally left unresolved. We shall draw 
our study to a close with a discussion of this issue followed by a summary of our 
overall conclusions. 
Augustine's approach, focused on temporality and eternity, was to insert our 
human time into God's own time, and Balthasar following Augustine, wrote that 
"the extended structure of time can only be dissolved vertically, by being 
reinfolded in the freedom of transcending love"34. What this means exactly is 
difficult to fathom, but it reveals the intuition that the solution for Augustine and 
Baithasar is Christological: 
Christ descends into time and redeems our time from within. Since Jesus is the divine Logos 
made flesh, every moment of his existence is filled with eternity. Time is no longer futile. 35 
(Balthasar regards Jesus as embracing even the 'no time' of hell in his Holy 
Saturday descent to the realm of the dead). 
One difficulty with Balthasar's approach is the distance Baithasar seems to 
assume between creation and created time and the Godhead. Phrases such as 
Christ descends into time lull one into thinking of God's own time as operating 
'above' and perhaps parallel to created time, so that after a certain 'divine time' 
the Godhead enters our time in Jesus Christ. The truth of this way of thinking is 
that God is not bound by created time, but there is no sense in which time is 
'outside' God if by that we mean unrelated to the personal reality of God. Again 
Balthasar's use of Bulgakov's understanding of the processio of the Son from 
the Father gives the unmistakable impression that the self-generation of the 
Godhead is dominated by (an originally Platonic) cause-effect model. 36 It might 
be argued that this model indicates logical rather than temporal priority37 but 
this already suggests the necessity of a modification of this model of processio 
so that God is not understood as being subject to some kind of external time 
constraints analogous to created time's structure. Perhaps it is not that this 
34 Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Man in History (London: Sheed and Ward, 1967), p. 19. 
35 J. O'Donnell, Balthasar, pp. 147-8 
36 Zizioulas, following the Cappadocians, appears to err in this direction with his understanding of 
the Father as the "cause" both of the generation of the Son and of the procession of the Spirit". 
See his Being as Communion, p. 41 
37 Cyril of Alexandria for one was nervous of any language akin to cause-effect terminology where 
the Trinitarian persons were concerned because the (often-assumed) implication of the 
superiority of cause over effect might introduce a creeping subordinationism. See his Dialogus de 
Trinitate, J. P. Migne (ed. ), PatrologiaGraeca, 75.721,744. 
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model is incorrect so much as inadequate if it does not stand alongside a model 
which stresses the pneumatological drawing out of the Father's intentions, 
'retroactively' focusing the Father's aims and even crystallising those goals, 
whose 'achievement ' is the Son38. Taken together these two models imply that 
the Son is as much pneumatologically constituted as paternally caused. To 
these two models a third might tentatively be added, emphasising the Son's 
actualisation of the Father in and through the Spirit; there is no Father without 
the Son, who realises the Father's will in con-stituting (with the Holy Spirit) the 
Father's will through obedience. This third model is especially controversial as it 
could be taken as undermining the Father's priority, but the divine taxis as 
discerned through the narrative of Jesus Christ which gives content to such 
priority can still be retained on this understanding. 39 Further, this model is not to 
be taken in isolation. All three models are flawed if understood separately in the 
context of a temporality akin to the fixed past/present/future structure of created 
time but then again this is their virtue; that we can only understand these 
models together as they are subversive of being assimilated to some framework 
mirroring created time's structure. These models taken together stress the 
mutual co-constitution of the Godhead and it is this very action which, in its 
infinite variety and depth, gives sense to talk of God's time. 40 Created time can 
be understood within this time, God's gracious making room for creation within 
His triune life. Our participation in the Godhead depends on our sharing in this 
dynamic of co-constitution, not in the sense that we contribute to God's self- 
generation but in that primarily we allow this dynamic co-constitution to mould 
our way of being. Thus for example we participate in the relatedness of Father 
and Son as we allow our missio in Christ to correspond more closely to Christ's 
38 "If the Father is shown as "begetting" the Son and "breathing" the Spirit, the Spirit will be 
shown as "liberating" the Father and "achieving" the Son". R. W. Jenson, Unbaptized God, p. 139. 
39 What is undermined by this approach is the idea that the Monarchia is limited to one Person. 
We join with Gregory of Nazianzus, Calvin, T. F. Torrance and others in insisting that the whole 
Trinity and not just the Father is the arche of the Oneness of the Godhead; the Trinity is to be 
conceived as three Persons distinguished "not in status, but in position; not in substance but in 
form, not in power but in sequence". See Calvin's Institutes I. xiii. 26. Elsewhere Calvin seems to 
suggest that the divine taxis is an accommodation to our human ways of contemplating God, 
Institutes l. xiii. 1 8. Our speculative attempt to put flesh on this shared Monarchia is with a view to 
shedding light on our participation in the Godhead, but such speculation is rejected by some 
scholars as both unnecessary and inevitably fruitless; "We cannot know what God is in his One 
Being, for as such the Being of God is utterly beyond all finite comprehension; nor can we ever 
know how God is One Being, Three Persons, for that is beyond all finite explanation. But we may 
know who God is, for he has made himself personally known to us through the Incarnation of his 
Son, and the Communion of the Holy Spirit". T. F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives, p. 142. 
40 This assumes that time and events are not mutually extrinsic. 
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missio from the Father (faith, obedience, love) and this is a participation in the 
processio of the Spirit. We participate in the relation of Spirit and Father as we 
are obedient to the Father in the power of the Spirit, so constituting the Body of 
Christ (church). Finally we participate in the relation of Spirit and Christ, sharing 
in the establishment of the Father's will as we allow ourselves to be conformed 
to Christ through the Holy Spirit (e. g. fruits of the Spirit). These are participations 
in which ours is a responsive activity based on a prior receptivity to God which 
is itself God's gift. These dynamics are inter-related and as we share in them 
our time becomes God's time (e. g. the realised nature of eternal life in John's 
Gospel, Jn. 6: 54,68,17: 3). 
The intra-trinitarian relationships are outside of created time and within time in 
that created time is within God, the mode they assume within time being the 
personal, loving, merciful, just kind of relationships which Scripture describes. 
Yet these are the same relationships which are for example immutable (in that 
they are not ruled by temporal change to the extent of damaging this 
perichoresis), impassible (in that they are not impacted from outside in ways 
affecting their co-constituting nature) and omnipotent (in being governed by no 
power beyond these relationships). Precisely because these relationships have 
these qualities the persons of the Trinity are able to engage with humanity and 
creation in personal ways appropriate to humanity without endangering either 
the integrity of the Godhead or the security of creation's consummation. The 
question then arises as to the relationship between events in the life of Christ 
and those within the life of the immanent Trinity. Can these be argued to be one 
and the same, so that for example "the resurrection of Jesus was the executing 
of the triune God's unity with himself"41 or are they somehow separate? The 
difficulty with identification is the Hegelian danger of assuming the necessity of 
creation for God's self-constitution. 42 The difficulty with separation is that it 
would raise again the question of the authenticity and personal nature of God's 
engagement with creation. Perhaps we can answer this by still retaining the 
separation of the immanent trinity's constitution and the economic Trinity's 'self- 
41 R. W. Jenson, Unbaptized God, p. 140 
42 A further potential difficulty with identification is the contingency of historical events, 
contingencies which suggest God risks Himself in bringing creation to its appropriate 
consummation; e. g. God's ° identity with himself must truly be atriskas Moses and Pharaoh 
struggle or as Jesus dies". R. W. Jenson, Unbaptized God, p. 140. Such a risk might be regarded 
as ultimate love, but it might also be regarded as ultimate recklessness given that creation's only 
hope rests in God as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier! 
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repetition' for creation's sake. Might it not be possible to argue that God is 
indeed personally involved in (for example) the history of Jesus Christ in a 
passible, mutable way in being affected by creation (e. g. in ways not utterly 
dissimilar to human emotions such as anger, disappointment etc. ) but not in a 
manner destructive of the essential, mutually constituting relationships of the 
Trinitarian persons? The narrative of Good Friday indicates the profound effect 
of humanity's rejection of God on both the Father and the Son, while Easter Day 
indicates that the Triune relations are 'still' actively co-constituting. God's 
involvement is genuine but there is a quite proper refusal of God to risk His very 
being, out of love for creation, in that only as God remains God does creation's 
hoped for consummation remain possible. Much more would need to be said of 
course about the nature of God's passibility and mutability but this offers one 
possible way forward. 43 
8.10 Conclusion 
To conclude, the Classical conception of participation carries certain dangers 
when understood in relation to God. Anti-materialism, individualism, intellectual 
elitism and denial of particularity are some such dangers. Our study has led us 
43 One further question for example is whether the 'preexisting God-man Jesus Christ' (cf. Barth, 
C. D. 11.2, p. 110) is envisaged as humanly preexistent prior to the Incarnation or not. One solution 
to this dilemma is Kong's viewing of the humanity of God under the dual aspects sub specie 
temporis and sub specie aeternitatis. From our perspective one cannot speak of a pre-temporal 
Jesus whereas, from God's eternal perspective on past, present and future, the human Jesus is 
always with God as the elected one and as the Lord of time. "This is'the realm of eternity. It is 
impossible to speak simply in the strict sense of a non-incarnate logos'. While God is God without 
humanity, he wills to be God with humanity, so that there is'a single and indivisible knowledge 
through which he knows himself as the one who freely became man in the Son. Hence the eternal 
Logos knows himself as Logos only by knowing himself simultaneously as incarnate; and only as 
Logos incarnate is the eternal Logos known also by the Father and the Holy Spirit. " See John 
Thompson's article "Jüngel on Barth", in The Possibilities of Theology: Studies in the Theology of 
Eberhard Jüngel in his Sixtieth Year (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. 167 A potential problem with 
this view is that it stands in danger of eternalising all the events of Christ's life from a divine 
perspective, so that Jesus' agony is eternal, as is Holy Saturday, as is His birth. But the sense in 
which we relate to the risen Jesus as human is given substance by the completed nature of his 
life, death and resurrection, not by the everlasting presence of the events which make up the 
narrative of his human life. Put another way, the Ascension has already happened in the life of 
God. This problem can be addressed by recalling Boethius' point that the presence to God of all 
time is due to God's primacy rather than being a property of time. If God has all time present to 
mind, this need not entail all time is timelessly actual. John Simons argues "that the eternal now 
may be conceived on the model of the conscious present in respect of the co-presence of 
simultaneity and succession, so that it is not unreasonable to think of all temporal events present 
to God both in their unchanging order and in their unfolding succession". See his'Eternity, 
Omniscience and Temporal Passage: A Defence of Classical Theism', Review of Metaphysics, 
Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 567 
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to suggest an understanding of participation based more on the scriptural 
pointers to a Christian notion of participation, particularly those ways of 
conceiving the term found in Paul's letters. Our participation in God is rooted in 
God's participation in our human condition in the person of Christ. Ontologically 
our relationship with God has been transformed by dint of Christ's life, death, 
resurrection and ascension and it remains for us to affirm fully the new creation 
we are in Christ, or as God relates to us in Christ through the Holy Spirit. (This 
participation is distinguished from the perichoretic relations of the Trinitarian 
persons, the latter involving mutual constitution, the former suggestive of 
(ongoing) dependence). Our freedom to affirm our new creation in Christ is a 
freedom whose possibility is realised through the initiating action of God and 
whose exercise is primarily God's conforming of ourselves to Himself in Christ 
through the action of the Holy Spirit. (Thus participation is about sharing in that 
human-Godward movement we find archetypally given in the Son's relation to 
the Father in the Spirit. ) Such participation is implicit in our creation (which is 
also our election), and in fact this aspect (or tier) of participation is symbolised in 
baptism, where our initial passivity and God's prior activity provide the ground 
for our correspondent participatory response to His creation, election and 
redemption of human beings. Thus two tiers of participation can be 
distinguished (though they must not be severed from one another). Participation 
covers both justification and sanctification on this view, both being rooted in the 
person and work of Christ and thus giving continuity to our being and becoming. 
Our active participation in God is our participation in God's encounter with the 
world and in particular this involves active membership of the church, Christ's 
body. Sacramental, ethical, epistemological and ecclesial dimensions to our 
participation are all essential and go together as we realise ourselves ever 
more closely to be the human beings God seeks us to be in (relation to Himself 
through the Spirit in) Christ. Such an approach does not undermine 
eschatology because, as we have seen, it is possible to understand progressive 
participation as a continual rolling back of our initiative apart from God, 
recognising and reconciling ourselves more and more to God's loving 
movement towards us and in us, a movement which will be concluded 
eschatologically with God's perfecting of ourselves and creation. The 
eschatological perfectedness of creation and in particular of human beings is 
not a question of deification but about an embracing of our God-given humanity 
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(recreated in Christ), dependent, derived and distinct from God and whose 
perfectedness implies right relatedness with our fellow human beings and 
creation as well as with God. This participation can be understood as a 
participation in God not in the sense of a substantial sharing or crude 
ontological assimilation but in terms of relations with the persons of the Trinity 
(and with fellow human beings) which both correspond to and are distinct from 
the intra-trinitarian relations. Aspects of this correspondence-in-distinction have 
been highlighted. 
Different dimensions of participation can be distinguished and related in all of 
this. We are given to participate in Christ's ontologically reconciled humanity but 
it remains for us to 'grow into' this new being. This is realised as we participate 
in Christ's response to the Father by pneumatologically dependent relations 
analogous and corresponding to the Son's relation to the Father and Jesus' 
relation to his neighbours. This brings a participation in Jesus' life, knowing and 
communion with the Father and the Spirit which is to be understood primarily as 
Christ's timely conformation of us to Himself through the Spirit. 
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